SERVICE TO THE CAUSE

Many times, because the Peshwas were busy in bigger external activities it would cause inconvenience to Shahu, and his problems would become unbearable to others in his company. The below letter by Tarabai is an example, “Matushree Aaisaheb (Tarabai) has ordered Bajirao Pandit Pradhan. We desire that you should come here, and our son (Shahu), and you discuss together, act towards the expansion of the kingdom, get orders issued as per your convenience. But your visit would occur after much time, and he has reached the limits of his endurance. Therefore, by ensuring his satisfaction, running the whole administration yourself is appropriate for you. Son does not pay anybody else any attention apart from you. You too should not increase suspicion on both sides. What more to write in detail (19 April 1739).”

Once the Peshwas began working with authority, the work being performed by other Pradhans did not remain that much important. Sumant was the one looking after external affairs. Senapati was the one engaging in warfare. But the Peshwa himself began acting as the Senapati, and appointing his own independent emissaries at external courts, and began dealing with the external states through his own orders. Due to this, the previous Ashtapradhan (Council of eight ministers) system was automatically rendered useless. It was anyways in decline at the time of Tarabai.

A servant who would keep troubling his master about what he should do, and how to do it, was of no use. Such type of letters from the Pratinidhi are often visible, which are conspicuously absent from Bajirao. The following letter from the Pratinidhi is a good example, “The Swami’s whole force lifted camp and left. Everybody remains hungry for want of money. Hearing this, the servant is pained a lot. It is a very difficult situation. Money is nowhere to be found, neither are there any loans available. We are sending fifty gold coins for your service.” Many times, the incessant complaints from the Sardars would come to a head, that people would not last in their forces; nobody would serve wholeheartedly; they would simply desert in emergency situations; they would get up and leave; then the Sardars had to grovel in front of them requesting them to stay back. This was the reason for Shahu to favour Bajirao so much. Shahu tested everybody under him, and only after that trusted Bajirao completely.

Bajirao and Chimaji implemented the standard Maratha campaign policy, wherein they would first establish their authority and terror through their own prowess, or at times using force; would render the region desolate; after that, displaying concern about industry, artisanship, people’s welfare, stabilizing the region; beginning enterprises like moneylending and through them acquiring kingdom and money; in Malwa, Bundelkhand etc. provinces.

When Bajirao’s name and fame spread all over the country, many people from the Nizam’s or other external courts became eager to serve him. In those times, enticing servants of other powers and aligning them to our own cause had become a commonly deployed tactic. Such competition would be constantly going on between Shahu and Kolhapur’s Sambhaji II. “When the revered Mother (Bajirao’s mother, Radhabai) went for pilgrimage, Sawai Jaisingh gave his forces to accompany her. In it, Dileep Singh was at the forefront, and led one-hundred-and-fifty cavalrymen. He is very clever and strong. He intends to send his son along with one-hundred to a hundred-and-fifty Rauts in Rau Swami’s service. If you order, they will bring their forces.” This was a letter dated 5 May 1737 written by Vyankaji Ram to Bajirao. This shows that even the people in the north had begun feeling like serving the Peshwas.

Even though Bajirao did not show any mercy in punishing the guilty, he would extremely religiously provide profuse encouragement to appreciate people serving under him, and take good care of all under him. There are many documents available which contain such encouragement. One sample is as follows. Bajirao wrote to Mahipatrao Shinde, “You have written your intent, which we understood. Whatever Trimbak Gopal relates to you, consider them our own utterances, act accordingly, and save the day. Whatever is the situation, you already understand. In such a situation, defeating the cruel, and acquiring name for ourselves, is the right thing to do, but you already understand this well. Your father has toiled hard for the kingdom and achieved great fame. After him, if you too hold your loyalty and perform great deeds, then it would be beneficial for you. Maintain your army well, break the teeth of your enemies, and write home satisfying news regularly. We will not block your progress.”

The Peshwas also employed Mahars and Mangs in the infantry, and would encourage all the castes equally. Many specific men like Arabs, Kolis, Mavalas, Rangdas (Rajputs), sailors, gunners were needed for many specific tasks. And they were not always available to hand in times of need. The task of maintaining a well-appointed army was always difficult. Nowadays, the army remains in control through well-laid rules. This was not the case during the time of Maratha Confederacy. Due to this, many times there were incidents of defeat at the crunch time.

