BACK STORY – ANWARUDDIN KHAN

At this time the Peshwa and Raghuji were struggling with each other in Bengal. Due to this, Satara forces could not arrive to help Murarrao Ghorpade. In March 1743, the Nizam took control of Arcot, and dispatched a challenge to Murarrao asking him to hand over Tiruchirappalli. His huge army laid siege to the fort. However, well-stocked with provisions that could withstand a long siege, he refused to hand over the city and the fort. The siege dragged on for six months without any impact on the fort. The Nizam realised that the fort could not be taken by force. He, therefore, began negotiations with the embattled Murarrao. The Nizam offered Murarrao two lakh rupees and the fort of Penukonda, not far from his base at the fort of Gutti, if he handed over Tiruchirappalli. With no succour on the way, Murarrao accepted the offer, evacuated the fort on 29 August 1743, and handed it over to the Nizam. The transaction was described by Ananda Ranga Pillai, “By these means Asafjah, who is an astute man, gained his object, but at the same time Murarrao gathered renown.”

This way, the Nizam removed Murarrao and took control of Tiruchirappalli on 29 August 1743. He unfurled the Badshah’s standard there. Meanwhile, the Maratha army went ahead to block him, but there was no battle. At first, the Nizam appointed a trusted aide named Khwaja Abdullah as the Regent to the boy Nawab at Arcot. However, the very next morning Khwaja Abdullah collapsed and died. The Nizam, therefore, summoned an old hand in his service named Anwaruddin Khan to take over the guardianship of the young Nawab. Anwaruddin had joined the Mughal army in the reign of Aurangzeb, and over the years had shown ample evidence of courage and loyalty to the Nizam. As a security for his good behaviour, however, Anwaruddin’s third son Mohammed Ali remained as a hostage at Hyderabad.

Anwaruddin Khan’s ability had been tested more than once in the preceding years. Babuji Naik was keen to obtain a Jagir in the Carnatic and had come with a large army towards Hyderabad, where in the Nizam’s absence, just a small army remained. Babuji sent a letter to Anwaruddin Khan asking him to pay the usual tribute and close the matter. Anwaruddin refused and preferred a war to paying any tribute and with a small army confronted Babuji Naik and defeated him at Andole, some ninety kilometres from Hyderabad.

After Bajirao’s campaign near Shrirangapatnam in 1726, Shahu had not entrusted the Peshwa with an invasion of the south. With Babuji Naik’s defeat, the Peshwa’s involvement in the Carnatic was to begin.

A Persian source, which perhaps belongs to the early days of Nanasaheb’s appointment as the Peshwa, states that Nanasaheb Peshwa began from Pune with a large army and intercepted the Nizam’s army. The records of this campaign are scant in Marathi letters, and it is only Anwaruddin’s biographer Burhan who gives some details of this campaign. The Peshwa’s army completely surrounded the Nizam and forced a siege. Seeing his demoralised army, the Nizam advised a payment of tribute. However, Anwaruddin remained silent. Noticing his silence, Shahanawaz Khan, a minister with the Nizam said to him, “The silence of the Saheb, what does it mean? Pandit Pradhan is no Babuji Naik. The one is not to be compared to the other, the other was a drop, this is the sea.”

The chronicle by Burhan that eulogises Anwaruddin then goes on to describe how he decided to stand forth boldly before the large army. Nanasaheb, dropping the plan of war, came and met the Nizam, who greeted him with “a Khilat, Itr and Paan”, and all the “formalities of conversation and conventions of friendship,” were adhered to. The later rise of Anwaruddin Khan is attributed to this stoic resistance on his part.

Returning from Tiruchirappalli, the Nizam took rest for some months at Arcot. While he was here, the British and the French sent him some gifts to keep him happy. His huge army established their terror everywhere. The disorder that had prevailed in the region, had caused the western trade to stop completely. He appointed his grandson Muzaffar Jung on the administration of the Balaghat ranges in the Carnatic by giving him Jagir at Adoni. By March 1744, the Nizam felt assured enough to leave the Carnatic and returned to Golconda.

The Carnatic would have settled down but for an assassination soon after. The Nizam’s arrangement at Arcot did not last for long. Among the old soldiery were some disgruntled Afghan mercenaries. The occasion chosen for their revolt was the wedding of one of the Nawab’s relatives. As the boy Nawab along with his many relatives arrived at the venue and took their appointed seats, the Pathans with their leader Abdul Khan made a boisterous entry and demanded an immediate payment of their arrears. Anwaruddin Khan had not yet reached the venue. Hirasat Khan, one of the nobles, tried to reason with the Pathans, but they refused to let the young Nawab leave the place.

As tempers rose, a rough soldier grabbed the young Nawab’s robe, which prompted an altercation between the Afghans and the Nawab’s party. Just then, Anwaruddin’s procession was also seen arriving. A young nephew of Hirasat Khan said to Abdul Khan, “You wretch! Is it for you to draw the Nawab’s robe and force him to sit down? Here comes the procession of the Nawab. He will have you beaten like dogs.”

The retort was sufficient for a sudden flaring of tempers. Swords and daggers were drawn. Hirasat Khan along with Abdul Khan and several others were killed. The boy Nawab was stabbed to death. Sixteen of the Pathans were killed in the ensuing melee. Anwaruddin Khan came on the scene and ordered an immediate retribution against the Pathans. He then sorrowfully reported his failure to protect the Nawab to the Nizam. The common people of the city whispered that Anwaruddin and Murtuza Ali had a role in the entire episode. Although the Nizam was highly displeased, he found no person other than Anwaruddin worthy of being appointed as the next Nawab. The Walajahi dynasty of Arcot thus began with Anwaruddin Khan.

