WAR OF JAIPUR THRONE

After the murder of Jyotiba Shinde in Bundelkhand in 1743, the forces of Shinde and Holkar stayed in Malwa for the monsoon to control the province. Nanasaheb dealt with some issues on the west coast and took a couple of hill forts near Junnar belonging to the Nizam. The Nizam, therefore, sent his officer Sayyed Lashkar Khan to meet the Peshwa. This became a nagging issue between the two and Nanasaheb’s departure to the north was delayed until December 1744. By this time, Shinde and Holkar had subdued the Pathan Nawab of Bhopal, who then agreed to pay his annual tribute. They next laid siege to the fort of Bhilsa (Vidisha). In March 1745, the fort was captured and the treaty with the Nawab of Bhopal led to a cession of fifteen districts to the Peshwa besides a yearly payment of tribute. The ruler of Orchha was made to pay a tribute in money and elephants, and half of his territory was annexed. In his third campaign to the north in 1745, Nanasaheb stationed himself at Vidisha and began sorting out minor revolts in that area.

Ishwari Singh of Jaipur opened discussions with Shinde and Holkar, paid them the army expenses, and brought them to help him. In the month of February 1745, he defeated Madho Singh with this help. The Peshwa and his Sardars both kept up the policy of acquisition of money and did not pay attention to justice. Meanwhile, Ranoji Shinde died in the month of July 1745. After that, some estrangement occurred between his son Jayappa and his steward Ramchandrababa. Due to that the unanimity in the northern policy was disturbed.

In August 1746, Malharrao Holkar had written to the Peshwa about an evolving crisis in the Jaipur succession. He wrote that there was an agreement with the Rana of Udaipur by which Madho Singh was to receive a share of twenty-five lakh rupees, but Jaipur’s incumbent ruler Ishwari Singh was blocking it. Holkar advised the Peshwa that nobody from Delhi would join Ishwari Singh or object to any action against him, and that even nobles like Mansoor Ali Khan and Aamir Khan were in favour of Madho Singh. The letter reveals Holkar’s aim as early as 1746 to help Madho Singh gain the kingdom of Jaipur, which he claimed by virtue of being the son of an Udaipur princess.

Madho Singh and his uncle Jagat Singh did not quit the pursuit of their objectives. Meanwhile, Bundi’s Umed Singh Hada also lost his kingdom and he joined Madho Singh. On 4 October 1746, meeting at Nathdwara, they discussed many plans. They opened discussions with Malharrao Holkar and sought his help.

Along with the Jaipur dispute, the Maratha operations in the Gwalior region continued under Vitthal Shivdeo Vinchurkar. On 27 January 1747, he wrote to Shinde and Holkar that he had captured the fort of Antri, just south of Gwalior after a siege of a month and a half and was now working to capture the Narwar fort.

Malharrao sent his son Khanderao and attempted to broker some kind of compromise. But that could not get implemented, and the affair came to a head. Jaipur’s experienced and hereditary Dewan Khatri Aayamal, who has also been referred to in the documents with names Rajamal or Malji, died on 9 February 1747, and his son Keshavdas assumed the office of Jaipur’s Pradhan. Since then, the Maratha relationship with the Jaipur throne fell into disrepair.

The Rana of Udaipur sent his own envoy to meet the Peshwa to canvas for the cause of Madho Singh. The Peshwa was informed that Ishwari Singh had failed to hand over the promised territory to his brother. The Peshwa had taken Ishwari Singh’s side before this. Opposing that, Malharrao now took up Madho Singh’s side in hope of securing some money. The Peshwa fell into a dilemma.

Ishwari Singh was joined by Jayappa Shinde while Madho Singh was supported by Malharrao Holkar. The two Maratha Sardars were now in an open confrontation with each other. Ishwari Singh’s two commanders, Narayandas and Hargovind, attacked Madho Singh and the Rana on the battlefield of Rajmahal. The battle began on 1 March 1747, and went on for two days. “Ishwari Singh emerged victorious. He captured much plunder from Madho Singh’s contingent. Ranaji’s force ran away. Many people died on both sides. Khanderao Holkar was standing to a side. He was killed by Narayandasji.”

Ishwari Singh, supported by Shinde defeated Madho Singh with Holkar’s army and claimed the throne. After this, Jagat Singh sued for peace, which was accepted by Ishwari Singh, and he returned to Jaipur after the roaring success. A terrible famine was going on this year in the north. Due to this failure, Maharana became extremely dejected, and began pressing Malharrao for help.

To be continued…

MUTUAL ANIMOSITY CONTINUES

The Peshwa was near Jaipur at the time of Mudagad campaign. Ramchandrababa in a letter to Nanasaheb Peshwa on 1 April 1748 described the entire campaign and ended the letter saying, “Mudagad was settled by the Swami. It was lost and fell into ruins earlier. Tulaji Angre had built the fort again and settled some people atop it. From there, he would indulge into raiding to plunder all the outposts in the Panhala province. He had wrought an absolute havoc. It was like he had begun a complete annihilation. Upon that, Bawda’s Bhagwantrao, Vishalgad’s Pratinidhi, Wadi’s Sawant, Appaji Angre all joined together took five hundred cavalrymen and eight to ten thousand infantrymen, attacked Mudagad and captured it. They burnt and polished off all the region from Rajapur up to Sangameshwar. A serious warning has thus been given to Tulaji Angre without any effort on the part of Your Honour. It is necessary for Your Honour to reward Appaji Angre adequately… There were defections at the fort of Suvarnadurg. Tulaji Angre personally went there and found twenty defectors. They were all killed. The Konkan is reduced to ash. Tulaji Angre might come to Satara for the Swami’s meeting on the Varshapratipada (Gudhipadwa, Hindu new year).”