To be continued…

CHAVHAN FAMILY

The description of the campaign is funny, and as follows, “They marched-off and decided that they will cover a distance of two to three Kos per day. On an auspicious chosen occasion, they entered the campaign-encampment. Everybody, including the stables, cavalrymen, and personal security guards arrived there. Artillery was readied up and brought there. All the Sardars were instructed to retain some forces at their native places and join the campaign with two, four or five thousand of their men. They, accordingly, complied as per the appointments. They were given rules regarding where in the convoy they would travel and how they will march. Senadhurandhar (Chief of the Army) and Senasahebsuba Bhosales were appointed at the head of the convoy. Pratinidhi, Chief Pradhan, Amatya, Sachiv, and Mantri were appointed on the right-hand side of the battle formation. Panditrao, Sumant and Nyayadhish (Chief Justice) were named on the left-hand side. Chitnis, Potnis etc. clerical office-bearers were appointed to the right-hand side of the travelling store of the convoy. Fadnis and Daptarkothi (Store Office) were appointed on the left-hand side. Relatives, protocol holders and Fatehsingh Bhosale were appointed on the right-hand side. On the rear, Appaji Somvanshi Sarlashkar and the other protocol bearers assisting him were appointed. The cavalry of the Huzoorat (personal security contingent) was appointed in front of Chhatrapati’s tent, and the assistants were appointed as per their masters. They were given instructions that everybody should travel in the convoy as per their appointed place, and there should be no crowding or commotion. Maharaj himself had been in the imperial convoys of the Mughals. According to that, it was decided that all the renowned diplomats, Pradhans, and Sardars were to sit in howdahs atop elephants. The Zenana was to follow Maharaj himself, and behind them forty to fifty elephants bearing their howdahs filled with dignitaries were to march. The artillery was to travel out front, banners and shields in front of it, and near them, the Garad (type of guards), Karol (another type of infantry soldiers), and cavalry was instructed to march. Senadhurandhar Biniwale (literally meaning vanguard) was to march in front of everyone. The frontline Sardars were to march as per their banners. After them, their Jilib (the retinue), various types of battlefield instruments, behind them the retinue elephants, horses, chariots, and camel riders were to march. Behind them the instruments like Nagaras, Shahajane, the band contingent, raiders, and behind them attendants were to walk. On the way, the water carriers were to march ahead of everyone sprinkling the ground with water. Marching for two to three Kos like this, everybody should walk up to their tents by accepting obeisance from the frontline cavalrymen who would have reached earlier to set up camp. They reached the Umbraj halt taking stops this way. They had to enter the Carnatic province thereafter, for which some cavalrymen were dispatched towards the destination, and encamped at Umbraj. They used to go on hunts with Pradhans and Sardars. Shripatrao Pratinidhi, as per the orders, attacked Udaji Chavhan and warned him, and brought him along to meet Maharaj. The next year, he was given armament, and was dispatched to capture the Miraj station which was under Mughal control. Bahiropant Pingle’s son Appajirao was in a sad mood because the office of the Peshwa was taken away from his family. To test him, he was given a Sardar named Santaji Dubal along with thirty thousand force and he was dispatched as well. They went and besieged the fort. But the fort had strong construction and good protection. They could not achieve much. Therefore, the Pratinidhi was ordered to attack the next day and capture the fort. The attack occurred the next day. The northeast turret fell under the cannon-fire. The men planted their standard atop the fort and captured it. Fifty to a hundred men lost their lives. Around fifty were wounded. Our force went to the fort, besieged it, and subjected it to a barrage of cannon-fire. Upon that, the castellan of the fort sued for peace and handed over the fort on 3 October 1739. After that, Maharaj himself went personally to inspect the fort. Dhulgaon’s Baloji s/o Shivaji Salunke (alias Dubal) was assisting the Patwardhan family. He was given the command of the Miraj station and after settling down the security of the province, Maharaj returned.”

This Dubal was a relative of Sakwarbai and used to favour the Pratinidhi. Due to this, it was felt that it was not appropriate to keep such an important fort under his command, and Bhausaheb removed it from Dubal in the Sangola campaign later and gave it to Shivaji Ballal Joshi. Shivaji Ballal’s daughter Ramabai was later married to Madhavrao. After this, in 1760, Nanasaheb gave the fort to the Patwardhans.

Shahu went out in a campaign in ceremonial style and camped at Umbraj for two years. From there, he dispatched many Sardars from time to time on various tasks. He too stepped out once in a while. Some of the stories of the auxiliary campaigns are available. “Chandrasen Jadhav took Udaji Chavhan along and had come down to the region around Beed. They have gathered the various local gangs of Veerappa and have wrought havoc in the region. We understood this from your letter. To resolve this issue, the Swami has dispatched Fatehsingh Bhosale, Rajashree Raghuji Bhosale, Rajashree Shambhusingh Jadhavrao, Sarlashkar Appaji Somvanshi etc. along with some force. All four of them would soon arrive there. You are advised to join with them and display your loyal service.” This was a letter written by Shahu on 25 January 1739, to Haibatrao Bangar Amir-ul-Umrao.

In the ensuing battle Veerappa was captured alive, and the opposing force was defeated. Due to this, Shahu was very happy, and on 24 March 1739, he wrote appreciation letters to many big and small Sardars. The camp was set up at Umbraj and near Miraj for two full years. “After that, he went to Shree Chafal religious place, sought blessings from the deity, performed ritual worship, charitable feasts, and returned to Satara. He got special worships performed at all the temples in the city. Pylons were erected all over the city. The whole city was decorated by traditional rangolis. Everybody presented him with gifts. On the roads in front of their houses, many ladies stood to perform traditional Aartis. Maharaj entered the palace in ceremonial style.”

Even while on campaign, Shahu used to visit religious places like Pune, Jejuri, Shambhu Mahadev, Pratapgad etc. as per the occasion. In the Miraj campaign, Udaji Chavhan began supplying provisions to the enemy. For that, Shahu dispatched the Pratinidhi to attack him. Due to that, Chavhan ran away to Mughal realms. On 8 November 1739, Pratinidhi captured the Athni station belonging to the Chavhans, and planted Maharaj’s standard there at the stroke of midnight. After that too, Chavhan kept troubling Shahu once in a while. In 1748, Shahu ordered Trimbakrao Somvanshi to settle this Chavhan matter permanently. After Shahu, Nanasaheb in 1751, tactfully enticed Udaji to desert the Mughals, join him, and placed him at Digraj with protocol office. However, Udaji was never cured of his wayward nature in his lifetime. In 1752-53, Nanasaheb himself had to take out campaign against him. Udaji once went on a campaign to Goa. At that time, his horse was hit by a bullet and went awry. Udaji’s foot was caught up in the stirrup, he fell down, his head hit a stone and he died (24 November 1762). His sons, Vithoji remained at Digraj, while second Preetirao served Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj at Karweer seat.

To be continued…

BAJIRAO-JAISINGH MEETING

A slightly different description of the visit to Udaipur is found in a nineteenth-century text named Veer Vinod. It says, “The Peshwa visited Udaipur by invitation and camped at Champa Baugh. About the meeting with the Maharana, he was told, ‘You are a servant of Satara, and even Satara’s king cannot sit on the throne of Udaipur. You should therefore be treated on par with the Pradhan.’ The Peshwa then said, ‘I am a Brahmin, so I have to be accorded greater respect and a higher status.’ The Maharana agreed and placed two cushions in front of his throne; on the first he seated Bajirao Peshwa, on the second he seated his Purohit. Since that day, the priest of Udaipur sits in front of the throne. The Peshwa bid farewell to Udaipur and left for Jaipur.”