To be continued…

NIZAM’S CARNATIC CAMPAIGN

In the last decade of the seventeenth century, the Marathas took the battle to the Mughals in the Carnatic under the effervescent leadership of Santaji Ghorpade. Santaji seemingly appeared out of nowhere and trapped ponderous Mughal armies and even attacked the camp of the Badshah Aurangzeb. His fall from Chhatrapati Rajaram’s favour followed by his assassination in 1698, ended the meteoric career of this great Maratha Senapati. His son Sidhoji established a principality in the Carnatic, around the forts of Sondur, Gutti, and Gajendragad. Sidhoji’s son Murarrao began his career in the early part of the eighteenth century and maintained a Maratha presence in the Carnatic for well-nigh five decades.

When Raghuji Bhosale quit the Carnatic in 1741 with the person of Chanda Saheb, and a hefty compensation from Nawab Safdar Ali, Murarrao Ghorpade with fourteen thousand troops was left in charge of the fort of Tiruchirappalli. In 1741, Murarrao sent his lieutenant Apparao as Governor of Madurai. Murarrao restored lands belonging to the temples that had been taken away by Chanda Saheb, and moved the deities back to their original place. The people of the region were conciliated and the Nayaks ruling at other places were not disturbed.

By the time the Peshwa and Raghuji went north in the dying months of 1741, Nizam-ul-Mulk had returned to the Deccan to recoup the losses his kingdom had sustained in his absence. A fruitful meeting with Nanasaheb led to the Peshwa getting charge of Malwa, while the Nizam moved on to his capital. The Maratha takeover of the Carnatic directly impinged on his own plans. It is said that he was instrumental in turning the Maratha attention to Bengal to have a relatively free hand in the Carnatic.

The Nawabs in the Carnatic did not accept the Nizam’s rule. Dost Ali had not paid any annual tribute to the Nizam. The Nizam now demanded this tribute from Safdar Ali. The Nizam never looked upon the Arcot Nawab with favour and he resolved to return to the Carnatic to settle affairs in the region. Safdar Ali had to pay an indemnity to the Marathas as well as the Nizam, and he asked his cousin Murtuza Ali to contribute towards it. Murtuza had designs to become the Nawab himself, and it was not long before he plotted to eliminate Safdar Ali. Murtuza’s wife was Safdar Ali’s sister. Murtuza asked her, “Do you require a red veil or a white one?” the latter signifying widowhood.

Safdar Ali’s sister chose the red. Murtuza then told her, “Thy brother Safdar Ali Khan waits for an opportunity to destroy me. If you can, bore a tunnel of trick to murder him.”

He then invited Safdar Ali to the fort of Vellore for the Shab-i-Baraat festival, which fell on 5 October 1742, when even the guards in the palace were granted leave. At dinner, Murtuza Ali’s wife then served her brother poisoned soup, who seeing his sister’s seal on it, drank it without suspicion.

The poison, however, failed to kill Safdar Ali, and Murtuza sent assassins led by a Hussein Khan Tahir to kill him in his bed chamber. Murtuza then proceeded to Arcot and declared himself the new Nawab. Murarrao Ghorpade, however, declared war on Murtuza Ali for killing a Maratha ally. Within a matter of ten days, the Arcot army also joined the Marathas, and Murtuza had to flee to Vellore disguised in female attire. The son of Safdar Ali, who was a mere boy, was appointed the new Nawab with the title Saadatullah Khan II.

With an intention of breaking the back of this revolt, collecting his own unpaid tribute of so many years, removing Raghuji’s security forces set up everywhere, and establishing his own control over the Carnatic, the Nizam embarked on a campaign to Carnatic along with a huge force from Golconda, in the month of January 1743.

The chaotic state of the region had already led to many nobles in Arcot writing to the Nizam to come and set matters right. Before the Nizam acted, in the first week of March 1743 he met the Maratha envoy Bagaji Yadav. Bagaji reported the outcome of the meeting to the Peshwa, “The Nizam said, ‘I am now eighty years old. So far, I have always fulfilled all my commitments. God has, therefore, protected my public image and esteem. I do not intend to go (march) to Pune or Satara. Our affection for each other remains. You need to go to Malwa. I have to perform my duties too.’”

The letter hints at a tacit agreement to not attack each other’s territory. The Peshwa was thus free to go north to Malwa, while the Nizam would be free to execute his plans. Then, with a mighty army of two hundred thousand men on foot and eighty thousand horse, the Nizam marched south and took charge of Arcot. The boy Nawab swore allegiance to him and was confirmed in his post.

In Pondicherry, Governor Dupleix took note of the Nizam’s invasion. None of the European powers assumed that they could be a match to the Indian princes at this stage; an Empire was the last thing on their minds. He wrote to Orry, Comptroller General in Paris, about the fresh invasion, while begging for more funds to buy expensive cotton for export, “the Marathas have not returned to this province, but Nizam-ul-Mulk has come with an army of more than 300,000 horse and an enormous cortege of elephants, camels etc. He is bringing with him as prisoners all who have incomes from this province. He puts pressure on them to obtain large sums which means so much the less money in the province. Once set at liberty, these ex-prisoners in their turn put the screws on the poor people so that this wretched country is plunged into increasing misery. Cotton is very dear here, and there is a great shortage of capital. It is impossible to find cloth in any quantity, so the difficulty of loading ships is no less than during the Maratha invasions.”

To be continued…

MUTUAL ANIMOSITY CONTINUES

The Peshwa was near Jaipur at the time of Mudagad campaign. Ramchandrababa in a letter to Nanasaheb Peshwa on 1 April 1748 described the entire campaign and ended the letter saying, “Mudagad was settled by the Swami. It was lost and fell into ruins earlier. Tulaji Angre had built the fort again and settled some people atop it. From there, he would indulge into raiding to plunder all the outposts in the Panhala province. He had wrought an absolute havoc. It was like he had begun a complete annihilation. Upon that, Bawda’s Bhagwantrao, Vishalgad’s Pratinidhi, Wadi’s Sawant, Appaji Angre all joined together took five hundred cavalrymen and eight to ten thousand infantrymen, attacked Mudagad and captured it. They burnt and polished off all the region from Rajapur up to Sangameshwar. A serious warning has thus been given to Tulaji Angre without any effort on the part of Your Honour. It is necessary for Your Honour to reward Appaji Angre adequately… There were defections at the fort of Suvarnadurg. Tulaji Angre personally went there and found twenty defectors. They were all killed. The Konkan is reduced to ash. Tulaji Angre might come to Satara for the Swami’s meeting on the Varshapratipada (Gudhipadwa, Hindu new year).”