Even in the Rajkot battle, Yesaji alias Appaji Angre fought on the Peshwa’s side. Appaji Angre’s help in Mudagad and Revdanda brought him into favour with Shahu. Earlier, there had been a move to appoint Appaji Angre as the Sarkhel in place of Tulaji, and he even sent a few letters with a seal calling himself as one. However, when Tulaji heard of the possibility, a few of his followers pretending to have differences with him, joined Appaji. At the earliest opportunity, probably before May 1748, these men murdered Appaji. However, there is some uncertainty about this as Appaji is also said to have moved to Gwalior where he continued to stay with his family.

The activities of Tulaji in south Konkan continued. In May 1748, he captured three forts from his neighbours, and the matter was reported to Shahu. Shahu commanded that the forts be returned, or armies will be sent to remedy the aggression. A perturbed Shahu also declared that if the Peshwa did not send his army, he would lead an army himself.

Manaji’s wavering loyalty was always a source of anxiety to the Marathas. The Peshwa could not hold Manikgad for long. On Nanasaheb’s return from the campaign to the north, the Manikgad affair was closed on 24 July 1748, when he ordered Ramaji Mahadev that the fort should be returned to Manaji Angre.

In 1748, Tulaji went south to Cannanore. Commodore William James’ fleet was attacked near Vijaydurg in October 1749 and his ship ‘Restoration’ was carried off to the fort. A British report said, “The engagement began at 11 at night and on the 13 October 1749 about noon, it being calm, she was boarded on all quarters, when the vessel was taken and the same day carried into Gheria.”

Tulaji continued his attacks on British ships when he attacked Commodore Lisle, and in 1753, he even attacked a much larger Dutch ship with fifty guns on it. At this time, Tulaji himself was in touch with the British and sent proposals of peace to the Company. The Company replied that they “would willingly embrace (the proposal) if he could deposit lakh of rupees as a security for his not taking any ships or vessels belonging to them, for which sum he would receive an annual interest.” Tulaji, however, refused to give any security to the Company for keeping his word after he took Anjanvel.

The Company’s letter also went on to complain about Manaji Angre saying, “we are at peace, yet he frequently plunders our defenceless boats.”

The last part of the letter from the British asked the Peshwa to take measures to stop the plundering of mercantile ships, “I think it would greatly benefit your dominions as well as for the Honourable Company’s interest if you in your prudence should take some effectual measures for rooting out all the pirates on this coast, and for this purpose I am always ready to assist. Some months back, Sambhajiraja (of Kolhapur) advising me he intended march against Gheria (Vijaydurg). I then showed him how willingly inclined I was to take any good measures for effecting so necessary a work.” The mention of the ruler of Kolhapur shows that his possessions in the south Konkan around the fort of Sindhudurg were also subject to Tulaji’s depradations.

Tulaji Angre’s arrogance is expressed in his next utterances, “Yamajipant and Antaji Shivdeo came to Satara. You wrote that there is news that there have been some disturbances beneath the fort, in this regard, such acts belong to real men. Whoever wishes to, should get their doubts cleared. (We) Don’t count anybody in this regard. To top it, in this province, the subject means a group of Bhudevs (Brahmins), and apart from them, the thoughts about forts and fortresses are well-known (12 June 1755).”

This way, the animosity between Manaji, Tulaji Angre and the Peshwa went on increasing with time.

To be continued…

PESHWA-RAGHUJI AGREEMENT

The clamour about the dispute between the Peshwa and Raghuji Bhosale had risen excessively outside similar to the erstwhile Dabhade affair. Shahu had become extremely frightened that these two powerful Sardars would fight amongst themselves, and would destroy the prestige of the kingdom. But whatever documents are available describing this struggle, prompt one to speculate that this whole display of animosity had been put up for the deception of the Badshah and Aliwardi Khan on purpose. Both of them clashed in battles two to four times. The Peshwa and Raghuji met secretly once near Gwalior and another time at Gaya. The Peshwa’s main intention was to establish Maratha control all over Hindustan, and implementing the Chauth rights was a symbol of the enterprise. The Mughal officials would not accept these Maratha demands through peaceful negotiations without displaying some kind of military force. Therefore, the Peshwa and Raghuji had distributed their areas of action amongst themselves, and had been working accordingly. In that, there were some incidents where they invaded each other’s territories. After such incidents, both of them got convinced, that there were heavy losses with hardly any benefit in opposing each other. Reconciling would help both of them and the kingdom to survive. Both of them had mediators who also reasoned with them. Shahu himself urgently called both of them back and officiated the reconciliation.

Raghuji’s representative Konherram Kolhatkar was at Satara. Raghuji wrote to him from Nagpur on 17 July 1743, “Immediately after returning to Nagpur from Bengal, we have dispatched detailed letters reporting the events there. In response to them, your letter and the Maharaj’s order letters have arrived. We have been ordered to come and meet him. For that, we had thought of riding off right away. But Bhaskarram had been kept in Bengal. We were waiting for him. Presently, he has arrived two to three stops behind the Peshwa’s army, taking the same route. Once his force reached him via Malwa, the above-mentioned (Peshwa), took Seoni-Chhaparia route and taking the usual stops, came to meet us. We both met, and there is no problem now. We will arrive for meeting the Swami taking the usual stops.”

Along with Nanasaheb, Pilaji Jadhavrao too had gone to Satara. On 2 August 1743, he informed Ramchandrababa, “The reconciliation between Shrimant and Daruni Mahal (Maharaj’s queens) has occurred. The formal protocol robes are yet to be given. Once that ceremony completes in eight to ten days, we will immediately proceed to Pune. Presently, where are you, what is your plan, do write whether you will set up camp there or come back to homeland.” This reconciliation with Daruni Mahal pertained to the misunderstanding that Queen Sagunabai had formed about the Peshwa in relation to Raghuji Bhosale (her relative). It was resolved.