Proceeding from Udaipur to Nathdwara, Bajirao sought blessings from the deity there along with his wife. Of course, Kashibai had accompanied Bajirao on the campaign.

Sawai Jaisingh was the most active Rajput prince in the first half of the eighteenth century with a long career of nearly four decades from the reign of Aurangzeb. He was a powerful voice amongst Mohammedshah’s counsels. His earlier policy of using the Marathas to grasp the entire territory between the Narmada and the Chambal had failed as Bajirao was determined to have it all for himself. The Jodhpur Raja Abhay Singh’s desire to rule Gujarat also fell through with the Peshwa’s own aggression. After three terms as Subedar of Malwa, the last few years had seen Jaisingh’s position to be somewhat diminished in relation to the Peshwa; and from being his patron, he had become a supporter and more of an equal. In the military field, Jaisingh had faced a defeat at the hands of the Marathas more than once, and his present posture of an accommodating politician was the result of experience gained in diplomacy and on the battlefield. Jaisingh now looked forward to meeting the Peshwa to conciliate him while persuading the Badshah to concede Maratha demands. It was to be a stern test of diplomacy.

Before the Peshwa reached Jaipur, in March 1736, Maratha armies had locked up Bangash in a ravine in the wedge between the Chambal and Kunwari rivers. Baji Bhivrao, who had enforced the siege, wrote to Bajirao, “It is clear that Bangash is a coward.”

Bhivrao had completed all the tasks in the region and collected dues. With negotiations on at Jaipur, Bajirao wrote to Baji Bhivrao to stop the fighting. Baji Bhivrao replied on 5 April 1736, acknowledging the Peshwa’s instructions, “To sum up, you have said, ‘What is the point in fighting for trivial gains when a major undertaking is underway?’ I may therefore not cross the Yamuna. You are meeting Sawaiji shortly and Khan Dauran is expected to come from Delhi. You should recall your armies from Marwar and keep them near you.”

Bajirao’s meeting with Sawai Jaisingh was altogether different from the one at Udaipur. Bajirao did not accord Jaisingh precedence in rank as he had at Udaipur. Some newsletters of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries give us a graphic account of many meetings between the two rulers that give us an insight in the ceremonial meetings of the age.

On 4 March Bajirao met Jaisingh near Kishangad at Bambhola. The Marathi letters mention this occurred at Manoharpur. The moment the elephants carrying both came in front of each other, both of them got down, embraced each other, and sat on the same larger seat. Jaisingh was at least twenty years elder to Bajirao. Bajirao felt it was mandatory for him to secure Jaisingh’s support.

The Vansh Bhaskar gives an account of the Peshwa’s meeting with Sawai Jaisingh, “As the Peshwa approached Bhambola, a place east of Kishangad, Jaisingh set out to meet him. Jaisingh demanded the same status at the meeting as the Rana of Udaipur. However, Bajirao refused, saying, ‘The Rana of Udaipur was greater, and was equal to the Raja of Satara as he never accepted the Mughal as a master, while the king of Jaipur was a servant of the Yavana (Mughal), and was always at their house owing to his covetousness. Hence, count me as your superior. However, today I will accord you an equal status. We will therefore, sit on two cushions of equal stature. I will be to the right and you will be on my left.’ Hearing this voice of the strong, Jaisingh agreed to sit on the same cushion.

“At the meeting place, both armies came face to face. A tent was erected in the middle. Both Bajirao and Jaisingh alighted from their elephant and sat knee to knee on the same cushion. The Brahmin (Peshwa) asked for the hookah and began blowing smoke. The smoke annoyed Jaisingh, but he kept quiet. The ministers from the Deccan were then summoned, save Malharrao Holkar, as he had fought with Jaisingh over Bundi, and Bajirao pledged not to insist on reinstating Budh Singh at this meeting. The meeting then ended with Jaisingh asking Bajirao to come back with a well-prepared army from the Deccan to attain his objectives.”

To be continued…

RAIGAD RECAPTURED

While supporting Siddi Abdul Rehman at Danda-Rajpuri, Bajirao was also keeping an open channel of communication with the Siddi’s men on the fort of Raigad. In a letter to Ambajipant Purandare on 24 May 1733, Bajirao explained the situation for the king’s benefit, “The senior Khanzada died. His son was outside, he is now with us. There are six younger brothers. This boy is clever. Siddi Sambool and Siddi Ambar Afwani are in the fort (Janjira). Twelve hundred men are on the fort, earlier there were just a few. Recently they had help from Anjanvel and Underi. Anjanvel is strong; so is Underi. All four forts have watchful Muslims in them. They have grabbed Mandangad. Rajgad has three to four hundred Muslims and four to five hundred Marathas. The fort is strong, they are fighting. Some messages have also gone up.”

Therefore, to finish this Konkan campaign quickly, Shahu gave additional forces with Sardars like Shrinivasrao Pratinidhi, new Sarlashkar Anandrao Somvanshi, Krishnaji Dabhade etc. around 20 May. Shahu also ordered Udaji Chavhan, Shambhusingh Jadhav, and Sachiv to dispatch their forces to Konkan. As per Shahu’s orders, the Pratinidhi entered Konkan in the month of May. Even while he had been directed there earlier, he was moving quite slowly. On 25 May, the Pratinidhi camped at Mahad. On 26 May 1733 Bajirao once again wrote to Purandare explaining how the campaign can end successfully, “Pratinidhi has come to Mahad, but it is of no use. If he goes to Anjanvel and enforces a siege it will immobilise the Habshi. The Habshi is not an ordinary enemy. Earlier, he had just Janjira, but could not be defeated. But if he has to be destroyed completely, it will need lot of hard work, a blockade from all sides with an armada, lot of money will have to be spent. An army of at least fifteen thousand with five to seven thousand having guns… if all this is done, in a year or two, Janjira will be captured. In the fort, they have the material needed for ten years, but a blockade and not allowing his ships to go out alone will help us succeed. The Swami’s destiny is great, but if there is an obstacle to this, it may take longer. The Siddi has two powerful arms, one is Anjanvel, the other is Underi. It will be good of the Pratinidhi goes to Anjanvel, then the Sarkhel can do something at Underi. Once these two are captured, his morale will be low. Raigad also has to be captured and one and a half to two thousand men will be needed there. This is the overview of this entire campaign.”

