THREE OPTIONS

Even though Saadat Khan made tall claims about his victory, it was still a victory of Malharrao Holkar’s guerrilla warfare. Since they could not find the river crossing quickly, there was some loss of lives. Saadat Khan’s success in the Doab gave hope to Khan Dauran, and instead of offering terms to the Marathas and turning back for the capital, he decided to move ahead and join Saadat Khan in his proposed chase across the Chambal. At Agra, after two days’ rest, Saadat Khan told his men that they should “be ready to march with four days’ provisions and water, and if anyone should be found in his tent after the hour of departure, his horse would be hamstrung, and himself paraded in derision around the camp.”

Preparing to carry the food and water in leather bags and vessels, he also loaded his elephants and camels with light artillery and swivels. He then “declared that he was resolved to pursue the enemy beyond the Chambal, and that he would be the first at the head of the troops to throw himself into the waters.”

Just then, Saadat Khan received a letter from Khan Dauran that he was “setting out to join him, and recommended his waiting a little until he might proceed with him on the destruction of those freebooters.”

Saadat Khan had just “mounted a horse, and was at a loss how to act.”

However, he eventually stopped his march, and moved west to join Khan Dauran near Mathura three days later. Kamruddin Khan and Bangash were still about thirty Kos from Delhi on the way to Ajmer, awaiting the Marathas in that quarter. On Khan Dauran’s arrival in Agra, “six or seven days were spent in visits and entertainment.”

Khan Dauran had twenty-five thousand horsemen, many cannons and elephants. Mohammed Khan Bangash soon joined them with another twelve thousand men. In this manner, there were nearly ninety thousand men around Agra while Vazir Kamruddin Khan, somewhat nearer Delhi, was barely a day’s march to the west of them.

At Kotila near Gwalior, Bajirao took stock of the situation. The safest option was to turn back to the Deccan in the face of these overwhelmingly large Mughal armies blocking his way to Delhi. The next option of staying at Ater or Gwalior in the ravines of the Chambal for long, was not safe. The last option was to move on and attack Delhi.

In his letter to Chimaji Appa written on 5 April 1737¸ Bajirao assessed his situation. “With Shree to Rajashree Appa, Bajirao Ballal sends his blessings. Everything fine here on 2 April 1737, near Sawai Jainagar. I sent my heavy luggage and camp followers to Bundelkhand with Raja Jagatraj and have gone light. The report about that, the battle with Saadat Khan, and the Sardars joining us, was written in detail and dispatched with Chaturbhuj Kashid (messenger), which you would have received and understood everything. Saadat Khan crossed the Yamuna and reached Agra. If we attacked him, since he had shelter of Agra fort, he might or might not break. If we held our patience and stayed at the confluence of the rivers Gambhir and Yamuna; the place had too many ravines. Khan Dauran and Mohammed Khan Bangash were coming from Delhi to Agra and once they joined Saadat Khan, the matter would become difficult to deal with, and therefore, staying at the Sangam of the rivers would not be wise.

“Secondly, Saadat Khan had written to the Badshah, and Amirs Khan Dauran and Kamruddin Khan, that ‘the Maratha army came across the Yamuna and I sank them. I killed two thousand, drowned two thousand in the river. Malharrao Holkar and Vithoji Bule were killed. So whatever Bajirao’s raid had fallen upon us, this is what happened to him. There is no strength left in his army. I will cross the Yamuna and push the Marathas beyond the Chameli (Chambal).’ He wrote many things that were mere gossip. He received the Badshah’s approbation and rewards in the form of robes, a pearl necklace, an elephant, and a turban. His emissary was also rewarded with a turban. Saadat Khan got it agreed that he was victorious. To top it, he also wrote back to the Amir many disparaging comments. I got this information from Rajashree Dhondo Govind from time to time. In conclusion, ‘my army has no strength left, it is lifeless, it has been sunk and demolished,’ is what he wrote. He showed it as a game of ‘hide and seek’.

“However, you know the typical Mughal way of doing business. They do little, boast a lot. What the Badshah thought was true, has to be proven false. There are two options of achieving this: one, sink Saadat Khan, or the second, go to Delhi and burn its suburbs, which would prove their claims to be false. When I found Saadat Khan would not leave Agra, I decided to go to Delhi, burn the city’s suburbs, and show the Badshah that the Marathas are still here, and on 18 March 1737, we marched off.”

Bajirao, watching the developments from across the Chambal, had found the opening he needed to execute the third and most hazardous option.

To be continued…

HOLKAR ATTACKS DOAB

Towards the end of February 1737, Khan Dauran erected his campaign tents outside Delhi and the next day he began marching towards Ater to chastise the Marathas. Seeing that Bajirao was attacking Agra from Bhadawar province, the Mughal officials hastily marched off to block him on 8 March 1737. There, they got the news that Jaisingh had started from Jaipur, and Bundi’s Budh Singh had joined the Marathas. Two weeks later, Vazir Kamruddin Khan started from Delhi by camping at Char Baugh near the Yamuna. He did not progress far, however, and was ‘loitering’ forty Kos from Delhi. By that time, Khan Dauran was in Agra, with his forty thousand strong army. Kamruddin stopped on the borders of the province of Ajmer and was joined there by Mohammed Khan Bangash who came from his seat at Farrukhabad. Saadat Khan, coming from Awadh, was in the Doab when Ater fell to the Marathas. Abhay Singh was at Jodhpur, where he kept himself intoxicated, “by the use of opium. He slept the whole day and spent the whole night in asking what was to be done.” However, not long after, he started from Jodhpur at the head of his army. The Nizam, to whom Kamruddin Khan looked with hope, came to Burhanpur and moved slowly north. Khan Dauran and the Badshah kept their communications open, and when the Badshah heard that Ater had fallen, he asked Khan Dauran to begin peace talks with Bajirao.