After coming to Satara, hardly any time was lost for the reconciliation between the Peshwa and Raghuji. Shahu resolved their dispute and fixed the areas of action as well as the overall arrangement as follows.

1. The erstwhile Mokasa (revenue rights) and Jagirs that the Peshwas had earned; the administration of Konkan and Malwa provinces; the tributes from Agra, Prayag, and Ajmer; three Tehsils from the Patna province; and the Inam villages falling within Raghuji’s territory granted to the Peshwa apart from the twenty-thousand rupees out of the receipts from the Carnatic, these items were to be considered rightfully belonging to the Peshwa. Nobody should object to this.
2. The rights of tribute from the areas Lucknow, Bahar (Bihar), and Painbengal (Bengal plains), apart from the region from Berar up to Cuttack, should belong to Raghuji. The Peshwa or anybody else should not object to it.

Working within these bounds, nobody should raise any disputes against anybody else. The offerings acceptable in the government treasury from those provinces were also agreed upon. A friendship was brought about amongst the two, and celebratory feasts were held. He got both of them to pledge at his feet that nobody should hold any untoward thought about the other. Both feasted under the government, presented each other with gifts, and Maharaj bade them farewell with these feasts and honours. The Peshwa too decided a different course of action in relation to Gadhamandala. Besides, Shahu also agreed with the Peshwa independently in this relation on 16 January 1744, which is also important.

To be continued…

BUNDELKHAND

On his northern campaign, one of Nanasaheb’s objectives was to consolidate and strengthen the foundations of the Maratha power in Bundelkhand. Bajirao had accepted the enterprise of spreading the Maratha Confederacy in the north Hindustan upon Shahu’s orders. In it, he first established Shinde, Holkar and Pawar in Malwa. Later, through Chhatrasal he got a foothold in Bundelkhand. To achieve Maratha sovereignty, and keep the Maratha threat everywhere equally, the foundation in Bundelkhand was more convenient as compared to Malwa. There was no other shelter for the Marathas more convenient than Bundelkhand, to keep a watch over an extensive region covering Rajputana, Delhi to the west, Doab, Prayag, Awadh to the north, Kashi, Patna and up to Bengal on the east. It was easy to quickly convey military resources from there to any of these places as necessary. Everybody agreed with this principle, and in the campaign of 1742, the Peshwa himself had stayed in Bundelkhand. He firmed up the first of his plans to solidify the Maratha power there. Any previous efforts before this had not had such organised form.

The central point of Bundelkhand were two locations of Jhansi and Orchha. Orchha stood at the erstwhile crossroads, six miles east of Jhansi, near the more recent Banda railway station, with the other erstwhile station posts like Chanderi thirty miles southwest, Gwalior fifty miles north, Jaitpur sixty miles east, and nearby Kalinjar. The Marathas slowly occupied these important stations as well. There were two routes to enter Bundelkhand from Deccan, the one via Ujjain-Sironj-Bhilsa, or from the southeast via Gadhamandala following the origin of the Narmada. The Peshwa had already previously taken control of these routes. The Peshwa himself had demonstrated how to keep a watch on all four sides from Orchha in this campaign lasting for one-and-a-half years.

Even though Chhatrasal and his sons had taken the help of Marathas in their helpless state, many big and small Bundela Rajput princes were ruling at various places. They did not want the Maratha control. The Marathas had begun their efforts to impose the Chauth on these kings too and to bring them under their control since the time of Chhatrasal. Bajirao had appointed Govindpant Kher Bundele on this task. He lived at Sagar and established a tradition to collect annual Chauth tributes on the basis of his military strength. Other Maratha Sardars would also visit as per their availability to collect this Chauth tribute. Orchha was under the control of a Bundela king Veersingh Deo. Six miles to the west, there was a hilly area and a small town at the base of those hills named Balwantnagar. Recognising the convenience of the location, Veersingh Deo built a fort on that hill, which later became famous as the Jhansi fort. Prithvi Singh, the current ruler of Orchha had not accepted the Peshwa’s authority.

The Sardars informed on 12 April 1742 to the Peshwa, “Rajputs were not listening to their own brothers, how would they listen to us! We are not deficient in the service of the Swami. Presently, we have come near Jodhpur. We will act as per the situation. Some revenue collections have been gathered. The region is desolate. We have dispatched the lists from which you will understand.”

From Gadhamandala, Nanasaheb entered the province of Bundelkhand and crossing the river Betwa, passed the monsoon of 1742 at Orchha. The annual chore of reducing small principalities to obedience and obtaining tribute from them continued. Peshwa encamped at Orchha for the monsoon and established his control in the regions of Damoh, Sagar, Lalitpur, Khechiwada, Ahirwada, Bhadawar etc.

The Peshwa wrote on 29 June 1742, “Quite a few days have been spent on the campaign in our own regions. After that when we arrived on the north bank of the Narmada, we resolved the Mandala affair. In the region belonging to the smaller princes, up to eight days were spent for each. All days were spent in the campaign. Thinking about returning to our homeland, the monsoons began and the Narmada rose up in flood. The boats were insufficient. Later, there was Tapti River to cross. The army would face extreme labour and it would cause great destruction. Therefore, we have encamped here.”