Even in the Rajkot battle, Yesaji alias Appaji Angre fought on the Peshwa’s side. Appaji Angre’s help in Mudagad and Revdanda brought him into favour with Shahu. Earlier, there had been a move to appoint Appaji Angre as the Sarkhel in place of Tulaji, and he even sent a few letters with a seal calling himself as one. However, when Tulaji heard of the possibility, a few of his followers pretending to have differences with him, joined Appaji. At the earliest opportunity, probably before May 1748, these men murdered Appaji. However, there is some uncertainty about this as Appaji is also said to have moved to Gwalior where he continued to stay with his family.

The activities of Tulaji in south Konkan continued. In May 1748, he captured three forts from his neighbours, and the matter was reported to Shahu. Shahu commanded that the forts be returned, or armies will be sent to remedy the aggression. A perturbed Shahu also declared that if the Peshwa did not send his army, he would lead an army himself.

Manaji’s wavering loyalty was always a source of anxiety to the Marathas. The Peshwa could not hold Manikgad for long. On Nanasaheb’s return from the campaign to the north, the Manikgad affair was closed on 24 July 1748, when he ordered Ramaji Mahadev that the fort should be returned to Manaji Angre.

In 1748, Tulaji went south to Cannanore. Commodore William James’ fleet was attacked near Vijaydurg in October 1749 and his ship ‘Restoration’ was carried off to the fort. A British report said, “The engagement began at 11 at night and on the 13 October 1749 about noon, it being calm, she was boarded on all quarters, when the vessel was taken and the same day carried into Gheria.”

Tulaji continued his attacks on British ships when he attacked Commodore Lisle, and in 1753, he even attacked a much larger Dutch ship with fifty guns on it. At this time, Tulaji himself was in touch with the British and sent proposals of peace to the Company. The Company replied that they “would willingly embrace (the proposal) if he could deposit lakh of rupees as a security for his not taking any ships or vessels belonging to them, for which sum he would receive an annual interest.” Tulaji, however, refused to give any security to the Company for keeping his word after he took Anjanvel.

The Company’s letter also went on to complain about Manaji Angre saying, “we are at peace, yet he frequently plunders our defenceless boats.”

The last part of the letter from the British asked the Peshwa to take measures to stop the plundering of mercantile ships, “I think it would greatly benefit your dominions as well as for the Honourable Company’s interest if you in your prudence should take some effectual measures for rooting out all the pirates on this coast, and for this purpose I am always ready to assist. Some months back, Sambhajiraja (of Kolhapur) advising me he intended march against Gheria (Vijaydurg). I then showed him how willingly inclined I was to take any good measures for effecting so necessary a work.” The mention of the ruler of Kolhapur shows that his possessions in the south Konkan around the fort of Sindhudurg were also subject to Tulaji’s depradations.

Tulaji Angre’s arrogance is expressed in his next utterances, “Yamajipant and Antaji Shivdeo came to Satara. You wrote that there is news that there have been some disturbances beneath the fort, in this regard, such acts belong to real men. Whoever wishes to, should get their doubts cleared. (We) Don’t count anybody in this regard. To top it, in this province, the subject means a group of Bhudevs (Brahmins), and apart from them, the thoughts about forts and fortresses are well-known (12 June 1755).”

This way, the animosity between Manaji, Tulaji Angre and the Peshwa went on increasing with time.

To be continued…

MUDAGAD & RAJKOT

Before the Manikgad affair of Manaji was resolved, Tulaji’s activities became unbearable. Towards the end of 1747, Tulaji Angre captured Mudagad and had wrought a huge havoc in the Konkan and plateau realms belonging to Vishalgad’s Pratinidhi, Bawda’s Pant Amatya Bhagwantrao, Wadi’s Sawant, and the Peshwa.

Going back to 1735, Bajirao Peshwa had promised Sambhaji Angre that he would not attack the fort of Mudagad, which lay strategically on one of the three Ghat paths from the kingdom of Kolhapur towards Vijaydurg. The fort commanded a large territory encompassing the fiefs of several Sardars of Kolhapur and Satara. However, to safeguard these areas, Bajirao broke his promise and demolished Mudagad. And this was not forgotten by Sambhaji or Tulaji Angre.

The Mudagad Fort is on the face of Sahyadri, at the mouth of Kajirda Ghat. In 1747, just after the death of Shripatrao Pratinidhi of Satara, Tulaji returned to the mountain and rebuilt fort Mudagad. From this perch in the Sahyadri mountains, Tulaji then began to attack territories of the potentates who were friendly to the Peshwa. Tulaji first moved towards Vishalgad fort and laid siege to it. The surrounding villages were taken over and taxes were levied, one of which was called the Habshipatti (a tax levied on account of the Habshi or Siddis).

The Peshwa wrote to Tulaji asking him not to charge the tax on the territory. He reminded Tulaji that even his father Kanhoji never collected taxes or troubled the people in this area. Brahmendra Swami also wrote to Bhagwantrao Amatya stating it is everybody’s desire to punish Tulaji, and taking the help of Sawants and the Pratinidhi, this should be done. It became clear that only an armed intervention would force Tulaji to leave the area.

One of the employees with the Pratinidhi was a Naro Rayaji Gode. Gode volunteered to go to the Sawants and raise men to join the army against Tulaji. Accordingly, Gode brought two thousand men from the Wadi’s Sawants and with the three thousand men from the Pratinidhi, formed an army. Tulaji’s brother Yesaji alias Appaji Angre joined the above rulers and fought against him. Gode personally led the attack on Mudagad. The battle was fierce, but Gode won a complete victory. He then proceeded to demolish the fort completely, ploughing it with an ass and marking the spot with “a torn sandal and a broken Kowrie” (Vahan-Kowrie means a torn sandal and a broken Kowrie tied together as a symbol of desertion of a place). Then, Appaji Angre, along with the Pratinidhi, Amatya and Sawant, devastated Tulaji’s territory from Rajapur to Sangameshwar. From the month of January 1748 up to March 1748, this campaign occurred including many big and small battles.