Hearing that the Marathas had fallen upon Aniruddha Singh, Saadat Khan and Safdarjung immediately started from Faizabad for his help. The moment they came upon the Yamuna, they got the news report that Ater had fallen. Since the river crossings had been taken under his control by Baji Bhivrao, Saadat Khan could not cross it.

At Ater, Bajirao was barely thirty Kos south of Agra. Two large Mughal armies led by Khan Dauran and Kamruddin Khan converging on Agra seemed to block the straight road towards Delhi. Saadat Khan’s army from the Doab was attempting to cross the Yamuna to join them. The Peshwa, therefore, planned a diversionary raid into the Doab, to divide the Mughal armies. He decided to ensure that the forces of various Mughal Sardars do not come together.

On 1 March 1737, Malharrao Holkar, Satwoji Jadhav, Pilaji Jadhavrao, Vithoji Bule and Baji Bhivrao with a lightly equipped ten thousand strong army comprising entirely of the cavalry; crossed the Yamuna at Rapri, about thirty Kos northwest of Itawa, and began looting the cities in the Doab. First, Holkar came to Itawa and then moved to Shukohabad, Firozabad, and Itimadpur, plundering the region. Lalji Khatri, the chief at Shukohabad, gave one-and-a-half lakh rupees and an elephant to Holkar and saved his city. From there, Malharrao kept plundering the region and advancing towards Firozabad. At Itimadpur, Holkar had come within a dozen miles of Agra across the Yamuna. Holkar then turned east and went deeper into the Doab, attacking Jalesar (Jaleshwar).

At this time, Saadat Khan was at Itawa. By forced marches, he turned east to find Holkar’s army. On 12 March 1737, at sunrise, Holkar came across Saadat Khan’s son-in-law Abdul Mansoor Khan, the later Safdarjung, leading Saadat Khan’s vanguard with twelve thousand horsemen. Thinking this force was very small, Holkar began an encircling manoeuvre around this army. Mansur Khan, however, began stepping backwards slowly, with the Marathas chasing him, until Holkar found himself face to face with the main army of fifty thousand men led by Burhan-ul-Mulk Saadat Khan. Both immediately attacked the Marathas on so passionately, that the Marathas being very few, were forced to run away to cross the river. Seeing himself unequal to the task of facing an army six times larger, Holkar turned back. The Mughal army gave chase. Ten miles to the northeast of Agra, there was Itimadpur lake, where Saadat Khan captured around one thousand Marathas alive. He killed nearly one thousand five hundred Marathas including some of the Maratha Sardars. During the pursuit, the Marathas missed the ford on the Yamuna and entered the river at a wrong place. Many downed. The archer force crossed the river along with the Sardars. They were followed by Saadat Khan using a bridge of boats, crossed the river, and stayed back near Agra. The remaining somehow ran away saving their lives, crossed the Yamuna, and joined Bajirao’s main force on 23 March 1737 at Kotila near Gwalior.

To be continued…

IMPERIAL COURT IN DILEMMA

Jaisingh explained clearly the situation without any fear in full court. He had posed a question as follows, “Even a powerful Badshah like Aurangzeb could not subdue the Marathas. In the long period after Aurangzeb, the Maratha power has increased tremendously, and the provinces like the Deccan, Gujarat and Malwa have actually passed under their control. Not a single imperial Umrao can summon up the strength to apply brakes to their advance. Their strength has been on the rise further, and with time the Badshah has had to accept ignominy all the time. I am fully aware of the nature of Shahu Chhatrapati, Peshwa and his Sardars, and I have understood their objectives and thoughts completely. Not a single one of them wishes to betray the Badshah or to destroy him. Instead, they inform that we should make arrangements for their livelihood, so that they will themselves secure the imperial realms. They will maintain armies in their service and will fight with our enemies. The Badshah has to rule Hindu subjects in this country. Akbar Badshah was a great man. He was also presented with a similar difficult question that time. He adopted a generous policy and took back the weapons he had raised against the Rajputs. Taking a reconciliatory path, keeping them happy, he brought real strength to the Empire. What is the problem in doing a similar thing even now? We should invite the Peshwa to meet us here, and entrust him with the responsibility of protecting us. Upon receiving this responsibility, his rebellious streak would be tamed. There is no disgrace for the Badshah in entering into such clear agreements with the Peshwa. I will take the responsibility to bring all this about in an appropriate manner. At least we don’t see any other solution to protect ourselves in the present situation.”

Jaisingh had proposed such flawless argument. However, the Mughal court began to talk of two Hindu rulers coming together against the Mughal Badshah, and Jaisingh’s motives became suspect. The opposition parties stated, “Jaisingh has secretly joined the Marathas and wishes ill for the Empire. They are co-religionists and help each other. If all of us fight with a unified front and equal passion, we can easily subdue the Marathas.”

Khan Dauran argued vigorously in favour of the Peshwa, showing his mother’s tour of holy places as proof of Bajirao’s desire to serve the Badshah. He accused Saadat Khan of collaborating with the Nizam to dethrone Mohammedshah. Jaisingh felt their diplomacy at Delhi would not succeed unless the Peshwa himself came to the north with a sizeable army.