The Peshwa was also strapped for funds. Explaining that a salary of five rupees has to be paid in the Konkan region against three on the plateau, the Peshwa wrote to Purandare, “Huge expenses are needed here. The work is the Swami’s, the kingdom belongs to the Swami, and therefore the expense will also have to be borne by the Swami. I cannot take loans to run the campaign. If the master provides funds, I will stake my life to gain success in the campaign. If the kingdom is lost, it will be the Swami’s. From my side there will be no deficiency of service.”

Yashwantrao Potnis had engineered some plan to capture the Raigad fort nearby. Bajirao had begun his movements according to that plan. But without informing Bajirao, Pratinidhi hatched up a different plan to capture this historic capital fort, a place for the ‘Maratha throne’. He kept confabulating with the Siddi’s men on the fort. These talks led to a breakthrough and the impregnable fort of Raigad was handed over to the Pratinidhi’s men on 8 June 1733. Due to this act of the Pratinidhi, of getting into Konkan and immediately conquering the important station like Raigad, the court showered huge amount of praise on him. There was widespread jubilation at this stupendous success. Shahu’s joy knew no bounds. But the Peshwa was incensed due to this. For one, the plan was for the Pratinidhi to meet the Peshwa at Rajpuri and then plan his moves. But the Pratinidhi even refused to meet the Peshwa. He planned a completely different scheme, and without allowing the Peshwa get a wind of it, had captured Raigad. Pratinidhi’s refusal to join forces for unified action had angered the Peshwa. Bajirao’s heart already had mixed feelings about Pratinidhi, and due to this act, the hatred amongst the two went on increasing and the campaign was thrown to the wind. To ensure the Pratinidhi did not succeed, Bajirao instigated Bankaji Naik through Sekhoji Angre, and the castellan of Anjanvel, Siddi Saat through secret messages.

Hearing the news reports of capital Raigad’s capture, Shahu wrote a letter in his own hand on 20 June 1733, as follows, “Do whatever it takes to protect the captured station. If God wills, we will come to inspect Rairee and Vaje forts in the month of Shravan. The task which was not accomplished by Rajashree Shivaji Maharaj, Rajashree Abasaheb Sambhaji Maharaj, Kakasaheb (Rajaram Maharaj), and Mother Tarabai, has now been taken to its conclusion by Fatehsinghbaba and Rajashree Pradhan. This fame has spread in all three worlds, up to Nizam-ul-Mulk, and even up to Delhi. Do whatever it takes to maintain this fame untouched.”

To be continued…

THE AFTERMATH

Nobody felt it right that two Sardars serving the same imperial seat clashed with each other and the Senapati was killed at the Peshwa’s hands. However, nobody felt that all the injustice was committed by Bajirao alone. The general opinion expressed was that the Senapati got a punishment for his actions. By joining the Nizam, the Senapati had begun treason. If Bajirao had not defeated him, another crisis would have fallen upon the whole Maratha kingdom. Even Shahu had waited till the last emergency situation before ordering Bajirao to break the back of the Senapati’s revolt. Shahu was forced to take such an action to ensure that the erstwhile actions of Chandrasen were not repeated by Dabhade. However, Senapati was powerful. Recognising this, Bajirao and Chimaji played their hand carefully and cornered him. There was no reason for Bajirao to wish for killing the Senapati. If he had agreed to come and meet Shahu or had been captured alive, Bajirao’s responsibility would have been fulfilled. But Trimbakrao was fierce and remained a little inattentive, which is why he was caught unawares. Seeing that Bajirao and Chimaji themselves were on their way to attack, many of the Senapati’s colleagues deserted him. Later, Shahu behaved with generosity and keeping the kingdom’s benefits in mind resolved the matter. It is important to keep in mind, that while this whole Dabhade affair was raging this side, Shahu got the Sambhaji II affair resolved by forcing him to come to terms and got the Warana Treaty agreed.

In the monsoon of 1731, this whole Dabhade affair was negotiated. To console Umabai, Shahu himself went to Talegaon. On the way, seeking the blessings from deities at Shree Shambhu-Mahadev and Jejuri, he tried to wash away his sins accrued to him due to the Senapati’s assassination. He forced Bajirao and Chimaji Appa to bow down at Umabai’s feet and got her to pardon them. He got both the parties to agree to terms like finalising the boundaries of Malwa and Gujarat, depositing half the revenues of the Swarajya through the Peshwa into the government treasury, utilising the remaining half for the expenses of the army and the Senapati household, submitting the accounts of the revenues regularly to the government on time, arranging for the expenses of the army, and depositing the offerings in kind with Maharaj. He conferred upon Trimbakrao’s brother Yashwantrao the protocol garments of the Senapati, those of Senakhaskhel on another brother Baburao, appointed Pilaji as the steward of the Dabhades, and decided that both should obey Umabai as the elder. In a letter dated 15 January 1737, the following reference appears, “Umabai and Pradhan finally buried the hatchet. She visited Pune. He too visited Talegaon. It was very good.” But this amity did not last long. It is evident from Shahu’s diary, that Umabai and the Dabhades stopped participating in the enterprise of Swarajya.

The above agreement with the Senapati is especially memorable. Even though to console Umabai, Shahu had decided that the Peshwa should not intervene in matters relating to Gujarat, he put in place rules like the Senapati should act under the authority of the Peshwa, they should provide all accounts to him, and a fixed portion of all the incomes should be deposited with the government. This meant that the Peshwas were forced to pick up weapons against the Sardars who would not deposit the fixed portion of their incomes to the government, or would not provide detailed accounts to get their act together. The Sardars began giving excuses with respect to the accounts and stopped providing them to the government. There were numerous instances later where the Peshwa had to use force to bring them on track. The dispute between Nanasaheb Peshwa and Raghuji Bhosale of Nagpur arose in a similar fashion. But Shahu intervened in a timely manner to stop it. For now, Bajirao removed his attention from Gujarat completely. Later, Nanasaheb kept this memory of his father alive, and strove for many years to finally acquire half of the Gujarat revenues in 1752 from the Gaikwads as per the initial agreement.