Here, Shahu himself was also unhappy about Manikgad affair, and in early 1748 wrote to Sadashivrao Bhau to return the fort to Manaji Angre. Shahu wrote, “The fort of Manikgad and the surrounding region belonging to Manaji Angre was taken by you and it should be returned immediately. You have the Deshmukhi of Chaul, however, you are not running it well. This should first be done. The revenue from Kalyan and Bhiwandi amounting to fifteen thousand per year should also reach us. The Wajaratmab (Manaji Angre) is an old and loyal servant of the king. You should help him in any way you can. The moment you receive this letter, without further delay, the fort must be returned. In this manner, you will not disturb the goodwill towards you from the king and the two Wadas (mansions / queens). You are prudent enough.”

On losing Manikgad, Manaji countered by seeking help from the Portuguese at Rajkot, his fort near Chaul (which had three forts, Rajkot was with Manaji, while Revdanda and Korlai were with the Peshwa). While Tulaji Angre was struggling to save Mudagad, the Peshwa was fighting with Manaji at Chaul’s Rajkot. Chaul harbour originally belonged to the Portuguese. When Vasai fell, they had given it to the British. But the Peshwa felt that he should capture it. When the Peshwa captured Manikgad and other stations belonging to Manaji Angre, he opposed the Peshwa and went to Chaul to the Portuguese seeking their succour. A letter from Ramaji Mahadev gives some details of Manaji Angre taking away some ships of the Peshwa’s navy and his own countermeasures. Manaji’s brother Appaji Angre was also with Ramaji at this time and intriguing with the men at Rajkot, “I have asked Shankarpant to come from Ghodbunder to Thal so that Manaji himself will come and oppose us. Once he does, we will defeat him all at once. Between Vasai and Thane, we have six Ghurabs and thirty Galbats and some smaller boats. Appaji Angre is working on the politics in Rajkot. Near Revdanda, Manaji himself with nine ships came face to face with Bajirao Belose. There was a battle. His own ship sprung many a leak, and he was defeated.”

Revdanda was a short distance to the south of Rajkot. Manaji began a massive cannonade from Rajkot on Revdanda. Ramaji wrote to the Peshwa that the fire was intolerable. He decided then to bring his armada into Revdanda harbour, and fire at Rajkot from the ships, while an attacking party attacks by land. Ramaji assured the Peshwa that the harbour at Revdanda was so good that the armada would be safe even if Tulaji or the Portuguese came to help Manaji. Rajkot was captured soon after. Manaji himself led the defence at Rajkot, however, he had to flee in the face of the strong Maratha attack. A minaret in a mosque at Rajkot had been used to fire guns at the Maratha navy. On 15 January 1748, Rajkot and the mosque were captured, and the Peshwa’s permission sought to demolish them.

Ramaji Mahadev fought with both the Portuguese and the British, “besieged Chaul’s Rajkot. On 15 January 1748, the high fortress and the Masjid within were captured through the prowess of Swami’s virtues. The fortress and the Masjid should be destroyed. Then Manaji Angre will not trouble much and come to meet face-to-face.”

To be continued…

MANIKGAD AFFAIR

Tulaji’s brother Manaji Angre was not always an ally of the Maratha power. The taking of Vasai, the founding of a separate navy, the Peshwa’s possession of nearby places such as Uran and Karanje, were perceived as a constant threat to him. Hoping to capitalise on the Portuguese ambition to take back Vasai, he sought an alliance with them against the Peshwa. A letter from the Portuguese Viceroy to Lisbon in February 1745 says, “The Angre of Colaba has sent an envoy to me. Although he has come here only on a goodwill visit, the reason behind his dispatch here is different. He has brought a secret message of his master that if I wish to take back Karanje (Uran) and Vasai from the Marathas, he is prepared to help me in that venture. His reason is that the proximity of the Peshwa is irksome to him. Had I another 2000 disciplined soldiers, I would have attacked Vasai myself.”

Shahu himself was not entirely happy with Tulaji and he wrote to the British in October 1745 that, “he would try Angre a little further before they entirely broke with him, but if he did not alter his behaviour, they could not afford him a much longer forebearance.”

Evidently, everything was not well. Shahu had reservations about Tulaji. The ill-feeling between the Peshwa and Tulaji did not abate. The efforts to undermine each other continued and this would lead to a storm that would affect the power balance on the west coast. All this, however, was still some distance away.

The British attempt to block the capture of Govalkot and Anjanvel and help the Siddis further aggravated Tulaji, and he struck at Tellicherry, the British port in the Malabar in late 1745, where he got away with two British ships. In early 1746, he took three more British ships off the coast of Gujarat.

Later, on 3 May 1747, Tulaji went to Satara and met the Maharaj. “The Pratinidhi went afore himself and brought Tulaji to the Maharaj. After they approached the tiger emblems, Rajashree also went afore. Tulaji approached and kept his head at the Maharaj’s feet. He presented Maharaj with the protocol platter of gold coins. He showered the Maharaj with flowers made of gold and silver. Rajashree also covered him with protocol shawl. After that he was brought into the mansion and made to sit in front of the room of the elder Queen. He informed, that he wanted to place his head at her feet face-to-face. The Queen was satisfied. Maharaj’s permission was brought. However, Maharaj was a little taken aback due to this. Tulaji went and placed his head at the Queen’s feet. After that, he also went and presented himself in front of the room of younger Queen. But there, he dispatched the protocol presents to her, and dropped meeting her in person.” This way, Tulaji was felicitated well externally, but the settlement of the Angre possessions amongst the brothers did not occur as per his liking.