Shahu’s emissary at Delhi Mayaram sent some reports of the time of this discussion at court and informed him, “The Badshah has conciliated Abhay Singh and Kamruddin Khan. Akbarabad (Agra), Malwa and Gujarat were placed in charge of Kamruddin Khan. The Badshah is upset with Khan Dauran and Jaisingh since they paid the money to the enemy and agreed to terms. Khan Dauran related to the Badshah that he had entered into an agreement with the enemy’s Sardars that they would not create any trouble for the imperial realms, and that he had only given them territory occupied by Rohillas and brigands.  Bajirao was ready to serve the Badshah in all respects. He was sending pilgrims for bathing in the Ganga from the south. He had already sent his mother for this purpose. Saadat Khan was then summoned. He said Allahabad should be given to Bangash so he would teach Chhatrasal a lesson. He himself asked for Patna and said he would give loyal service. The Badshah himself may come after the water in the river recedes. Khan Dauran and Jaisingh will come south from Jaipur and Kamruddin Khan, Saadat Khan and Abhay Singh will come from Gwalior (21 October 1735).”

Times were difficult for the Mughal court. Ill omens seemed to come even from the sky. In Delhi and Agra, rain fell for thirty hours at a stretch. Most houses in the capital collapsed and the roads were streams almost five feet deep. All attempts to foil the Maratha aggression had failed. Opposing camps in his Durbar added to the Badshah’s confusion. The massive mobilisation of his troops and the two-pronged attack of 1734-35 did not stem the vigour of Maratha invasions. And now came dreadful news that the Peshwa himself was heading for the north.

Jaisingh felt a solution could be found in face-to-face talks with the Peshwa. A grand gesture was the need of the hour. Towards this, he extended an invitation to the Peshwa, with the prospect of a direct meeting with Mohammedshah. The Peshwa accepted and decided to go north, leaving Pune on 8 October 1735, accompanied by his son Nanasaheb. Malharrao Holkar, Ranoji Shinde, Anandrao Pawar, Baji Bhivrao and Pilaji’s son Satwoji Jadhav also accompanied him.

To be continued…

KAMRUDDIN VANQUISHED

Kamruddin Khan started on 20 November 1734 and headed for Bundelkhand taking a huge force and artillery with him. The plans for the Maratha campaign were finalised on Dussehra. Bajirao’s mother Radhabai decided to go on a pilgrimage to northern religious places. For that, to ensure some man from the family was present in the north, Nana was sent on the campaign along with Pilaji Jadhavrao. He was thirteen years old at this time, and it was intended to provide him an experience of the campaign to the north and the associated political moves. On 17 November 1734, Pilaji began his journey from Koregaon, crossed the Narmada by the end of the year. Pilaji Jadhavrao, Ranoji Bhosale, Vyankatao Narayan Ghorpade, etc. many Sardars arrived in Bundelkhand at the beginning of 1735. Shahu had dispatched special letters on 14 December 1734 informing them, “We have received confirmed news report that bigger armies are coming from Delhi. We can’t gauge how difficult the situation would become. Still, avoid straying to faraway provinces for one month and stay around Fatehpur.”

By February 1735, Pilaji was in Narwar after which he confronted the Vazir in Bundelkhand. Many skirmishes between the two forces are described in the Marathi letters addressed to the Peshwa and Chimaji, “On 15 February 1735, we are at Hategaon, near the province of Bodse. Vazir Kamruddin is after us. We left the heavy equipment and camp-followers in Bundelkhand. Thereupon, the news report about the battle that occurred there through Abaji messenger and Kasidjodi (pair of messengers), has been conveyed via Rajashree Dhondo Mahadev. We had dispatched two letters with them, which you must have received and must now be aware of the details. Before this on 13 February 1735, the battle occurred while we were still travelling. We raided the army at Kamarga and looted hundred to one-hundred-and-twenty-five camels. While fighting, the Mughals ran to the tank of Udat Singh and stayed there. We also encamped half a Kos away. The next day, the Mughals had the Eid festival. But they began marching at dawn without staying back, without any marching drums, extremely quietly. We had planted Rauts (spies) around their camp for getting intelligence. The moment they came with the news, we marched off with the whole force, kept circling around the Mughal convoy, keeping their rear-guard in front of us, gave battle to the Mughals. My own security guard, Rajashree Satwoji Jadhav, Govind Hari, Ranoji and Bhika Shinde, Santaji More, Shivaji Ghalwade, Yedyaji Satkar, Arjunji Bhosale, and all the men struggled hard, vanquished a Vazir like Kamruddin Khan himself, thereafter crossed the Vetravati River along with the force, and marched towards Jatwada, Bhadawar and Gwalior. We pushed Kamruddin into the fort of Orchha. On top of this, the Mughals lost all hope to give us chase for a return attack. Even if they come, we don’t count them much. The Mughals who were chasing us, the Swami’s force attacked them from their behind, blocked their path and finished them. This battle was not ordinary. In summary, through the Swami’s unfathomable greatness, the success was ours. The Swami should not worry about anybody on our side. Detailed report has been written in the letters sent by Rajashree Jadhavrao, which will be related.”