After Trimbakrao, the Senapati family did not see an equally valorous warrior. Yashwantrao was an addict. He was not able to show anything in the cause of the nation. Due to this, Gaikwad got the opportunity to step forward. Hereafter, the Dabhades lost their erstwhile capability and Gaikwads began to take care of the Gujarat administration with complete authority. However, the Dabhade family retained the epithet of Senapati. If Shahu had taken away the office of the Senapati from Dabhade and had given it to Gaikwad, the moment he realised that Yashwantrao did not deserve it, Shahu’s awe would have prevailed. But this was not possible while Umabai was still alive. Umabai was duly respected by Shahu and the Peshwas too. After Shahu’s death, Dabhade again tried to revolt against Nanasaheb Peshwa.

To be continued…

BATTLE PREPARATIONS

Bajirao had appointed Holkar on the task of keeping an eye on the movements of Nizam and Bangash. He carried out that task excellently. In the first three months of 1731, sometimes facing him, sometimes without facing, Holkar had completely harassed Bangash. However, Nizam was alert and had kept conspiring against Bajirao. Kanthaji Kadam and his brother Raghuji alias Sawai Katsingh began acting against Bajirao. They joined Trimbakrao Dabhade and Pilaji Gaikwad. While Bajirao was roaming around keeping an eye on the Nizam, these three together wrought havoc in the Khandesh regions belonging to the Peshwa, and began troubling the Pradhan forces. For this, in the November of 1730, Shahu protested against these three Sardars.

Collusion between the Nizam and Bangash was not something the Badshah would like. He had ordered Bangash, that he should defeat the Marathas in Malwa first, and then defeat the Nizam too. Until the two actually met, at least the Nizam’s force was under the impression, that the Nizam would now open hostilities against Bangash. Instead, when they met each other over the Narmada, and began colluding to conspire together, the Badshah decided not to oppose the Marathas thinking that these two together will become difficult to manage for him. The Bakhar historians write the reasons behind the dispute between Dabhades and Bajirao as follows –

“Even when Nizam-ul-Mulk had entered into a treaty with Bajirao, he had not forgotten how Bajirao had caused him great humiliation of defeat. He thought about extracting his vengeance without openly showing up himself. He thought Trimbakrao Dabhade was a useful candidate for the same. He and Bajirao were already against each other. Feeling the injustice because the Gujarat Chauth and Sardeshmukhi was snatched from his hands, Dabhade began amassing his force with an intention to fight with the Peshwa. And introducing this dissension in the Maratha leadership of the time, the Nizam began conspiring against Bajirao. After gathering 35 thousand strong force, he assumed that the Nizam would provide him help, and got ready for attacking the Deccan. He began declaring in the general public, that he served the Maratha Chhatrapati, whose kingdom was occupied by Bajirao, which he was on his way to restore back. Maintaining this, he took assistance from Pilaji Gaikwad, Kanthaji and Raghuji Kadam Bande, Udaji and Anandrao Pawar, and Chimnaji Damodar. The moment the Peshwa came to know this, he too reached Khandesh along with his army on Gujarat borders. At that time, Bajirao did not have even half the army as compared to the Dabhades. Bajirao got all the information about the conspiracy hatched by Dabhades and Nizam-ul-Mulk together. He informed all that to Shahu. The conspiracy also involved breaking down the Maratha kingdom into two parts, and giving some of it to Kolhapur’s Sambhaji II. Due to this, Shahu became angry with the Senapati.”

The moment the treaty with Sarbuland Khan was agreed, Chimaji Appa went to Umbraj and met Shahu Maharaj on 8 July 1730. Bajirao too was probably with him. It is probable that they had discussions for fifteen days to a month and decided the future course of action. Referring to the documents from Shahu’s diary, one does not get an impression that Shahu’s attention involved information about any conspiracies in any external regions beyond the two adjacent areas of Satara and Panhala. Shahu used to keep incessantly engrossed in using his influence, awe and sometimes threats to resolve the Patilki, Deshmukhi disputes amongst the Sardars in the regions adjoining to him like Thorat, the Sarlashkar, Shambhusingh Jadhav, Somvanshi etc. But it does not seem like Shahu’s heart had any inkling about the activities of his Sardars at places like Malwa, Gujarat, Berar, Nagpur etc. or those of the imperial Umraos, the actual huge form they were taking, and the effect they would have on his kingdom.

Keeping detailed news about various parties and opponents, recognising the future policy through that, in the monsoon of 1730, Bajirao had begun his preparations secretly. Shahu was convinced that the Senapati was actively opposing him. Deciding and agreeing the plan with Maharaj that he would enter Gujarat, tactfully bring the Senapati to meet Maharaj, by preventing a meeting between him and the Nizam, Bajirao arrived in Gujarat in the month of August. Making the arrangements for the impending campaign there, on 10 October 1730, on the occasion of Dussehra he encamped at the Sangam (confluence), and embarked on the campaign along with Chimaji Appa. He returned back to Pune only after wrapping up the Dabhoi campaign on 14 May next.

Nizam began his havoc in the regions. His conspiracy with the Dabhades was put into action. Kadam Bande, Pawar etc. Sardars began acting against the Peshwa. Kolhapur’s Pradhan Chimnaji Damodar also joined the Senapati’s conspiracy. Bangash and Nizam were to begin working together. Recognising all these things beforehand, Bajirao decided to carry out his plan with fortitude. Here, Shahu was trying to appease the Nizam, Jaisingh, and Udaipur’s Rana by sending them garments etc. Bajirao’s assistants like Aavji Kavde, Ambaji Purandare, Raghunathji Prabhu, Aayaba Mujumdar, Fadnis etc. people arrived near Surat via Baswada gauging the situation at various places. Bajirao informed Shahu about Kanthaji Kadam’s trespass and secured his permission to check him. From 6 December up to the end of January, Bajirao himself travelled from Surat, Bharuch, Vadodara to Nadiad. On 29 January 1731, he took away the revenue rights belonging to the Pawars in that region.