The dispute over the fort of Manikgad tested how far the Peshwa could go in relation to the Angres. Manikgad was a fort controlled by Manaji, located on the Panvel crossroads, east of the creek of Rewas, not far from the present-day road from Khalapur to Panvel. Aiming to reduce Manaji’s power, Ramaji Mahadev first moved against Manikgad in a surprise attack at night. The attack party left Uran and employing ladders, climbed the fort and the unsuspecting garrison was overcome. The Havildar in charge, along with twenty others, was killed and the fort captured on 29 May 1747. When news about the capture of Manikgad reached Satara, it met with a strong disapproval.

Manaji got angry and himself rushed to Satara where Sagunabai took Manaji’s side and raised a huge outcry against the Peshwa. Shahu welcomed him warmly and awarded him with an elephant. The said elephant has left us an anecdote of Manaji’s great personal strength. The elephant got out of control, escaped from the stable causing destruction in its wake. It would not listen to anybody. Manaji went, caught it and brought it back to the stable. An elephant was a great honour in those times, and Manaji during his stay at Satara visited the place where the pachyderm was secured. To his surprise, he found the elephant improperly secured and out of control. Keeping his wits about him, Manaji managed to tie up the elephant’s hind legs and immobilise him (indeed, this was a traditional example to describing great personal strength; a similar description exists for Shuja-ud-Daulah of Awadh in the Bhausaheb Bakhar too). He then sent for the mahouts accusing them of negligence and not serving him despite their being servants of the Peshwa. Manaji was praised profusely, but the Peshwa’s Mahouts and him engaged in name-calling each other, and came to fisticuffs.

The Manikgad affair lingered for a few months, when Nanasaheb was at Delhi to meet Mohammedshah and resolve the Jaipur succession issue. Shahu’s queen Sagunabai was unhappy about the Manikgad affair and on 13 July 1747, Purandare wrote to the Peshwa and Bhau, “Sagunabai said, ‘Is it your desire to completely uproot Manaji Angre? The fort was taken by deceit. You had taken an oath at the feet of the king and me that such things will not happen. How will we believe you now? Now on, we can have anything in common only if the fort is returned.’”

To be continued…

ANJANVEL & GOVALKOT

In a letter dated 11 March 1745, Tulaji wrote, “Rajashree Yesaji Bhosale had planned to get down the Ghats beneath Mahimatgad along with his force, and harm us. So, you wrote that Rajashree Swami and revered mother Baisaheb had dispatched Rajashree Banba to bring Yesaji Bhosale to them. We understand what he would do coming here. Those coming here should have thought what would be the effect and how they would survive. If they decided to come even after this, then our policy of respect must be changed to disrespect. It was good that the Swami turned his forces around. Whoever tries to move a muscle here, would be defeated.”

The British had written to Nanasaheb on 15 January 1745 laying their grievance about Tulaji before the Peshwa, “You cannot but be sensible to the robberies and injuries Tulaji and his predecessors have committed upon the Honourable British Company and those under their protection to the amount of an immense sum which naturally obliges me to take all opportunities of distressing him.”

The letter further gives the importance of Anjanvel for the Marathas and the Peshwa’s own trade from inland territories, since that was the main route by which the British brought and sent goods inland. The route would close once Anjanvel fell into Tulaji’s hands, and the Peshwa would lose revenue, “The port of Anjanvel is to be wished in any hands than Tulaji, in being the only one left which has greatly contributed to the increase of your revenue and consequently the enriching of your dominions.”

Capturing the Govalkot and Anjanvel forts from the Siddis became an important objective for Shahu. He urged his Peshwa to write to his good friends at Bombay, to desist from helping the Siddis, so that Tulaji could take the forts. Taking into consideration the strained relations with Tulaji, Nanasaheb wrote a rather roundabout letter to the British on 18 January 1745 transmitting his sovereign’s request, “Your Honour already knows it is the Raja’s order that Anjanvel and Govalkot should be taken. He has now directed Tulaji Angre to besiege both places, but as he considers Tulaji and you are at variance, and that you may molest his fleet, he orders me to write Your Honour not to do so, or to succour the Siddis, to this purpose; I have before written to you and now do the like. Angre now besieges those places, therefore. I desire you will consider of what I now write you, and as you know what will increase our friendship, you will act accordingly about this business. I have given orders to Tukaram and he will inform Your Honour…”

Later, Maharaj granted the office of Sarkhel to Tulaji, gave him one of the contingents of Fatehsingh Bhosale, and asked Jiwaji Khanderao Chitnis along with the force, provisions and treasury to accompany him. On 23 January 1745, Govalkot and Anjanvel were captured by Tulaji, and he himself wrote the account for the same on 27 January 1745 as follows, “To Rajashree Balaji Raghunath Gosavi, Sarkhel Rajashree Tulaji Angre presents his wishes. We had besieged Anjanvel, and on the second day of the waxing moon fortnight of the month of Magha, Monday, I myself boarded the naval ship, while also attacking the fort from the landward side along with the whole army, we captured it two hours in the day. Writing this for your information. The moment the news about Anjanvel’s fall reached Siddi Yakut at Govalkot, he ran away with ten of his men. The people who had been left behind, tried to entice some of Chiplun’s soldiery to their side, and had acquired their standard and men from that fortress. We had dispatched our navy over Govalkot. They sent one gentleman for negotiations with message, that their act of flying our standard was fine, but take our two hundred men inside the fort. They shouted from the top of the fort disallowing them to approach it. They also opened up a right barrage of cannon- and gunfire over our men. Due to that, five to ten of our men were injured. But they attacked the fort in the afternoon. Thirteen to fourteen hundred men attacked from the water as well. Govalkot was also captured on the Thursday. Writing this satisfactory news for your information. You are our representative at the court. Keep writing about the happenings at court regularly. What more to write about this. Keep your benevolent eye upon us.” Balaji Raghunath Vaidya was Tulaji’s representative kept at Shahu’s court at Satara. This letter was written to him on 25 January 1745.

A happy Shahu congratulated Tulaji and renamed the forts as Gopalgad and Govindgad. The capture finally confirmed Tulaji’s appointment as the Sarkhel of the Maratha fleet.