Vyankatrao Ghorpade wrote to Chimaji, “To Sakalagunalankaran (decorated with all kinds of virtues) Akhandit-Lakshmi-Alankrit (ornamented with unending wealth) Rajashree Chimnaji Appa Swami Gosavi, Vyankatrao Narayan pays his obeisance. Knowing the situation here on 25 February 1735, do order someone to write about your situation. Your letter previously dispatched, was received. Whatever you have written to Rajashree Pilaji Jadhavrao, accordingly whatever we are doing, we have written here. Knowing the situation here, it is not like he does not plan as per the situation. Due to the threat of Kamruddin Khan, the work of collection of revenues has not progressed. The reports about the battle with Tamras (copper-skinned) has been written in the previous one or two letters in detail, which will be related to you. In summary, through the effect of your virtue, even when it was the Vazir like Kamruddin Khan, we threatened him soundly and achieved success. Much fame was also achieved on our side. The hard fight given by our men was not ordinary. You must know. We received a letter from Rajashree Anandrao Pandit Sumant. That, and other letters from Rajashree Malharrao Holkar, Rajashree Ranoji Shinde were received, which have been copied down and sent alongside. From those you would understand. We have sent our letters along with those written to my son to Nandani, so requesting the Swami to send a messenger to Nandani and acquire these letters. Upon receipt of replies for those, our messengers would come this side, do send letters with them. What more to write, keep your graceful eye out for us.”

Pilaji wrote on 2 March 1735, “The Vazir came at us with twenty-five thousand troops from Delhi. We fought two or three battles. We took two to three hundred camels from him. We have come to Sikri. Kamruddin is willing to pay five lakhs, but we don’t desire to grant him terms.  He is twelve Kos from us. We will soon return via Devgad.”

Mohammedshah was annoyed with the Vazir and Mir Bakshi for not only failing to push back the Marathas, but paying them large amounts of money. A crestfallen Khan Dauran explained to the Badshah that he had convinced the Marathas to not disturb the Badshah’s possessions. The failure of the Vazir and Khan Dauran’s campaign added strength to Jaisingh’s advice to the Badshah to come to terms with the Marathas and recruit them in the imperial cause.

Holkar, Shinde and Pilaji Jadhavrao returned home in July 1735. The Peshwa came forward nearly two miles to ceremonially receive his victorious Sardars. However, Shahu was worried. The expedition to the north and the intense mobilisation of the Mughal armies led to the king once again urging a rethink on whether it was not better to go to south, to the Carnatic, to earn money, where, “one town pays as much as one Pargana in the north. Besides, there was always a chance of a tragedy in expedition to the north and especially involving Delhi.”

These campaigns in 1735 in Malwa and Bundelkhand exposed the weakness of the Mughal Empire well enough. At the same time, the Peshwa’s mother completed her religious pilgrimage completely without fear.

To be continued…

KHAN DAURAN’S DISGRACE

The struggle between the Mughals and the Marathas was now heating up. Both the parties prepared as per their strengths for a passionate struggle. By 1733, the Mughal court found that its chief Umraos – Nizam, Bangash, and Jaisingh – had all faced defeat at the hands of the Maratha power that seemed to be spreading rapidly in newer territories of Hindustan. The previous year, they had spread over a three-hundred-kilometre wide front from Gwalior to Ajmer, approaching Agra. Jaisingh had gone forth to meet the challenge but was soon locked up in his fort while the Maratha troops had the run of the country.

A Mughal commentator named Warid has commented on the events of the period. Sawai Jaisingh, who collaborated with the Marathas, comes for special mention. Accusing Jaisingh of doing nothing when he was master of the entire region from Agra to the Narmada, Warid says he received huge amounts of money from the Badshah which he shared with the Marathas and sent them back to their homeland. “After two or three years of this procedure, the Marathas began to expect their ‘breakfast’,” as Warid styles it, “and every time grew greedier and more avaricious.”

The Nizam, who understood the Marathas better than any other Mughal Umrao, wrote to the Badshah in 1733, “The aggressions of the Marathas are increasing day by day. They are extending to northern India. They have penetrated into the important provinces of the empire. There is not much distance between Akbarabad (Agra) and Shahjahanabad (Delhi). In spite of this, people have become very heedless. They do not understand the disaster which is in front of them.”

The pusillanimous courtiers and apathetic chiefs of the Mughal court emboldened the Marathas to return every year while Bajirao raised his demands with every victory. In 1733, since the Peshwa was engaged in the Janjira campaign, he had dispatched Pilaji Jadhavrao in Malwa and Bundelkhand. At the beginning of 1734, he arrived in Bundelkhand and generated a huge fear in the Badshah’s heart. Jaisingh having failed, Mohammedshah commanded the boastful Shamsham-ud-Daulah Khan Dauran to set out with an army to expel the Marathas from Malwa. However, Khan Dauran was unwilling to move out of Delhi while the Vazir wanted to lull the Badshah with the pleasures of life so that he could retire to his own country home for a life of repose. Warid comments, “For years it had been the custom at Court, when the Dakkhan intelligencers reported the invasion of Gujarat and Malwa, to send out Mohammedshah on long visits to the various gardens around the capital, or to distract his mind by hunting and shooting expeditions in the many royal preserves. Meanwhile the Vazir sought relaxation by a visit to his country house on the canal about twelve miles from Delhi, where he would remain a month or longer. His time was taken up with fishing or hunting deer. All business was suspended, and the country remained practically without a government. The pious Mohammedan could do no more than raise his helpless hands to Heaven.”

Mir Bakshi Khan Dauran could not put off a campaign for long. He was ordered to go to Malwa in June 1733; he eventually rode out in February 1734 with his brother Mir Aatish Muzaffar Khan, when Bajirao had just returned to Pune from his Konkan campaign. In March, the Umrao moved another six miles outside the capital and stopped there.

Much used to the easy life of the Mughal capital, Khan Dauran sent his brother Muzaffar ahead, who led the army as far as Sironj. Here, “The Marathas returned, surrounded his camp, and by continual skirmishes, so straitened his quarters, that provisions and necessaries became scarce in his army; but he contented himself with conserving his person, and waiting for orders from his brother and the Badshah.”