To be continued…

ALIWARDI’S REQUEST

Aliwardi Khan perfectly detected, that the Peshwa and Raghuji were not acting in unison and were nursing animosity towards each other. Aliwardi, in his letter to Mahadevbhat Hingne towards the end of 1742, wrote, “Raja Aayamal met the Peshwa at Sironj and convinced him to come here. This Garib (ordinary, poor mortal) with the help of God, Badshah and good fortune drove Bhaskarram from Khatwa to Panchet to Medinipur to Cuttack up to Atharpur, chased him, and recovered Bengal and Odisha. He then went to Sambalpur. He was confronted by our men and he was unable to take a stand and ran away like a jackal. This insignificant creature is now headed for Murshidabad. The Badshah has agreed to the destruction and chastisement of Bhaskarram and Raghuji, and Bhaskarram is running away from here unscathed. So, you should inform the Pandit Pradhan in detail and request him to go to Devgad and Chanda (Chandrapur) and punish Bhaskarram, and to stop Raghuji from entering this province.”

He informed the Peshwa directly about arresting Raghuji’s advance and sent him some amount of money for the expenses. However, the Peshwa did not get it, and it was carried off by the Nawab of Awadh in the middle. Meanwhile, the Peshwa received the Badshah’s order to proceed to Bengal and drive away Raghuji from there in the November 1742 at Bundelkhand.

Thus, in a way, Bhaskarram’s state of disarray became beneficial to the Peshwa. Since they had accepted the guarantee of protection of the imperial realms, the Badshah did not have any objection to grant the notifications for the Chauth to the Peshwa. Besides, the opposition that Bhosales at Nagpur had been mounting too, had to be dealt with at some point of time. Raghuji was not ready to accept the principle that the Peshwa was the chief executive of the Maratha Confederacy, and it was pertinent to align his policy with that of the Peshwa. There were instances of the two sides sparring with each other in the regions of Khandesh, Berar, Gadhamandala etc. So, the Peshwa planned to take the benefit of the opportunity which had walked right up to him and took the responsibility of checking Raghuji by entering Bengal upon the Badshah’s orders. The Peshwa’s intention in going to Bengal is documented in a letter dated 8 November 1742 as follows, “From Antarved (Doab), near Delhi, on Hindon River. The news here is, that the Shrimant’s campaign is proceeding towards Bengal.”

In early 1743, Nanasaheb’s emissaries were already in Delhi making demands for the Chauth of several provinces and promising that in return, they would protect the Badshah’s provinces. Chauth was supposed to be a payment to obtain protection and its refusal an invitation to plunder. It was not always one-fourth of the total revenue, often quite less. It was also accepted as a cession of territory by the ruler. Eventually, the scope enlarged to the Marathas keeping a small force for the protection of the rulers in exchange of regular payment of Chauth.

The events in the next few months were quite extraordinary. The Peshwa had already decided to move further east towards the Doab. Crossing the Yamuna, he reached Prayag at the confluence of the Ganga and the Yamuna. On 1 February 1743, a letter from Prayag says, “At Prayag southern bank of the Ganga. The Shrimant was in Gwalior. With an intention to establish control and proceeding towards Patna province, he arrived in Bundelkhand. Then, considering Prayag and Kashi to be nearer, he did not go to Patna, but proceeded to Prayag. In the Triveni Sangam (confluence of three rivers), they all bathed, and all rituals were completed in a very good manner. The Subedar at Prayag also gave boats almost insisting about the same. Many of our people sat in those boats, visited the fort (at Allahabad) and took darshan of the Wat tree (the Akshay Wat is an ancient banyan tree inside the fort of Allahabad said to have been where Ram and Sita once rested, and which has been revered since. It is known as ‘Akshay’ meaning indestructible or permanent, as Badshah Jehangir once tried to destroy it by burning and driving nails into its trunk and roots. However, the tree rejuvenated and lived on). It is unprecedented that three-quarters of a lakh people bathed here. It has never happened before, and it appears difficult in the future too. Unlimited blessings of good deeds (Punya) have been achieved – how much can one write about that! God’s workings are strange!”

At the present time, the Badshah was unable to save Bengal from the invasion of Raghuji, however, he was dependent on the revenue from the province. With Mansoor Ali Khan’s mission to Bengal aborted, Mohammedshah turned to the emissaries of Nanasaheb for help. By then, Nanasaheb was at Varanasi.

A letter from Mohammedshah to Nanasaheb said, “Your services this year have prevented the ingress of the enemy in our province (Malwa). I am sending you a special dress, Shirpech, a horse, and an elephant. It is surprising that the Subedar of Bengal has not been able to extricate himself from his (enemy’s) army. The consequence is this; in order to chastise Raghuji you closed the routes, and we have informed Aliwardi that this will disturb the province. He has gone to Odisha with his army. The enemy reached at this time. However, later he withdrew. The enemy will plan another attack. Our army will be ready. However, the servant (Peshwa) with sincerity in his service and considering the permanence of the treaty (about Malwa) should shut the paths of ingress of these rebels and not allow them to enter the Badshah’s territory. This will make me very happy. I have spoken to Mahadev Pandit (Mahadevbhat Hingne, the Maratha envoy at Delhi).”