To be continued…

SARKHEL TULAJI ANGRE

Manaji Angre did not want Chimaji Appa to have the fort of Chaul and Revdanda, located so close to Colaba, and represented to the Portuguese that he will even pay for their upkeep. However, his efforts were in vain and the Portuguese-Maratha treaty was finalised in October 1740. In the same month, Manaji tried to take over Chaul, but the Portuguese foiled his attempt to do so.

The Portuguese gave the forts to the Marathas in exchange for two villages in Bardesh near Goa and the fort of Daman. At this time, the Portuguese envoy asked for some more territory around Daman, which was refused. Chimaji told the envoy, “Like Bajirao, it is my desire to drive the Portuguese out of India. However, I did not do so in order to favour the British.”

The muted antagonism between the British and Maratha powers had disappeared after Vasai, and the Maratha court looked at the British favourably. There was ample evidence that Chhatrapati Shahu, represented by the Peshwa, and the Maratha navy headed by Sambhaji Angre did not see eye to eye. Keeping in mind the hostility with Sambhaji Angre and the now-on now-off friendship with Manaji, the Portuguese-Maratha treaty of 1740, with prophetic prescience, had this clause, “when we fight with the Angre, the Portuguese will support us in all respects including their warships.”

Although, Shahu did not give up his efforts to bring the Sarkhel fully under his authority, he could achieve only partial success. The capture of Sashti and Vasai in 1739 and Chaul and Korlai from the Portuguese in 1740, had afforded the Peshwa new places to set his own Navy to sea. The island of Arnala near Vasai was used for building new warships. This fleet was outside the command of the Angres and the British feared that the greater resources of the Peshwa would soon allow it to grow rapidly.

The Portuguese, however, had not yet come to terms with the loss of Vasai. On 12 November 1741, Sambhaji Angre wrote to the Viceroy at Goa, “If you wish to recapture Vasai, please let me know and I will secretly make the necessary arrangements.”

The Portuguese too responded on 2 December 1741, agreeing to such a treaty and recommending a unity in operations at sea between the two powers. However, before a treaty could be taken any further, Sambhaji Angre died on 11 January 1742. His death once again opened the issue of succession between Manaji and Tulaji Angre, both sons of Kanhoji by the same mother. Before this, dividing the Angre possessions in two parts, the elder brother Sambhaji had been appointed as Sarkhel and installed at Vijaydurg, while the younger brother Manaji had been appointed as Wajaratmab and installed at Colaba. It was not appropriate to divide the possessions like this. But the Peshwa had felt at the time that this plan was beneficial to him in that it had helped keep the two Angres under his check. After Sambhaji’s death, Manaji went to meet Shahu Maharaj at Satara, trying to secure the office of the Sarkhel for himself since he was next in line for the inheritance. Maharaj announced, whoever frees two most important locations, Anjanvel and Govalkot, from the Siddis the office of the Sarkhel would be conferred upon them. It was a matter of deep shame that the efforts to capture these two locations had been going on for so many years till then. Yamaji Shivdeo was mediating on behalf of Manaji. Later, Tulaji Angre took up the adventure of freeing those two locations, and Yamaji Shivdeo stood guarantee, upon which the office of the Sarkhel was given to Tulaji by Shahu. In 1743, Tulaji seems to have been referred to with an epithet of Sarkhel. While at Satara, Manaji submitted written complaints against the Peshwa and Ramaji Mahadev to the Chhatrapati. In it, the main complaint was that the Peshwa had captured his stations like Paalgad, Mirgad, Uran etc. belonging to him. But Shahu could not resolve these complaints.

From the time Tulaji took over as Sarkhel in 1742, his attacks on the British shipping hurt the Company to the extent of five lakh rupees a year. In 1743, he attacked their ketch (usually a two-mast sailboat approximately 40 feet long) called Salamander, which took shelter in the fort of Colaba. In November 1743, a twelve-hour gun-battle with a British convoy and several of Tulaji’s ships was followed by another on the first day of December 1743, when Tulaji’s Ghurabs had to flee from the scene. When Tulaji attacked forts of Govalkot and Anjanvel in 1744, the British sent two ships named ‘Restoration’ and ‘Bombay’ to thwart his bid.

To be continued…

ANGLO-MARATHA ALLIANCE

The defeat of the Portuguese at Vasai in May 1739 at the hands of the Marathas, led to their territories shrinking to Goa and a few outposts. The forts of Korlai and Chaul held by them were south of Colaba and had a garrison of eight hundred men. However, given their weak position, the Portuguese decided not to retain possession of these and wrote to the British whether they would be willing to take over Chaul and Korlai. The British discussed this offer of the Portuguese Viceroy and wrote back that rather than allow Manaji to get the possession of these strongholds, and the Siddis being too weak to be able to hold them, they should be offered to Shahu. The British refused to take over the forts saying, “Our situation is now so dangerous, as lays upon us a necessity to keep measures with these new neighbours, who would immediately be alarmed with jealousies on our application to the Shahuraja’s court.”

They concluded, “So that there remains no choice but the Marathas, whose effects are already so powerful that the reduction of the whole coast to their obedience seems infallible and sooner or later they cannot fail to get possession of these forts.”

The Marathas at Sashti, only across a narrow strip of water from Bombay, were thus considered such a threat that they did not wish to excite the suspicions of Bajirao and Chimaji by taking over these forts. The Portuguese signed a treaty with the Marathas thereafter, by which the forts of Chaul and Korlai would be handed over to them.

Eventually, it was Sambhaji’s battle with Manaji that did the greatest harm to the power of the Angres as well as the Maratha Navy. In early 1740, when Bajirao and Chimaji Appa were near Aurangabad fighting Naseer Jung, Sambhaji once again made a bid to capture Colaba. To save Manaji, Nanasaheb and Chimaji came to the Konkan, as did Captain Inchbird from Bombay. Sambhaji’s fleet was caught between the Maratha land forces and the British fleet, however, Nanasaheb did not accept the British offer to close the issue and allowed Sambhaji to withdraw.