To be continued…

SARBULAND KHAN YIELDS

Shahu had distributed the provinces for campaigning amongst all the Sardars independently. The Peshwa did not agree with this. Due to this kind of arrangement, the Marathas would not remain unified, every one of the Sardars would separate out from the central administration, and due to that the kingdom will lose its strength. For all these reasons, the Peshwa felt that, the chief Pradhan should keep a watch and be the authority everywhere, everybody should act within the Peshwa’s orders, and the Peshwas and Maharaj signified the central government. To establish this arrangement, the Peshwas had to struggle against Senapati Dabhade, Angre, Raghuji and Fatehsingh Bhosale etc. Sardars. The Peshwas were forced to accept this undesirable task to establish a unified administration from time to time.

In Gujarat, Bande and Pawar were campaigning on behalf of Shahu, while Pilaji Gaikwad was working on behalf of the Senapati. A dispute arose between Bande and Pilaji, and they fought a passionate battle in the month of April 1725 near Khambayat. In it, Pilaji was defeated and went towards Kheda. Kanthaji collected one thousand rupees from Khambayat. There was a British factory there, from where Kanthaji had demanded five thousand rupees. Shahu felt this dispute between two of his Maratha Sardars was hurtful. Actually, the dispute between Peshwa and Senapati had been picked up by their assistants Kadam and Gaikwad. Shahu was trying for a compromise between the two from his side. Just then, Bajirao also dispatched Udaji Pawar to Gujarat to collect Chauth. Pilaji opposed him. Udaji and Pilaji fought a battle at Dabhoi and Udaji captured the fortress there. Upon this, Kanthaji and Pilaji got together, and attacked Udaji. Then Udaji left Gujarat alone and ran away to Malwa. Here Kanthaji and Pilaji set up their permanent outposts at Vadodara and Dabhoi. Similarly, Kanthaji Kadam’s adopted son Krishnaji captured Champaner and set up his control there.

At this time, half of the revenues of Gujarat used to be with Chimaji Appa, which was taken away by Shahu on 31 July, and was given to Khanderao Dabhade for building a corpus. Still, Khanderao did not desist from encroaching upon the Peshwa’s realms. When the struggle between the Nizam and Bajirao was at its peak in 1728, Dabhade had attacked Malwa, wrought havoc there, and collected tributes from there. For this trespass, Shahu admonished Dabhade on 21 May 1728 as follows, “What need did you have to enter the Malwa province, render the realms desolate, and collect tributes? Whatever money you have collected, deposit everything to Bajirao Pandit. Do not cause any trouble in Malwa henceforth, and ensure that another complaint does not reach us.” But this scolding did not stop the overall dispute.

Sarbuland Khan had been constantly complaining to the Badshah that the help extended to him in terms of money and army was not sufficient to face the Marathas. Seeing the Maratha advance, the Badshah himself thought about coming to Gujarat. But it never came through. Still, he sent a huge help to Sarbuland Khan. When Bajirao came to know all this, he sent his emissary Shamrao to Sarbuland Khan, and began negotiations in 1728, about granting the Marathas the Chauth rights over Gujarat similar to Deccan, which would ensure they protected it from all the enemies, and ensure that the Badshah’s administration runs smoothly. At this time, the Mungi-Shevgaon Treaty with the Nizam was also getting finalised. Kanthaji and Pilaji had just been defeated by Sarbuland Khan at Ahmedabad and were plundering the interior. Later, the help promised from Delhi never arrived, and unless the Chauth rights were accepted as per Bajirao’s demands, the Maratha menace would not stop. To put Sarbuland Khan in further corner, and get him to grant permanent Chauth rights, in the month of February 1730, Chimaji Appa entered Gujarat along with Udaji Pawar from Malwa. Chimaji took the route Baswada, Jhalod, Dahod, and made to threaten Sarbuland Khan with full aggression. He took the stations like Dahod, Champaner under his control. Chimaji went on plundering region after region, collecting tributes from there, and collecting a huge tribute from Petlad in the month of March 1730. Thereafter he plundered the Dholka city, and demanded Chauth rights from Sarbuland Khan. Bajirao too informed the Khan, that unless Chauth and Sardeshmukhi rights were accepted via a written agreement, the forces would not return back. Sarbuland Khan looked upon Pilaji Gaikwad and Kanthaji “as little better than bandits. But Chimaji Appa had behind him the authority of both the king and the Peshwa. To Chimaji Appa, therefore, the distracted Sarbuland Khan addressed himself, and offered to give him the Chauth and Sardeshmukhi of Gujarat, if he would protect him from other Maratha marauders.”

To be continued…

EFFORTS AT RECONCILIATION

Since all his assistants were defeated, Sambhaji II’s rebellion was vanquished. If he had not surrendered quickly and requested his previous arrangement to continue, then it would have been a very difficult situation for him. This time Shahu had prepared excellently on all sides. Most of the Sardars on Sambhaji II’s side had deserted him and aligned with Shahu. Shahu had satisfied them and taken them in his service. Tarabai herself had quit her erstwhile adamant stance and had gone ahead and accepted his refuge. Sambhaji II himself was incapable of erecting the whole plan and carrying it out to success on his own. He used to engage in his efforts relying on other people. But, the primary reason of him losing his colleagues was Shahu’s progress. Shahu’s affable nature, his skill of forgiving his own enemies and winning them over, his concern to keep his subjects satisfied, and the feats of valour that his Sardars had been displaying all over, all these reasons contributed to dimming Sambhaji II’s radiance. Bhagwantrao Amatya himself had said, “In this Karweer kingdom, there is nobody who is discerning, wise, thoughtful, decent, clever, or intelligent. In Rajashree Shahuraje’s kingdom lakhs and lakhs of districts have been settled and have become prosperous.”