To be continued…

BADSHAH AWARDS MALWA

Hearing that the Marathas had captured Dhar, the Badshah was incensed. He immediately called all his Umraos and Jaisingh for a confidential discussion. The overall purport of the discussions that occurred was, “From Dhaulpur, on the north banks of Chameli (Chambal) on 17 May 1741. Like last year, even this time, the Maratha forces would enter the Antarved (Doab) and render the region desolate. Therefore, the Badshah gathered all big and small Amirs under Sawaiji’s command and dispatched him. Subedar of Prayag and Awadh’s Mansoor Ali Khan were also sent orders to join Sawaiji. Sawaiji arrived at Agra with a huge force. The moment Shrimant heard this news, he called up Malharji and Ranoji, thought of arresting the advance of Aamir Khan and Mansoor Ali Khan, and dispatched Aavji Kavde, Govind Hari, and Sardars of many other contingents up to Prayag. Due to that, both those Subedars remained in their own provinces. Seeing this, Sawaiji thought wisely that if he faced the Marathas without their (Amir Khan and Mansoor Ali Khan) forces, he would come up short, and therefore, sent conciliatory messages. He dispatched Aayamal with the brief. Upon this, the Peshwa left Pilaji Jadhavrao with the baggage contingent, took Ranoji, Malharji and Pawar along to Dhaulpur. Sawaiji too arrived there from Agra. On 12 May 1741, Sawaiji stepped out of his army camp, and met with Shrimant. The next day, Sawaiji visited Shrimant’s tent. In summary, there is no comparison when it comes to Shrimant’s fortune. How much should one write! You will know once we meet. Everyone else including Sakharampant Bokil are fine.”

Later, the meeting that occurred was described to Pilaji Jadhavrao at Gwalior as follows, “On 12 May 1741, the meeting with Sawaiji took place. On the same evening, we went to his tent. Today, Thursday, he will come to our tent. On 20 May 1741, we will bid him farewell and return.”

In this meeting, the treaty was given basic shape which has been referred to at many places. Sir Jadhnath has written Jaisingh’s biography in which the clauses are mentioned as follows,

1. Peshwa and Jaisingh should help each other in case of foreign invasions.
2. Badshah should not be betrayed.
3. Jaisingh should get the Malwa grant-notifications from the Badshah for the Marathas in six months.

After some negotiation it was agreed that the grant-notifications of Gujarat and Malwa would be handed over immediately. The promised sum of fifteen lakh rupees was also handed over to the Peshwa.

Agreeing thus, the Peshwa returned from Dhaulpur to Gwalior. Besides, he had acquired good enough income from tributes collected at various places. Because of the advent of the monsoon, the Peshwa kept Shinde-Holkar in camp to get the remaining tasks completed, and began his return journey. He arrived at Pune on 7 July 1741.

After this, Jaisingh fulfilled his promise to the letter. He and the Badshah had got a taste of the Maratha strength. Accepting the Peshwa’s application, the Badshah informed them, “As demanded, we are sending the grant-notifications of the office of Subedar of Malwa with Hingne.” The Badshah’s grant-notifications awarding Malwa to the Marathas was issued in September 1741.

The associated Firmans were readied up and were stamped and sealed by the Badshah on 4 July 1741. The Firman had many clauses in ambiguous language. Much negotiations took place on that too, and on 7 September 1741, again another Firman was issued by the Badshah in writing agreeing to hand over the complete administration to the Peshwa along with the Dewani (civil) and Faujdari (criminal) affairs. It was dispatched to the Peshwa through Jaisingh in due course of time. But the grant-notifications pertained only to the Malwa province. Gujarat was left out. The Maratha efforts to acquire those were constantly on afterwards. But since the Marathas had already acquired actual control over Gujarat, they never needed the grant-notifications.

The project that Chimaji had begun in the Keelak Samvatsar of 1728 through a victory over Giridhar Bahadur at Amjhera, culminated in the Durmati Samvatsar of 1741. All the intervening chaos had occurred through the Badshah’s Durmati (bad ideas). The Maratha control had anyways been established already, before the grant-notifications fell into their hands. As a minor loophole, Badshah Mohammedshah too preserved his dignity by naming his son Shehzada Ahmedshah as the nominal Subedar of Malwa with the Peshwa as his deputy or second-in-command. These were usually the ways of the Mughal court. It was just that the Badshah saved his prestige by issuing the notifications.

To be continued…

MEETING JAISINGH

Travelling on from Edlabad (Muktainagar), the Peshwa crossed the Narmada. Even before, he had got the news, that Malharrao Holkar had captured the Dhar outpost on 5 January 1741. Similarly, in the Nemad province, there were stations like Handia, Badi Deori, Chhoti Deori etc. which were reported to be captured by Aavji Kavde and Trimbak Hari. Thus, even before the grant notifications from the Badshah fell into his hands, the Peshwa had begun to establish actual Maratha control all over Malwa. In late January 1741, Nanasaheb asserted his control over the small state of Ater south of the river Chambal. Bajirao had defeated the ruler in 1737 and laid down the policy of succession to be followed. Of late, the Mughals had begun to interfere in the state. Nanasaheb wrote to Mahadevbhat Hingne at Delhi to reinstate Himmat Singh as its ruler and convey the decision to Sawai Jaisingh. Issues such as these, that were carried forward from Bajirao’s time were attended to at this time.

On 16 February 1741, he wrote to Hingne, “We wrote to Malharrao not to trouble any of the regions belonging to Sawaiji. He would comply. You too discuss wisely with Sawaiji and ensure that our objectives are accomplished. Do not tarry in this regard. We trust Sawaiji completely. It behoves his stature of an elder statesman to allay our debt burden and acquire whatever is possible from the Badshah for us. If he desires something in kind, write back.”

This letter also reminded Hingne that the Nizam had agreed to pay fifteen lakh rupees, exempt the pilgrim tax at Prayag and hand over Kashi to the Peshwa. As Jaisingh was the go-between to deal with the Badshah, Nanasaheb asked Hingne to speak to the Jaipur ruler and get these done. He also wrote to Holkar not to harass Rampur, as it was a territory belonging to Sawai Jaisingh who was helping the Peshwa in Delhi. Hingne was also dispatched to resolve the matter between Holkar and Jaipur.