Nanasaheb did, however, imprison Sambhaji’s brother Tulaji Angre, and carried him off to Pune in chains. Sambhaji Angre, a devotee of Brahmendra Swami, requested him to obtain Tulaji’s release. The Swami assured him that he will get it done and wrote to Chimaji and Nanasaheb. The Swami’s request was complied by Chimaji Appa, who wrote, “You have ordered that I should remove the shackles of Tulaji Angre. So, I have written and it is done.”

Nanasaheb too wrote to the Swami, “There is nothing more to me than your order. I have already brought Tulaji to Pune and broken his shackles.”

Manaji was saved from Sambhaji in April 1740, but the loss of Karanje and Elephanta island to the Peshwa’s army stung him. He felt that the growing power of the Peshwa would soon overwhelm him. He, therefore, patched up with Sambhaji.

With distant campaigns to the south, the north, and the east, the Marathas spread across the Indian land mass in the next two years. Sambhaji’s activities in the south Konkan from his stronghold at Vijaydurg contined, while Manaji stayed at Colaba. Captain Inchbird – the most experienced British diplomat who was well-versed with native customs and language – supported a treaty with the Peshwa against Sambhaji. On 16 May 1740, he submitted his report to the Board at the fort of Bombay, “The Marathas are so jealous of Sambhaji’s power and so many hostilities have already passed between them, that they are bent upon reducing him and will in all probability attack him as soon as a proper season will allow of the entering upon action. Chimaji having at present retreated with his forces up country to secure his family interest and succession on Bajirao’s death. They have been likewise very pressing to gain a declaration of our intentions in case of their attacking Sambhaji Angre whether we will assist them with our fleet or not.

“The Board are unanimously of the opinion that in our present situation and state of war with Sambhaji Angre and the little prospect there is of bringing him to any reasonable terms of peace, we cannot do better than embrace the Maratha party, and assist them in any expedition against him.”

At this time, the British were close friends of the Maratha power. They were also united in their opposition to Sambhaji. In separate letters Shahu wrote to the Peshwa and Chimaji that he trusts them and that “they behave with loyalty”. The talk of a combined Anglo-Maratha force attacking Vijaydurg thus began as early as 1740. It was Bajirao and Chimaji’s death in that year that delayed this measure by over a decade.

To be continued…

CAPTURE OF DERBY

The Derby was attacked on 26 December 1735. An entire day, from six in the morning to five in the evening, had been spent in capturing it, taking down one mast, then another, firing shots into the main body of the ship, until she lay immobile in the water. Then, the British crew surrendered and Angre’s men boarded the captured vessel. A further letter from Captain Abraham Anselone, the ship’s captain said to Bombay, “Seven of our men were killed, five more their legs shot off and many other wounded. There is 115 of us now prisoners with Angres. He seems to insist on peace of no (release?) for us…”

The ship was later taken to Vijaydurg, and the crew sent to prison. British authorities at Bombay began negotiations, however, Sambhaji did not budge.

In April 1736, a royal envoy named Raghuji Rajwada went to meet Sambhaji Angre to convince him to cooperate with Shahu, who was keen to win the Govalkot and Anjanvel forts. He wrote to Chimaji Appa about what transpired in the meeting. “The Sarkhel answered that, ‘the Swami has done good for us! He engaged us for a year saying he will give Colaba, but there is no fruit. Meanwhile, Siddi Saat said to me that in my interest we should help each other. We should defeat the siege at Govalkot fort. He has promised to win Colaba for me. I will act accordingly.’”

Sambhaji not only justified his alliance with the Siddis, but questioned Shahu’s claim on the Konkan. Raghuji Rajwada reported his conversation, “’What has Rajashree (Shahu) got to do in the Konkan? Half is the Shamal’s (Siddi), half is ours, why are you quarrelling here?’ Raghuji asked him, ‘Who gave you the Konkan?’ To this, Sambhaji answered, ‘It was given to me by God.’ (Raghuji asked) ‘But are you not a servant?’ Sambhaji replied, ‘We are rebels, what are you going to do about it?’”

Seeing Sambhaji aligning with Siddi Saat, Raghuji made his recommendation: “If Siddi Saat is sunk, half of Sambhaji Angre’s intoxicated arrogance will disappear.”

Siddi Saat made good his promise to Sambhaji and advanced north to attack Manaji near Colaba. He attacked Maratha forts, and put to the sword the entire Maratha garrison at the fort of Rewas. Hearing this, Chimaji Appa rapidly descended into the Konkan and in a seminal battle at Kamarle, near Sagargad, Siddi Saat was killed and the power of the Siddis was broken.

The death of Siddi Saat was a major triumph for Chimaji. There was a lull in the quest to capture Colaba. Three years would pass before Sambhaji would come back to attack Manaji.

After nearly a year, in November 1736, Captain James Inchbird visited Vijaydurg and met Sambhaji. A strong armada comprising six British warships came to Vijaydurg harbour. However, no agreement could be reached. When Sambhaji’s chief minister, Visajipant, came aboard the British vessel to negotiate, Inchbird refused to let him go until all the British prisoners were released. Inchbird finally agreed to come ashore and meet Sambhaji (after he had taken some hostages as security) and made a visit to Vijaydurg, where he was well-received and even taken around the fort. Eventually, a treaty was signed, and the crew returned to Bombay.

Significantly, Sambhaji’s proposed treaty contained some interesting clauses, two of which assert that he considered Shahu as a Master, but the Siddi and the Portuguese as his friends:

1. To the end that Colaba may be delivered up to me, I insist upon your going down with your fleet, to put me into perfect possession of the same.
2. As I am obliged to obey the Shahuraja, my Master, in order to please him, I must feign an attack against the Siddis with my own fleet.
3. That I look upon the Portuguese and Siddis as my friends, but if any difference should happen to arise, the British shall stand neutral.