Even the people were now tired of this internal war. Many of them acknowledged the bad effects of the internal dissensions. On both sides, there were many reasonable people who knew where the progress of the nation lay. The diplomats and well-wishers on both sides used to often meet each other. Through occasions like marriages and other functions, there used to be people-to-people contact between Panhala and Satara, and at these times there would be discussions about political subjects. In summary, even though Shahu and Sambhaji II were not meeting face-to-face from an external point of view, the activities seemed to be taking place as if in a single family. Even when Tarabai was a prisoner at Panhala, Shahu used to maintain correspondence with her. They had to carry out or investigate the affairs related to Inams, incomes, festivals and other matters through this correspondence. Thus, an atmosphere conducive to resolve the dispute between the two went on taking shape.

Actually, the efforts to bring about some kind of a treaty amongst the two seem to have occurred right at the beginning, i.e. in 1708. Similar such treaty seems to have happened on 30 December 1725. Such agreements must have taken place often. Shahu had been thinking about giving a portion of the kingdom to Sambhaji II and satisfying him from the beginning. In the very first treaty, Shahu had reserved some portion in the northern regions of Swarajya for Sambhaji II. As Sambhaji II’s rebellious behaviour went on increasing, the terms of the treaty went on getting stricter and narrower. This can be seen if one performed a comparative study.

In the summer of 1729, when Tarabai took refuge with Shahu, the project to bring about a treaty between the two brothers began. The actual initiative for the project was taken in 1730 by Sambhaji II through Nilkanth Trimbak Pradhan, by dispatching his conditions to Shahu, and the friendship occurred through the mediation of the Pratinidhi, Bhagwantrao Amatya and Tarabai. It was decided that they should meet face-to-face. Sambhaji II wrote the following letter to Shahu.

“Revered Mother has written about the meaning of elder brother’s affection and his desire that the friendship between our two parties should firm up through wisdom. This is expected of an elder brother. We also desire that both should think about each other, both parties earn esteem amongst people. Before this, the revered mother had written about sending Rajashree Babaji Prabhu. He was not well, otherwise we would have sent him. We have presently dispatched him. When he presents himself at your service, he will relate everything verbally.”

At this time Shahu received another letter from Bhagwantrao Amatya as well, “There has been an infestation of lowly people at the Kolhapur court. Therefore, we desire to serve Saheb.” The letter written by Bajirao to him is also eminently readable.

The Babaji Prabhu mentioned in the above letter is the same as Buwaji or Bowaji Nilkanth Prabhu Parasnis. He was a clever gentleman who would make a very good impression on anybody whom he met with, and he toiled hard to bring about the friendship between the two brothers. Since he was ill, the work for the treaty had to be postponed a bit. Shahu sent protocol garments and letter with Babaji Prabhu for Sambhaji II and felicitated him. Due to that, Sambhaji II’s heart melted with love, and his reply to Shahu via a letter is an excellent example of the kind of language and brotherly affection of the times. “Whatever things elder brother wrote are true. The elder brother’s unselfish love is as before. We do not worship any other deity than the elder brother. Elder brother is at my father’s place. It behoves and glorifies the elder brother to take care of me in all respects.”

To be continued…

SAMBHAJI II’S SURRENDER

Pratinidhi polished off the whole camp and arrested thousands of men. The people captured mainly included Tarabai, Rajasbai, Sambhaji II’s wives, Bhagwantrao Amatya, and Vyankatrao Ghorpade. Out of these, Rajasbai and Sambhaji II’s wives were honourably delivered at Panhala, and Pratinidhi returned back to Satara along with the remaining three. Shahu initially thought about sending Tarabai back, but she said, “Wherever I go, I have to remain in captivity, So why not with you.”

So, she was kept at the royal mansion atop Satara fort which was repaired for her stay. Yado Gopal was given to her as her steward. If Tarabai had gone to Kolhapur, Ramaraja would not have been installed on the Satara throne later, and the history of the Maratha Confederacy could have been different to some degree. Sambhaji II paid the ransom for Bhagwantrao Amatya to keep his own prestige and got him released. He did not even investigate about Vyankatrao. The Pratinidhi would not release him since he was considered a rebel. So, Bajirao paid the ransom of ten thousand rupees and freed him from the Pratinidhi’s captivity. Pratinidhi and Bajirao were servants of the same master. This example of one servant paying the ransom for an enemy captured in battle to the other servant, is an indication of Shahu’s state administration.

After this, Sambhaji II dumped his intentions of war, and resolved to surrender to Shahu, to ensure his arrangements were in place. It is not known on whose advice Sambhaji II had acted. His wife Jijabai was probably the chief actor. Historian Mr Khare has perfectly described Jijabai’s nature, which helps us understand Sambhaji II’s politics and capability. “Jijabai was bright as the fire. Her punishments were hard-hearted and strict. She would never think twice whether the route she had chosen was good or bad, in her craze to achieve the objective. She was an extremely suspicious person. She would feel like everybody was waiting to destroy her. It can be generally stated that the credit for establishing a separate seat at Kolhapur goes to Jijabai. At this time and later during Madhavrao Peshwa’s time, the Kolhapur seat was protected only due to Jijabai’s wisdom. Tarabai too was equally rebellious, pushing, and eager to display her authority, similar to Jijabai. But Tarabai did not understand whether her objectives would be fulfilled through such efforts. Even though Jijabai was of similar nature, she was circumspect. She would achieve her objectives, by recognising her own strengths and weaknesses, paying heed to those of her opponents, would act as per the situation, without remaining adamant on her demands, and giving in at times. Tarabai never had this compromising cleverness. However, around 1730, the administration of Kolhapur was in a state of disorder. Jijabai did not agree with anybody else. She had begun oppressing the Sardars and ministers, due to which the leadership of Karweer was in a state of chaos. Besides, Jijabai, in her initial immature years, did not have that large an influence in the kingdom at this time.”