Nanasaheb spent the months of March and April 1741 in establishing this control everywhere, and collecting tributes from places in Malwa. It is not possible to give sole credit of whatever success was achieved in this campaign to Nanasaheb only. He had the support of erstwhile capable, experienced, colleagues, diplomats and warriors. Shinde, Holkar, Pawar, Pilaji Jadhavrao, Ramchandra Malhar, Mahadoba Purandare etc. were working in the background ahead of his visit or after him in the tasks of establishing control and collecting tributes.

Mahadevbhat Hingne was placed at Jaisingh’s court. The Peshwa wrote to him, “Tomorrow on Monday the meeting is scheduled for twenty hours. Therefore, you ought to come here (this side of Chambal) taking along three people (as protocol hostages). Malharba is insisting here, that we should hand over them to him, and then go for the meeting. We don’t need to worry when we have Biharidas Bhaiji there. You bring sons of Rajmalji and Hemraj, these would be the two, and one gentleman from the copper-skinned should be brought here and left with Malharba. Most importantly, whatever political move you have engaged in with Sawaiji, you ought to carry it to conclusion, and bring about a friendship between both the parties.” To ensure there was no betrayal, the above precaution of keeping some people hostage at the time of the meeting.

Jaisingh reached Agra with his army. Aavji Kavde with Govind Hari Patwardhan were sent to check Mansoor Ali Khan towards Allahabad. Seeing this, Mansoor Ali Khan did not join Sawai Jaisingh, who changed his approach and decided to meet the Peshwa as a friend. It was decided that Jaisingh should come to Dhaulpur beyond the Chambal, and the Peshwa should go there from this side. Accordingly, in May 1741, Nanasaheb with Shinde and Holkar crossed the river Chambal and reached Dhaulpur. In week-long parleys at Dhaulpur in the summer of 1741, the Peshwa met Jaisingh and demanded Chauth from all Mughal provinces, and in exchange he undertook protection of the Mughal Empire by the Marathas.

The clauses which the Nizam had agreed to in the Battle of Bhopal had remained unfulfilled for various reasons. Later, when Bajirao died, Nanasaheb went on this campaign, mainly to get those agreement clauses complied to. His initial intention was to visit Delhi direct, meet with the Badshah, and get a quick result. By the time he reached Gwalior, Jaisingh began discussing with the Peshwa about a compromise on behalf of the Badshah. Delhi court was now convinced that it was impossible for them to give battle to resist the Marathas. The negotiations went on between Agra and Gwalior for two months. The Peshwa initially put forth a larger demand, that the Badshah should agree to grant the Marathas the Chauth of all Hindustan, so that the Marathas would become responsible for the protection of the whole country. Upon this, after the negotiations it was concluded, if the Firman granting the Subedar office of two provinces, Malwa and Gujarat, is issued immediately in favour of the Marathas, they would ignore their greater demands and leave. To this, the Badshah displayed his approval, and informed that the Firman would be dispatched with Mahadevbhat Hingne. However, they asked that the Peshwa should submit a written application to that effect, so that the Badshah then approve that request and issue the Firman. The Peshwa dispatched the written application, and got Jaisingh to agree for a face-to-face meeting to ensure all this documentation is actually materialised.

To be continued…

BATTLE CLOUDS IN SUMMER

Here Bajirao, Shinde, Holkar, and Pilaji Jadhavrao reached Pune and began thinking about the future. One does not need to explicitly say, that Bajirao drew the expected meaning out of all these conspiratorial moves.

In Delhi, the Nizam gathered an army of thirty thousand and the best Mughal artillery he could find. Many rulers were summoned to join the Mughal army. The Bundela Rajas joined the Nizam, swelling his army to nearly seventy thousand men. Accepting the Badshah’s pre-condition to permanently drive the Marathas away from Malwa, the Nizam started off from Delhi in October along with thirty thousand cavalry, excellent artillery, and a complete authority over the administration. Leaving Delhi, the Nizam decided to avoid the ravines on the road to Gwalior, crossed the Yamuna a little south of Agra to enter the Doab, and then re-crossed the Yamuna at Kalpee to enter Bundelkhand.

Fully aware that his march into Bundelkhand and Malwa will not go unchallenged, the Nizam wrote to his son Naseer Jung to prevent the Peshwa from coming north, and if he does, to march from Aurangabad and catch him between the two armies. On 12 November 1737, the Nizam stayed at Dhamoni. And the next month the battle at Bhopal took place.

Posing a mighty scare to the Badshah and his Umraos at Delhi in the summer of 1737, Bajirao started off towards the south. Bajirao’s aggression became too much unbearable to everyone. They all decided to defeat Bajirao through any means necessary. Even though Bajirao had subdued and softened the Nizam to a certain extent, his strength was still intact. From the meeting at Rohe-Rameshwar in 1732, the Nizam-Bajirao friendly relations were apparently still intact. Even though internal frustrations and anger continued on both sides, they did not have open enmity. All this completely vanished due to the attack on Delhi in 1737. The Vazir at Delhi, Kamruddin Khan used to favour the Nizam. Mir Bakshi Khan Dauran was the only person who had maintained the policy to adopt any amity towards the Marathas so far. This policy changed henceforth. The Badshah and these Umraos decided to permanently destroy Bajirao. They invited the Nizam from the Deccan to Delhi, especially so that he would accept this adventure. He prepared well and then proceeded towards the north. At the same time, while Bajirao was returning, for about three-quarters of a month, both were staying around Bhopal and Sironj. However, they did not express their own feelings to each other, or did not meet face-to-face.

