The relations between the Peshwas and the Sarkhel were on a downswing since 1733. At that time, it was the failure to secure help from Sambhaji Angre that forced Bajirao to abandon the campaign against Janjira. Sambhaji felt that as the newly appointed Sarkhel, it was his right to have Colaba under his charge. However, Manaji was reluctant to be subservient to Sambhaji. Sambhaji attacked Colaba, therefore, and Manaji fled to Revdanda fort further south. Lakshmibai Angre, Kanhoji’s widow, complained of Sambhaji’s actions to Shahu, “Chiranjeev came from Vijaydurg to Colaba, he spoke ill to me and Manaji, I was driven out and he decided to take Manaji’s life. On hearing this, early morning he fled to Revdanda.”
Sambhaji followed Manaji to the fort of Revdanda, and once again he had to flee. Manaji was in dire financial straits, which is reflected in the letters he wrote to moneylenders at Alibaug, seeking small loans for himself. At this time, Sambhaji too wrote to Bajirao (in December 1734), seeking a personal meeting and mediation to resolve the domestic dispute between the two brothers. In 1735, Bajirao brokered a peace between Manaji and Sambhaji. A division of assets between the two brothers was planned. Manaji was designated as the Wajaratmab and given control over Colaba, while Sambhaji was given Suvarnadurg and Vijaydurg forts. The brokered agreement, however, did nothing to soothe Sambhaji’s desire to be the sole master of the Angre Navy. In fact, it achieved quite the opposite.
After a year of cooperation with Shahu and trying to capture the Siddi’s fort of Govalkot and Anjanvel, Sambhaji once again tried to capture Colaba. Seeing the strength of the Peshwa’s land forces and his support to Manaji, Sambhaji made common cause with the Siddis of Janjira, at that time the arch enemy of the Marathas, on the west coast. Several letters testify to this alignment. Nanasaheb, who was in Satara, wrote to Chimaji Appa and mentioned Chhatrapati Shahu’s letter to Sambhaji, “The Rajashree Swami has written to the Sarkhel (that), ‘we have heard that you plan to give forts Mandangad and Vijaydurg to the Shamal (an alternative name for the Siddis due to their dark skin) and sign a treaty with him; what is this? Your father served us loyally at so many places and you are his son. Is it possible for you to do such a thing? Henceforth, do not entertain such thoughts and protect and reinforce the places in your charge.’”
Eventually, Sambhaji Angre did join forces with the Siddis. A letter from the Maratha Subedar Ramaji Mahadev Biwalkar to Chimaji Appa on 23 December 1735 said, “The Shamal (Siddi Saat) and Sarkhel have come to an agreement. They have a joint Chowki at Kelshi (a village in Konkan) and their officers collect dues jointly. They have sent robes of honour to each other.”
Sambhaji Angre’s fleet was indeed powerful, and his exploits at sea could not be checked by the British or the Dutch. In December 1735, a British ship named ‘Derby’, that did not carry his passport was attacked and captured. It was brought to Suvarnadurg and its cargo removed to compensate for the payment. The crew was kept in prison and the British at Bombay had to negotiate for their release.
Sambhaji’s method of capture of the Derby is graphically described by one of the sailors on board the Derby, and gives us an idea of the Maratha mode of naval warfare, using their smaller, swifter ships against larger ships carrying larger ordnance, “About six in the morning, the enemy fired upon us, which was returned, everybody being in their Quarters according to the Quarter-Bill fix’d at the Mizzen-mast (the aft-most mast in a two or three mast ship; it is shorter than the main mast). We kept continual firing, and finding they kept under our stern, cut away our Transome (the flat part of the ship at the stern that is above the water) and Balcony, for the more convenient traversing our stern guns. The Captain proposed putting the ship about; I being in the Waist, and having everything ready, heard that there was an objection made thereto, so stood Head to Sea. About eight o’clock they destroyed most of our rigging. We got our men to splice our rigging; and clap stoppers on, but was shot away as fast as repaired. By ten o’clock the Mizzen-mast was shot by the board, having so little wind, could not make the ship answer her helm. Our long-boat catching fire, cut her away; our Yaul (a two-mast ship) at the same time being shot down upon deck, hove her over boar. At one, the main-mast went. At the same time, two double-headed shots came into the Bread-room between wind and water, one under the Chesstree – the ship at the same time having two-foot water; and tho’ proper endeavours were taken to stop the leaks yet made a great deal of water. Had two double-headed shot and a large stone in the Fore-mast, which damaged it so much, we deemed it incapable of service.
“Our ship lying all the time of the engagement, like a log in the water, not having any wind to command her, he (Captain) thought proper to consult with his officers what would, or could be done, telling them that we might fight an hour or two longer, but it would be to no purpose. That he was persuaded the enemy would not leave us, since they had shot away all our masts and that it was impossible for us to get clear of them, and that by contending longer, would be only murdering our mem. Therefore, by 4 or 5 o’clock in the evening, the Captain and the officers jointly agreed to surrender the ship. Accordingly, she was surrendered, and the enemy came aboard us.”
To be continued…
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