Thus ended Khan Dauran’s campaign, and he returned to his life in the palace, distributing alms for “extricating so illustrious a General from the manifold dangers of that mighty expedition.”

To be continued…

JAISINGH DEFEATED AGAIN

There are many other important reasons behind the Peshwas not being able to step out in year 1732. The Dabhades had been hurt so bitterly because of the battle of Dabhoi, that Umabai began behaving like a stung honeybee, and began a spree of stinging attacks everywhere. Therefore, a fidgety Shahu on this account kept the Peshwa brothers near him. Besides, around the same time, the affair of Janjira’s Siddis had escalated, and Brahmendra Swami had begun insisting at Shahu’s court to mount a campaign against them. So, Shahu recalled all his Sardars and discussed with them about the preparations for this campaign. Since Shahu’s nature did not have the ability to display quick results, too much time was wasted in dry discussions. The Badshah removed Bangash and appointed Jaisingh again on the office of Subedar of Malwa in September 1732, and finalised everything related to the army he needed to drive the Marathas away from Malwa; the other preparations were required etc. After discussing with the Badshah, Jaisingh returned to Jaipur. From there, he marched off on 20 October 1732, and arrived at Ujjain in the month of December. Detailed news report of these movements was relayed to Pune by the Maratha emissaries placed at various locations. Upon this, Chimaji Appa and various other Sardars ran in from all sides to resist the Mughals. On 18 January 1733, Chimaji had encamped at Mandsaur. From there, he went straight to Bundelkhand, turning back on 22 April, he arrived back at Pune on 7 June.

In the previous year, Abhay Singh had got Pilaji Gaikwad murdered and snatched away Vadodara. Damaji, Dabhade, Bande etc. Sardars were trying to avenge that, and Shindes and Holkars had gone to help them. They captured Champaner in Gujarat. But suddenly, they got the news that Jaisingh was removing all the stations that the Marathas had established in Malwa. Both of them directly attacked Jaisingh himself. These two, Anandrao Pawar, Vithoji Bule and many others caught up with him and suddenly surrounded Jaisingh near Mandsaur. They caused to break his supply lines for food and water, and began to starve him out. Jaisingh immediately began negotiating for terms, that he would pay six lakh rupees in lieu of Chauth revenue and should be freed against that. But Holkar demanded more. Meanwhile, Sawaiji conspired to entice Krishnaji and Udaji Pawar and aligned them to his side, but Shinde and Holkar foiled that attempt and brought them back on track. Thereafter a battle also occurred. “Through the Swami’s prowess, we emerged victorious and (Jaisingh) agreed to terms.”

When the Badshah got the news at Delhi, he informed Jaisingh that he himself would embark on a campaign to help him. Due to that, the negotiations failed and, “A battle began. Marathas were ready. They mounted an all-round attack. Jaisingh’s Chandol, i.e. the rear-guard division, was completely killed. Holkar lost two hundred horses, and ten to twenty men. Holkar feigned that he was running away, turned around, and mounted a passionate attack. Badshah’s help was of not much use. So, having left no other option, Jaisingh agreed to pay the Marathas the tribute he had collected from 28 Parganas, and six lakh cash (February 1733).”

When Chimaji Appa had gone to the north, the emissaries of Hirde Sah, Aasharam and Haridas Purohit had come to Pune to meet Bajirao. After discussions with them, Bajirao had sent his emissary Mudhaji Hari with them, and sent them back to Chimaji in Bundelkhand. Even before this, Chimaji had begun the negotiations with Hirde Sah and Jagatraj about the Jagir and Chauth affairs through Govindpant Bundele. After Chimaji returned back to Deccan, Mudhaji Hari arrived in Bundelkhand. He did not connect with Govindpant. Later, the Peshwa recalled Mudhaji back to Pune. Govindpant and Mudhaji were instrumental in starting many political moves to take the objectives of the Peshwa to their logical conclusion. Chimaji succeeded in convincing Hirde Sah and Jagatraj completely, established his control over states like Orchha, Datia etc., and collected tributes from there. Overall, because of the many intricate political moves he engaged in with various rulers, although Chimaji could not display windfall gains in this campaign, he behaved amicably there and brought some kind of persistence to the Maratha control in the north. Shinde and Holkar followed Chimaji to the Deccan. They were felicitated by Shahu by conferring upon them the protocol garments (August 1733). This was their prize for defeating Sawai Jaisingh. One can achieve immediate success on a battlefield. But the delay that takes place in the actual benefits to accrue due to the negotiations and political moves was evident in this campaign.

In 1733, when Chimaji returned back to Pune from the north, Bajirao was engaged in the battle with the Siddis on the western coast. Even when it was urgent that the incomplete mission pertaining to Malwa-Bundelkhand had to be completed, both the brothers did not get a chance to leave Deccan. So, on the occasion of Dussehra, through Shahu’s auspices, they decided to dispatch Pilaji Jadhavrao on that campaign, and instructed him accordingly. He took two months to prepare and march-off. This campaign is called as Bhadawar campaign. By the end of December, he halted near Ashirgad. Pilaji Jadhavrao was accompanied by Shinde, Holkar, Pawar, Tubaji Anant, Govind Hari, Yedyaji Satkar etc. Sardars. Shinde and Holkar went ahead, besieged Badhwani, collected sound tribute, and reached Malwa. “Wrapping up the work at Datia, Shinde Holkar returned to Ahirwada and we went to Gwalior. We accomplished the Bhadawar task. We could have proceeded ahead, but the region has all become desolate. Therefore, we turned back, asked Govind Ballal if there was any task for us, and are coming back to the country taking usual halts.” This was the overall report of this campaign written by Pilaji from Narwar on 9 April 1734 and dispatched home. Overall, this year too, Pilaji could not show anything substantial. However, Bajirao had gone out up to Khandesh for a ride, and returned back to Pune.