The Derby seaman who wrote of the ship’s capture had this editorial comment about Sambhaji’s strategy, “Sambhaji now thought he was assured he had got his ends, and tells Inchbird, ‘I have now,’ says he, ‘made peace with the British of Bombay,’ and so made solemn protestation against those that broke it first; that he did not care for the Shahuraja, nor the Bajirao…”

The Derby affair of 1735 and the long-drawn negotiations for the release of its crew is an example of Sambhaji’s practice and his policy. The Vijaydurg Sardar’s relations with the Peshwa remained rocky with outward civility coupled with inner hostility. As for Shahu, he chose to appear loyal, without actually helping him.

The release of the crew did not end the war between Sambhaji and the British and there were skirmishes at sea until 1739. Manaji had similar encounters with the British near Colaba. The British too brought warhips from Mocha to blockade Angre’s ports. Periodically, there were letters seeking a reconciliation. However, both sides knew their offers of peace were a kind of subterfuge. The British and Angre, therefore, remained on their guard at all times. Sambhaji was careful in the selection of the ships to attack and usually steered clear of any armed fleet. Indeed, the British navy was unable to ply with any assurance of safety owing to sudden attacks by Angre.

To be continued…

SAMBHAJI VS MANAJI

The relations between the Peshwas and the Sarkhel were on a downswing since 1733. At that time, it was the failure to secure help from Sambhaji Angre that forced Bajirao to abandon the campaign against Janjira. Sambhaji felt that as the newly appointed Sarkhel, it was his right to have Colaba under his charge. However, Manaji was reluctant to be subservient to Sambhaji. Sambhaji attacked Colaba, therefore, and Manaji fled to Revdanda fort further south. Lakshmibai Angre, Kanhoji’s widow, complained of Sambhaji’s actions to Shahu, “Chiranjeev came from Vijaydurg to Colaba, he spoke ill to me and Manaji, I was driven out and he decided to take Manaji’s life. On hearing this, early morning he fled to Revdanda.”

Sambhaji followed Manaji to the fort of Revdanda, and once again he had to flee. Manaji was in dire financial straits, which is reflected in the letters he wrote to moneylenders at Alibaug, seeking small loans for himself. At this time, Sambhaji too wrote to Bajirao (in December 1734), seeking a personal meeting and mediation to resolve the domestic dispute between the two brothers. In 1735, Bajirao brokered a peace between Manaji and Sambhaji. A division of assets between the two brothers was planned. Manaji was designated as the Wajaratmab and given control over Colaba, while Sambhaji was given Suvarnadurg and Vijaydurg forts. The brokered agreement, however, did nothing to soothe Sambhaji’s desire to be the sole master of the Angre Navy. In fact, it achieved quite the opposite.

After a year of cooperation with Shahu and trying to capture the Siddi’s fort of Govalkot and Anjanvel, Sambhaji once again tried to capture Colaba. Seeing the strength of the Peshwa’s land forces and his support to Manaji, Sambhaji made common cause with the Siddis of Janjira, at that time the arch enemy of the Marathas, on the west coast. Several letters testify to this alignment. Nanasaheb, who was in Satara, wrote to Chimaji Appa and mentioned Chhatrapati Shahu’s letter to Sambhaji, “The Rajashree Swami has written to the Sarkhel (that), ‘we have heard that you plan to give forts Mandangad and Vijaydurg to the Shamal (an alternative name for the Siddis due to their dark skin) and sign a treaty with him; what is this? Your father served us loyally at so many places and you are his son. Is it possible for you to do such a thing? Henceforth, do not entertain such thoughts and protect and reinforce the places in your charge.’”

Eventually, Sambhaji Angre did join forces with the Siddis. A letter from the Maratha Subedar Ramaji Mahadev Biwalkar to Chimaji Appa on 23 December 1735 said, “The Shamal (Siddi Saat) and Sarkhel have come to an agreement. They have a joint Chowki at Kelshi (a village in Konkan) and their officers collect dues jointly. They have sent robes of honour to each other.”

Sambhaji Angre’s fleet was indeed powerful, and his exploits at sea could not be checked by the British or the Dutch. In December 1735, a British ship named ‘Derby’, that did not carry his passport was attacked and captured. It was brought to Suvarnadurg and its cargo removed to compensate for the payment. The crew was kept in prison and the British at Bombay had to negotiate for their release.

Sambhaji’s method of capture of the Derby is graphically described by one of the sailors on board the Derby, and gives us an idea of the Maratha mode of naval warfare, using their smaller, swifter ships against larger ships carrying larger ordnance, “About six in the morning, the enemy fired upon us, which was returned, everybody being in their Quarters according to the Quarter-Bill fix’d at the Mizzen-mast (the aft-most mast in a two or three mast ship; it is shorter than the main mast). We kept continual firing, and finding they kept under our stern, cut away our Transome (the flat part of the ship at the stern that is above the water) and Balcony, for the more convenient traversing our stern guns. The Captain proposed putting the ship about; I being in the Waist, and having everything ready, heard that there was an objection made thereto, so stood Head to Sea. About eight o’clock they destroyed most of our rigging. We got our men to splice our rigging; and clap stoppers on, but was shot away as fast as repaired. By ten o’clock the Mizzen-mast was shot by the board, having so little wind, could not make the ship answer her helm. Our long-boat catching fire, cut her away; our Yaul (a two-mast ship) at the same time being shot down upon deck, hove her over boar. At one, the main-mast went. At the same time, two double-headed shots came into the Bread-room between wind and water, one under the Chesstree – the ship at the same time having two-foot water; and tho’ proper endeavours were taken to stop the leaks yet made a great deal of water. Had two double-headed shot and a large stone in the Fore-mast, which damaged it so much, we deemed it incapable of service.

“Our ship lying all the time of the engagement, like a log in the water, not having any wind to command her, he (Captain) thought proper to consult with his officers what would, or could be done, telling them that we might fight an hour or two longer, but it would be to no purpose. That he was persuaded the enemy would not leave us, since they had shot away all our masts and that it was impossible for us to get clear of them, and that by contending longer, would be only murdering our mem. Therefore, by 4 or 5 o’clock in the evening, the Captain and the officers jointly agreed to surrender the ship. Accordingly, she was surrendered, and the enemy came aboard us.”

To be continued…