Badshah Aurangzeb had earned enmity with the Marathas and Rajputs. That became the bane of their lives for his dynasty. Bajirao caused a huge consternation for the Badshah in the period of just fifteen days to a month. Due to this, everybody was extremely frightened. All the Umraos were convinced, that if someone can free the Badshah from this tight embrace of the Marathas, it was the Nizam. All of them requested him profusely to come there and offered him the position of the Vazir. No need to say, that the Nizam too liked this project well-enough. He was just waiting for such an opportunity. There was a time, when the Nizam himself had insisted to the Marathas that they enter the northern regions, during the incident with Mubarij Khan, to ensure that the Badshah did not act against him. The whole objective that was decided in the Rohe-Rameshwar meeting was that the Nizam and the Marathas should not oppose each other in the north and south respectively. This situation had changed completely in the past four to five years. The Marathas had grown so powerful, that it looked like the Empire won’t last long. The Nizam was extremely shrewd and did recognise all these threads. He had the confidence, that if the Badshah was in full support, then he could definitely uproot the Marathas. He appointed Sayyed Jamal Khan to keep the Marathas in check in the Deccan. To ensure the Marathas did not get any inkling about his plans, he wrote letters to the Peshwa and Shahu, mentioning that, “There were suspicions upon his head about being a Baghi (rebel) or a traitor. To dispel it from the master’s mind, he was going to meet the Badshah. The brotherly relation between the Nizam and the Marathas was to remain intact.”

Any number of affectionate promises the Nizam wrote, the thoughts in his mind were completely opposite. Pantapradhan went to Delhi and met the sovereign, then what was to happen to the Nizam’s position! Another Subedar would be appointed. Therefore, he sent letters to all the Umraos and the Badshah himself that he was coming to meet them. “The treasury was deposited in the government. Once he reached there, the enemy could be quickly beaten back. Upon receiving this written letter from the Nizam, the sovereign dismissed the meeting with the Pantapradhan, and administered a pleading pledge to the Nawab. So, he was hurrying to Delhi.”

In this, the hypocrisy of the Nizam becomes evident. He told the Marathas that he was going to Delhi to seek forgiveness from the Badshah for him assuming independence in the Deccan after killing Mubarij Khan; while inside he was conspiring for their defeat. He got the Badshah to pledge that he would never try to negotiate with the Marathas, and he would fight with them. He firmed up the next steps, and only then departed towards the north.

To be continued…

NIZAM CROSSES BAJIRAO

Bajirao started off towards the north to meet the Badshah in the Diwali festival of 1736. Hearing this news, the Nizam started getting increasingly restless. He began worrying greatly, if Badshah provides his approval and support to Bajirao, then he would take away his own Subedar position of the Deccan as well tomorrow, and then he would have nowhere to go. The Nizam began trying very hard to ensure anyhow that the two never met each other, and to somehow crush Bajirao himself in between the two huge armies of the north and the south. He quickly sent urgent orders to his own Sardars, and got his army prepared. He also began to sensitise Delhi about this through his assistants. When the Peshwa got this news, he and Shahu dispatched urgent orders to their Sardars stationed back in the Deccan, to ensure that the Nizam was blocked here itself, and planned to begin troubling his realms. Since both these sides had begun such efforts, from the month of January 1737, up to two-and-a-half years after it, i.e. until the campaign of Nadir Shah was wrapped up, flames of war had engulfed the whole country in smaller or greater degree. Actually, this overall occurrence should be termed the ‘Two-and-a-half Year War’ between Mughals and Marathas.

Just two specific events in this huge war, Bajirao’s raid on Delhi, and the Nizam being cornered at Bhopal, only these are available in general awareness. But the available documents show many other big and small battles that were fought all over the country. Aavji Kavde, Raghuji Bhosale, Udaji Chavhan, Chandrasen Jadhav and his son, Dabhade company, Fatehsingh Bhosale, Ramchandra Hari, Vyankatrao Ghorpade, Sultanji and Janrao Nimbalkar, Sarlashkar Somvanshi, Pratinidhi, etc. many big and small Sardars have wrought an absolute havoc in the Deccan in these two to three years. If their activities are perceived in an appropriate scheme of events, one can discern that they all were participants of the above primary war in their own ways, and they had been activated by Shahu and the Peshwa to do so. The southern political moves would be decided by Chimaji Appa, and under his training, even Nanasaheb too learned his shrewdness. Shahu himself campaigned towards Miraj. Vyankatrao attacked Goa. Aavji Kavde wrought huge destruction in Khandesh-Berar. Fatehsingh and Raghuji Bhosale pounced upon the Carnatic with all their might. All these events were links in a huge chain of events. The moment the Nizam went to the north, the Carnatic was exposed. To capture it, Shahu dispatched Raghuji there. We would review this war a little more minutely. The Badshah had decided to use his last gambit. The two-year-long Mughal war was not over yet. Meanwhile, Chimaji Appa was in the middle of a campaign to oust the two-hundred-year-old Portuguese power from the Konkan. It was to be a fight to the finish.

After the Dussehra of 1736, Bajirao went to the north. Following behind him, the Nizam left Aurangabad and camped at Burhanpur. He stayed there until 7 April. The Nizam was camped at Burhanpur when Mohammedshah got tired of his querulous nobles and failed generals and finally remembered the Nizam. In February 1737, the Badshah’s emissaries bearing Firman to invite the Nizam to the north met him there. The Nizam then arranged his affairs in the Deccan, wrote a letter to Shahu saying he is going to Delhi to seek the Badshah’s forgiveness.