To be continued…

MOVEMENTS OF NIZAM & BANGASH

It is impossible to apportion the blame today in such a huge complex affair, and a commotion of various human natures. It is really difficult to decide whose mistake was bigger, who was the main culprit, or what was the nature of their crime. People who had made the warriors of Malwa and Bundelkhand eat dust, were not going to accept meek surrender in front of the Senapati. Peshwa brothers had planned to completely defeat Nizam and Dabhade plan of again instigating Sambhaji II and capturing Shahu. They had prepared well to teach the Dabhades and the participants of his party a lesson that, even though both the parties were servants of a single master, the Peshwa carried the whole responsibility of the kingdom, the Senapati must act within his orders, whatever the difference of opinion they had amongst themselves, mediation by an outsider like the Nizam to resolve an internal dispute will not be tolerated. For that, they also tried secret deals to diminish the strength of their opponents. Upon coming to know that Udaji and Anandrao Pawar were behaving opposite, on 29 January 1731, Peshwa confiscated their revenue rights.

The Nizam marched to Khandesh with his well-equipped artillery. Trimbakrao started from Talegaon on the eighth day of the waxing moon fortnight of the month of Ashwin, Thursday, i.e. 8 October 1730. Halting at Dindori, he performed his father’s annual Shraadh rites on the first day of the waning moon fortnight of the same month. From there, he went to Narayangaon and then Sangamner. He met Turktaj Khan there. Then he met the Nizam on the banks of Geer River as mentioned in Farsi bulletins. This Geer was actually Girna River which flows northward from Manmad, which means that the above meeting must have happened near Chalisgaon. Nizam asked Sinnar’s Deshmukh Kunwar Bahadur to assist Dabhades. Chimnaji Damodar, who had been appointed as Sambhaji II’s Pradhan, joined Dabhade on this same route. After entering Gujarat via Taherabad, Mulher etc. Pilaji Gaikwad, Pawar brothers etc. joined Dabhade from Surat. After this, they all captured the Mandavi fort from Durjan Singh, and celebrated the Shimgi Pournima (Holi) nearby on 12 March 1731. After crossing the Narmada, they stayed at Karnali for the new moon on 26 March. Bajirao’s messengers gave them a letter there. The moment they read the letter, they decided to battle it out.

In 1730, while the campaign against Sambhaji II was taking most of Shahu’s time, this scheme of the Nizam and Dabhades was taking shape in the background. Seeing that Bajirao and Chimaji had captured two big provinces of Malwa and Gujarat, the Badshah had dispatched Abhay Singh to Gujarat and Mohammed Khan Bangash to Malwa. Mohammed Khan Bangash had been appointed as Subedar of Malwa and was at Gwalior awaiting funds from Delhi. In December 1730, Khan Dauran sent him a letter to urgently go and stop the Marathas from crossing the Narmada. Bangash who was keen to avenge his defeat at Bundelkhand, moved towards Ujjain. At Sarangpur, Malharrao Holkar began harassing his army.

Mohammed Khan Bangash reached near Ujjain. At that time, the Nizam began secret negotiations with him. Nizam informed Bangash, “Pilaji Gaikwad and Udaji Pawar have fallen out with Bajirao and they are ready to work with the Muslims. If we all come together, success will not remain far away. I will come to the Narmada very soon to meet you.”

Bangash agreed, and headed for Dhar while he sent his son Ahmed Khan to face Holkar. However, Holkar followed Bangash to Dhar and throughout February 1731 kept him busy with sporadic attacks around that city. The Nizam went to the Narmada to meet Bangash, who was delayed. On the crossing point of Akbarpur, from 17 to 28 March they discussed everything in detail about the ways to defeat the Peshwa. While this leisurely meeting was on, Bajirao was already moving rapidly against this growing coalition. The three days that Nizam and Bangash spent at Akbarpur eventually proved fatal for Dabhade. On 28 March, Bangash returned to Ujjain, and Nizam marched off towards Surat to help Dabhade. On 1 April, the Nizam was still on the north bank of the Narmada when he heard that Bajirao, having fought a battle, was rapidly moving towards Surat. The startled Nawab hurried to intercept the Peshwa. Since Bajirao’s watchful eye was peeled on his route, on 1 April, he foiled Nizam’s ploy on the battlefield of Dabhoi.

To be continued…

DEEP SINGH’S MEDIATION

The effects of the Keelak Samvatsar in year 1728 were borne by all of Hindustan. In the north, the Badshah, Mughal Umraos, and Rajput rulers began preparing to protect themselves. While the Nizam began using Dabhades and started to oppose the Peshwa again. Therefore, Shahu seriously thought about bringing Sambhaji II on the right track, and resolving the internal discord. All these huge events took place in 1730 so close and enmeshed together, that it has become difficult to separate them all out and relate the course of history in a single order.

Given the convoluted politics of the Delhi court, Sawai Jaisingh did not last long as the Subedar of Malwa. Mohammed Khan Bangash, who had faced defeat and disgrace in Bundelkhand, promised the Badshah that he would throw the Marathas out of Malwa. The Badshah thus replaced Jaisingh with Bangash as the Subedar. However, he was poorly equipped and financed for this mission. Obtaining what guns and soldiers he could at Agra, Bangash finally made his way to Gwalior.