Sambhaji II’s mother Rajasbai had carried out Kolhapur’s administration for the two years Sambhaji II had gone to join the Nizam. Later, she would visit Satara with Sambhaji II. She lived a long life and died on 26 April 1751.

Besides Jijabai, one cannot say Kolhapur’s ministers were chief advisors for Sambhaji II. In 1723, Timaji Raghunath Hanmante was the Peshwa at Kolhapur. In 1727, the Nizam made Chimnaji Damodar as Sambhaji II’s Peshwa which has been mentioned earlier. Since 1730, Mahad’s Nilkanth Trimbak Prabhu seems to have been the Khasnis and his brother Keshav Trimbak seems to have been the Pradhan. When the Nizam was defeated at Palkhed, Sambhaji II was exposed, returned back to Panhala, and was settling down his administration there with advice from Krishnaji Parashuram Pratinidhi, in the month of March 1730, Shahu attacked him via a campaign and defeated him. In letters dated 12 July and 17 October Shahu has issued orders to Sambhaji Angre and Pratinidhi to capture Vishalgad. This shows that Shahu seems to have captured Panhala already and Sambhaji II did not have any shelter. In such a situation, on 8 August 1730, Sambhaji II ordered his Pradhan Nilkanth Trimbak to go to Shahuraje and negotiate terms of a treaty.

Before this, Udaji Chavhan would keep supporting Sambhaji II off and on. Since he did not have anybody else, Sambhaji would keep his company. But this Udaji Chavhan has to be counted amongst many persons who had whiled away their lives through false pride of their prowess, and uncertainty in their minds. He had met Shahu, spoken with him, pledged his allegiance to him ritually at the beginning of 1729. But he still continued his errant ways like before, and therefore, Shahu himself attacked him later.

To be continued…

SAMBHAJI II DEFEATED

Immediately afterwards in 1729, seeing that Chimaji Appa and Bajirao both were far away in Malwa, Udaji Chavhan came to the banks of the Warana and began plundering the region. He began staying at the Shirol station and began troubling the regions around it. Sambhaji II appointed him as his Senapati. At that time, Shahu himself embarked on a campaign to the south along with many Sardars, to capture Sambhaji II and Udaji, at the beginning of 1730. One day, when Shahu was on a hunt, he got the news that Chavhan was around somewhere. Upon that, Shahu gave him promise to not hurt his life, and invited him for a meeting. He went back after the meeting.

An interesting anecdote of Shahu precedes the main battle between the two cousins. Shahu was hunting in a forest and had spread out his men. Alone in a palanquin with just a stick, he saw two burning wicks and guns behind a tree.

“Who is it?” Shahu called out.

Two men came before him, bowed their heads before him and said, “We are assassins.”

“Then why did you not kill (me)?” Shahu asked.

The assassins said, “Seeing you, we lost our courage and the heart to do the deed.”

“Who sent you?” Shahu then asked.

“We are from Panhala,” the men answered.

“Leave your guns, and run away,” Shahu advised them, “If the Pratinidhi finds you, he will kill you.”

They had been sent by Chavhan and Sambhaji II. After this, Shahu prepared to finally vanquish Sambhaji II and Chavhan as a final resolution. Letters mentioning, “The Swami is embarking on a campaign towards Panhala,” were dispatched all over to Pratinidhi, Shambhusingh Jadhav (son of Dhanaji Jadhav), Davalji Somvanshi, Sidhojirao Nimbalkar, Sekhoji Angre, Bajirao Pradhan, Pilaji Jadhavrao etc. and they were invited to participate in the campaign. This project began on the Dussehra of 1729, and went up to the next Falgun month.

Shahu ordered Trimbakrao Dabhade, “Capture the mansion at Herle and stay around Kolhapur to threaten Chavhan. Do not go too far.”

Shahu ordered many big and small Sardars like Sidhoji Thorat, Davalji Somvanshi, Ranoji Ghorpade, etc. to attack Udaji Chavhan. To ensure that Sambhaji II did not again conspire with the Nizam, to permanently resolve this matter, and to finish-off all his helpers, Shahu gathered all Pradhans, ministers, Pratinidhi, Senapati etc. everyone, encamped towards the Warana River, and began a campaign on the other side in the Kolhapur regions.

Since the time the Pratinidhi had joined the Nizam he had been desirous of acquiring Shahu’s trust. So, at this time, Shahu purposely dispatched the Pratinidhi against Chavhan, and ordered Shambhusingh Jadhav to accompany him. This Shambhusingh Jadhav was Dhanaji Jadhav’s son. He had accompanied his brother Chandrasen in Nizam’s service for a few years. But he fell out with his brother and joined Shahu. This seems to be even his first task that Shahu gave him. This campaign was dispatched by Shahu in the Panhala province belonging to Sambhaji II, and Shahu himself had gone up to Bhilwadi. From the month of August 1729, up to the August of 1730, for the whole year, Shahu purposely kept Bajirao around Pune-Satara. Shahu knew fully well if at all a calamity arose, nobody would be more capable than Bajirao to resolve it.

Udaji Chavhan encouraged Sambhaji II and instigated him to fight against Shahu Maharaj. Sambhaji II wrote letters to his eight ministers and Sardars, and ordered them to present themselves along with their forces. Accordingly, the armies gathered on the banks of the Warana. It also contained Ichalkaranji’s Vyankatrao Ghorpade and Bhagwantrao Amatya. But they were not internally aligned with Sambhaji II. The moment Shahu’s preparations were complete, he ordered Shrinivasrao Pratinidhi to attack Sambhaji II. “Udaji Chavhan was at Shirol in the dome (?). Pratinidhi and Shambhusingh besieged it. Sambhaji II caused the siege of Shirol to be lifted and brought Udaji back from the station to the army encampment. The battle was again fought the next day and they were beaten. Upon that, he left with Chavhan and arrived at Panhala. Jadhavrao and Pratinidhi plundered the whole camp. (Sambhaji II and Chavhan) ran away alone.”

To be continued…