When Bajirao began his return journey through Jaisingh’s territory and onward to Malwa, he crossed the Nizam. Bajirao was camped at Dhamoni in Bundelkhand. On 7 April 1737, the Nizam left Burhanpur. On 10 May 1737, the Nizam crossed the Narmada and arrived at Sironj. However, suspicions were running rampant on both sides. To allay those, Bajirao sent Baburao Malhar and Pilaji Jadhavrao to meet the Nizam. He met Pilaji Jadhavrao at Sironj on 20 May 1737, stayed there up to 29 May, and passing Gwalior, and Agra, reached Hodal about one hundred kilometres from Delhi. Actually, Bajirao sent Pilaji Jadhavrao to meet him to gauge his intentions. Pilaji wrote to Bajirao, “Yesterday on 20 May we met the Nawab. He felicitated us profusely and was very happy. Whatever protocol garments you gave, we presented to him. He is sending headgear for you. The Nizam gave me a turban ornament and some horses today morning. They will march off the day after tomorrow on further journey. Apart from this, many other reports I will relay when we meet. Do stay where you are until we reach for your service. My son Appa accompanied the Nawab one stage to the north until the halt of Duraiserai. He requested that the Rohilla Nawab (of Bhopal) should not be disturbed. For now, do not provide any trouble to the regions of Bhopal’s Yaar Mohammed Khan.”

To ensure that Bajirao did not trouble the Nizam on his journey, Pilaji was asked by the Nizam to send his own son to accompany them until the next halt. Nizam continued his journey to Delhi. Bajirao came back to Pune.

In this peaceful manner, the two crossed each other barely fifty Kos from each other. Both preserved the peace agreed at Rohe-Rameshwar five years earlier. By the middle of July, Bajirao was back in Pune. Shahu welcomed the Peshwa’s triumph.

To be continued…

BENEFITS OF THE CAMPAIGN

In his long letter to Chimaji Appa written from near Jaipur, Bajirao completes his narrative of the attack on Delhi, “Khan Dauran sent letters after letters to Sawai Jaisingh. So, he too took fifteen to sixteen thousand army and artillery and has gone to Basava. He will meet the Khan Dauran. Sawaiji sends us affectionate letters asking us to spare his regions. Our emissary Vyankaji Ram is with him, through whom he keeps writing. We won’t trouble his regions. He will provide some food and provisions on the way. Abhay Singh is at Jodhpur. We will now proceed to the Gwalior & Bhadawar provinces where some of the revenues are due. We plan to collect our arrears, and if the Mughals give us chase, we will harass them, run so fast that they will pant for breath and lose strength to fight because of running behind us, corner them somewhere, give them battle, and vanquish them through Rajashree Swami’s grace, and father’s blessings. Do not worry about us. Main thing is, the Badshah and Khan Dauran are thinking of a treaty. The Mughal Umraos have summoned up all their courage. Their leader is Saadat Khan. If his arrogance is vanquished through the Shree’s blessings, then everything would occur as we expect. If the treaty is proposed as per our expectation, then we will agree, otherwise not. We polished off the region around Delhi. Further Sonipat, Panipat, and the region beyond the Yamuna remains. That also will be rendered similarly desolate, and we will ensure that the Mughals would not get food and provisions easily. Whatever happens, we will inform you afterwards through letters. If the Mughals remain in Delhi, we might go to Agra, enter the Antarved (Doab) and destroy the regions there. If the Nawab Nizam-ul-Mulk does something, crosses the Narmada, you apply the check to him from behind. Whatever we have written so far, act according to that. Beat them down, kill them all. We would do the same here. You too finish them off there. Nizam sitting at one place cornered is excellent. Bless you to keep your affection.”

The Peshwa emissary posted at the Badshah’s court was extremely shrewd. He had recognised each of the Umrao’s nature, behaviour, keeping a close watch over the movements of the Mughals, and kept informing Bajirao secretly about what he should do so that all of them were rendered ineffective in front of Bajirao. Acting as per that information, Bajirao achieved this extraordinary feat in such a short while. When two of the Badshah’s huge armies were ready for battle, Bajirao avoided encountering both of them, raided Delhi suddenly, and without hurting the Badshah himself, defeated his Umraos just through his fear. This clever strategy seems to have some contribution from Dhondo Govind. Therefore, the Mughals were extremely angry with him, and he was driven away by the Vazir. However, due to that, Bajirao was able to make good use of him.

Bajirao’s attack on Delhi was designed to show the Badshah that the Marathas were capable of marching up to Delhi if their demands were not met. At every stage, the Peshwa was fully aware of his sovereign Chhatrapati Shahu’s desire not to harm the Mughal Badshah. The Marathas raided Delhi despite these injunctions, lack of any artillery and the chronic shortage of funds. In Delhi, the presence of the experienced Dhondo Govind in his camp was an asset. Having achieved his aim of showing his army to the Badshah at his capital, he rapidly retreated to Kotputli in the territory of Jaipur, where he knew Jaisingh would not attack him. However, he was still prepared to lead the Mughals on another chase until they were worn out and then pounce on them at an opportune time.

Studying this overall campaign, one cannot but marvel at Bajirao’s shrewd cleverness, his quality of trusting his assistants completely, and getting the tasks he wanted accomplished in an extensive battle-array. One of the letters mentions, “The Swami went on the northern campaign this time around along with the army. There, through the Swami’s prowess, the enemies surrendered to him. After expanding his fame everywhere, the Swami displayed his prowess all over the country. One cannot stop writing about it. After a successful campaign, the Swami returned back on the first day of the waxing moon fortnight of the month of Shravan (17 July 1737), seeing which everybody was happy.”

Another one goes, “You wrote that Abhay Singh might meet. So, the Swami’s arms are strong. Whoever thinks bad about him, would be rendered a pauper. It was excellent that the Mughal arrogance was blown away. The Swami reigns supreme in this country anyways. Even the sovereign (Badshah) desires the Swami’s respect. They would happily serve the Swami and behave as he pleases.”

To be continued…