Jaisingh, on his way back to Jaipur, began to devise ways to reconcile the Badshah with the Marathas, and if possible, recruit them in the imperial cause. Khan Dauran was Mohammedshah’s favourite, and was also in favour of such a policy. Jaisingh, therefore, decided to send some emissaries to the court of Shahu to hold talks and find out how the Marathas could be persuaded to stay south of the Narmada.

Seeing the Marathas attack both Malwa and Gujarat, the Badshah became frightened. Trimbakrao Dabhade was incensed. The Nizam began fidgeting. The whole Hindustan was discomfited. The Badshah sought Jaisingh’s advice in his fear. “He ordered him that, he should take the Mandavgad fortress back, and he should send his trusted diplomats to Shahuraja, to convince him so that the Marathas do not step into Gujarat and Malwa, and ensure that they don’t even cross the Narmada hereafter.”

Of course, to make a permanent arrangement like that, a necessity arose to investigate first, whether the Maratha were thinking about this, to acquire an understanding of their strength, to understand on which condition would they agree to leave alone Gujarat and Malwa provinces. For satisfying this need, it was important that someone met Shahu himself. In this matter, upon Udaipur’s Rana Sangramsingh’s advice, Jaisingh dispatched his trusted emissaries to Satara. Three intelligent diplomats, Deep Singh Kumbhani and Mansaram Purohit, working for Jaisingh, and Vyaghraraj (Baghji in Marathi documents) working for Sangramsingh, known for their skills everywhere, arrived at Satara in the monsoon season of 1730. They met Maharaj, Bajirao, Chimaji Appa, Purandare, Pratinidhi, Fatehsingh and Raghuji Bhosale etc. and completely experienced the situation at Pune and Satara. They discussed various things with these dignitaries and understood the overall thinking. From Satara, these emissaries went to Aurangabad to meet the Nizam. They were treated with appropriate respect there as well. They stayed at Aurangabad in the month of Ashwin and in November they started off to go back. On the way, near the Ajanta Sarai, Udaipur’s Baghji died. “The Nizam went out and brought them back. They again went to meet him. The discussion lasted for four to five hours. They had returned back alone with Ajanta.”

Deep Singh and Mansaram went back. Out of these, Mansaram had so much fallen for Shahu, that he came back to Satara and stayed here. Shahu seems to have issued an order on 13 March 1733, “Taponidhi (a collection of penance) Mansaram Purohit lives at Nandura. Go to his house, felicitate him, satisfy him and bring him for a meeting with the Maharaj.” No wonder he became very useful in establishing friendly relations between Jaisingh and Shahu.

This mediation proved to be beneficial for the Marathas. “Shahu and his Sardars had only noble intentions in their mind which would enhance the strength of our Dharma. They did not have any intention to unnecessarily finish others off and trouble them. Their officials were righteous, brave and diligent. All of them desired to live peacefully with the Badshah, Rajputs and even with the Nizam. If the annual Chauth for the two provinces, Malwa and Gujarat, eleven lakhs and fifteen lakhs respectively, is given to the Marathas without fail, they would not trouble these provinces. Instead, by stationing their forces, they would protect them.”

To be continued…

BENEFIT OF JAGIRDARS

One specific point in relation to the Jagirs must be mentioned here. We make our assumptions about the erstwhile situation based on our current political and administrative situation. We do not pay attention to many of the differences between the two situations. In the recent years, due to the growth in communication channels, it has become easier to appropriately secure the borders in remote faraway places even from a central capital city. If such resources don’t exist, the government has to make special arrangements for the security of the borders in such places. Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj used his forts in such situations. But once the kingdom expands, even this system of forts is rendered insufficient. There were many examples of castellans themselves joining the enemy. In such a situation, the Peshwas had to create many trusted independent Sardars by giving them Jagirs in faraway provinces, who would be persistent and responsible. For their own protection and survival, these Jagirdars had to fight with the enemy with their lives on the line. Because the enemy was powerful around them, they had to remain submissive towards their own central government, and ensure that it would always send help in time of need. When the Peshwas captured the faraway provinces like Bundelkhand, Malwa etc., if they had not permanently stationed brave warriors like the Shindes, Holkars, Pawars, Bundeles there, then in those chaotic times it would not have been possible to maintain the security of those regions living at the capital Satara. Fatehsingh Bhosale was established at Akkalkot, and Murarrao Ghorpade lived at Gutti and ensured the Carnatic was put in check for fifty years. The Gaikwads in Gujarat and Bhosales in Berar were also established with the same objective. The later Peshwas established the Patwardhans in southern Maharashtra with the same purpose. While creating such Jagirs, the people appointed on them were mostly those who would obey the central authority as far as possible. But they used to become uncontrollable later due to various reasons.

There is one more important point about the Jagirdari system. If the sovereign unified kingdom broke down due to some reason, the numerous individual Jagirdars remain untouched from the calamity. The Maratha Confederacy was dismantled, but the many Jagirdars of the time turned into individual principalities under the British authority. But since the Mughal Empire did not have Jagirdars, when it sank, there were no remains left behind. Even at the time of India’s independence, of the 565 principalities very few principalities belonged to the Muslims. The Muslims captured Iran in a very short time. Just five years were enough for the Bengal province to pass into British control. Whereas, the British had to toil fifty to a hundred years to capture Maharashtra.

In 1066, Normandy’s William captured England. The situation of that time deserves due consideration in relation to this subject. He distributed the English lands amongst his disciples and colleagues, and he created feudal lords whom he could trust similar to our Jagirdars. But these feudal lords later became powerful and began opposing the central rulers. At that time, the task of defeating each one of them and aligning them to the central authority became extremely difficult. This is a famous chapter in English history. So, the central rulers have only two ways to manage such a situation, either maintain perfect communication links all over the kingdom, or appoint trusted and semi-independent subordinates everywhere. Akbar had maintained an excellent network of roads and postage and communication links in his kingdom. Therefore, he could maintain security in his kingdom without awarding Jagirs. But he also did not secure much success in the hilly and remote regions in the Deccan. There was no convenient road link between even the capital forts of Raigad and Satara. Once some kind of stability is achieved in the kingdom, the communication links can be established. Peshwas never got this opportunity. In settling Shahu down, the Maratha council felt the need to freely move about outside Maharashtra, and while fulfilling it they had to create large Jagirdars at various places. This is the reason behind huge capitals and colonies of thousands of Maratha families being established in faraway places like Vadodara, Dhar, Dewas, Indore, Ujjain, Gwalior, Sagar, Jhansi etc.

To be continued…

SHAHU’S ARRIVAL IN HOMELAND

Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj’s grandson, Sambhajiraje’s son, Shahu was born on 18 May 1682, at Gangauli near Mangaon beneath Raigad in north Konkan. On 3 November 1689, Raigad fort fell into the Badshah’s hands. At that time, along with his mother, Shahu was captured and was imprisoned. He had to live this half-alive-half-dead life in imprisonment roaming around Maharashtra in the Badshah’s camp. Many have been under the impression that the Badshah transported Shahu to Delhi and kept him hostage there. This is not correct. Shahu never saw Delhi in his whole life. All his time with the Badshah was spent in the military encampments bearing the terrible privations and difficulties encountered while travelling through hills and forests amidst the confusion of war. Badshah Aurangzeb died at Ahmednagar on 20 February 1707. At that time, Shahu, along with his mother was there.

At the time of his death, the Badshah did not have any of his sons with him. Eldest Shah Aalam was in Afghanistan, youngest Kaambaksh was at Bijapur. Azamshah performed Aurangzeb’s last rites, ascended the throne and marched off towards Delhi. Shahu began on his southward journey at a point midway to Delhi in Malwa. At this time, he was accompanied only by his personal servants. There was no army. Influential Rajput Sardars like Sawai Jaisingh in the north were supporting Shahu. Shahu has mentioned somewhere for him, “Swami and Sawai Jaisingh have individual relations since long time. Whatever he wishes for Swami must fulfil.”

His mother went to Delhi and Shahu dispatched Uddhav Yogadev Rajadnya with her. Moropant Sabnis, Mahadaji Krishna Joshi, Gadadharbhat Nashikkar, and an entertaining Hindustani brahmin Shuklaji were with Shahu when he came south.

Towards the Narmada’s south there was a small principality named Beejagad also known as Wadhwani, which was ruled by a Rajput king named Mohansingh Rawal. He had been working in alignment with the Marathas and fighting with the Mughals for the past four to five years. In 1704, Nemaji Shinde had entered Malwa and mounted a huge struggle, which was supported in a large measure by Mohansingh. Shahu and him had been introduced before. So immediately after crossing the Narmada, Shahu went to him first. Shahu has described him somewhere in words, “He has been established by the Swami. He has behaved with utmost loyalty with the Swami.”

Mohansingh provided Shahu some force and some money and arranged for his further travel. This was the reason why, Shahu took the western route through Saputara-Beejagad-Sultanpur into Khandesh, instead of taking the usual eastern route via Burhanpur which would have Mughal security detail. Jotyaji Kesarkar had gone to the north with Azamshah to bring the gazette notifications for Shahu. He received those notifications from Bahadurshah on 3 August at Gwalior. After that, he came south and met Shahu at Ahmednagar. But these notifications have gone missing since then and are nowhere to be found.

Even though Shahu did not gain much military strength initially, he was immediately flooded with Maharashtra’s moral sympathy. In these people, not only the Hindus, but the Muslims had expressed their affection as well. The utter destruction of the country under Aurangzeb’s administration was starkly visible to everyone. And so were the Maratha prowess and hard work for so many years. There was a general feeling that the Badshah had begun an unnecessary oppression against them. Shahu got the benefit of this, and the moment he was released, many Zamindars and Commanders favoured him. Renowned Maratha Sardars would serve their selfish interest by aligning sometimes with Tarabai and sometimes with the Mughals. They felt Shahu’s arrival was a blessing. Because, since he had accepted the Badshah’s feudatory status, helping him would never invite anger on part of the Mughal officials. So, even the neutral Sardars also joined Shahu quickly. He also impressed everyone with his magnanimity and firmed up his position.

Mohansingh helped him reach Sultanpur. Near Sultanpur, there is a fort named Kokarmunda on the banks of the Tapti River. The Zamindar there named Ambu Pande, probably real name Amrutrao Kadam Bande, was a wealthy magnate. He joined Shahu. Both of them crossed the Tapti River, and towards the end of May 1707 arrived at Lambkani. The moment he had begun his journey in Malwa, he had begun sending letters all over Maharashtra and had urged everyone to join him. All this scribe work was probably done by Gadadhar Prahlad. Shahu’s father-in-law Rustamrao Jadhav (Savitribai’s father) got the following letter on 25 May, “You have been the Swami’s close relatives, and have helped in so many times earlier. So, it has been decided to grant you a Mansab of seven-thousand cavalrymen.”

To be continued…