PORTUGUESE ANGLE

The news of the fall of Madras to the French reached Nanasaheb, who had to be in attendance to Shahu at Satara. He wrote to Pilaji Jadhavrao on 9 December 1746, that the French were likely to attack the British on the west coast at Mumbai and then, even the Maratha posts of Vasai or Versova, “In the Carnatic the Firangis (French) attacked and took the place of the British. Anwaruddin Khan sent an army, but this was also given a thrashing. They took a few more places. This means they might attack Mumbai or even Vasai and Vesave (Versova). Hence, I am sending you there. In Vasai, you can put wet wood with a little mud around the fort, do not send the horsemen to fight. You are aware of the powerful artillery of the Firangis. Versova is vulnerable to fire from ships, so strengthen it with brave soldiers. Our guns should fire at the ships, they may not be able to stand it. Once Sardars like you are there, the enemy will not be able to approach. I am sending (Sadashivrao) Bhau on a campaign to the Carnatic to distract the Firangis. I had written in the past that you should accompany Bhau. However, you are required at Vasai at this time… in the past the Firangi British had attacked Khanderi, but they were beaten back as the fort was manned by the brave.”

The moment Shahu dispatched Sadashivrao to the Carnatic, Naik got angry and began venting out his frustrations in front of Shahu. On 7 February 1747 a report read, “Babuji Naik is at Satara. He did not complete the ritual feast. The thinking is, present Rajashree with the feast, complete the ritual, and only then embark on the campaign. In Bhau’s campaign, there are twenty-thousand men. The moment Rajashree asked, where Naik would leave for after seeking farewell, Yamajipant informed, he would go towards the provinces of Shire, Chitradurga, Rajadurga, Harpanhalli. Upon hearing this, Rajashree said, ‘Let us see what happens.’”

We get information from Portuguese correspondence of the time about what was at stake. A letter from Goa to the Secretary of State in Portugal in February 1747, discusses a possible Maratha attack on their post at Daman. The Viceroy also asked for troops to attack Vasai but found that Nanasaheb had already sent additional troops to defend the place, “Nana has been detained in the court of Satara for more than a year now. It is learnt that Shahu was scared of him in his Pune court and wanted, therefore, to keep him away from the said court and near to that of Satara to watch him more closely, on account of the jealousy and caution that originated from his power. The junior and senior queens, wives of Shahu, had great animosity with Nana because of the dispute of some lands that the queens wished to gift to one of their persons. Nana was unyieldingly opposed to that gift. Nana began to corrupt the ministers of the Satara court by payment of money. He bribed all the maids of the queens with large sums of money and finally corrupted Shahu himself with very rich presents. He succeeded and planned everything according to his desire.”

Nanasaheb’s own letter of 22 February 1747 gives us his impressions of the matter. The Peshwa wrote to Ramchandrababa that he wished to restore the forts captured from Bhosales of Sawantwadi. However, at this time, it was not possible and the Firangis were not willing to do so. “The Firangi is untrustworthy, he must be taught a lesson, but it is not possible at the present time. We are, therefore, heading towards Bednoor.” This did not, however, prevent the Peshwa from providing the Bhosales with monetary support.

Nanasaheb was, for the Portuguese, the prime mover in the Maratha state. Many of their letters are written with an embedded animosity for the Peshwa. The letter further discusses the other ministers of the court, “Shripatrao (Pratinidhi), Minister of Shahu and enemy of Nana died. Naro Ram, another minister, has reached the decrepit age of eighty. The lone minister, young and intrepid, is Nana now. He has huge forces and a large amount of money. He can soon be master of the entire dominion of Shahu as well as that of Sambhaji II, which, put together will constitute a formidable potency.”

The Peshwa had been at Satara for over a year and a half. In Shahu’s court, Mahadoba Purandare was a partisan, however, Govindrao Chitnis, who had the king’s ear, was considered capable of an independent opinion. Govindrao played a vital role during this time to sound Maharaj about the real state of affairs.

To be continued…

TROUBLE IN DECCAN

The Mughal Empire had met its death blow. The second power to face the same calamity in the same year, was that of the Firangi Portuguese. Coincidentally, these two Empires began almost at the same time, and although the European power did not spread into the hinterland, it formed an extremely well entrenched fanatical state.

There the similarities end. The reduction of Vasai and the brutal sack of Delhi in the same months of the year were a study in contrast. In Delhi, the Persian conqueror came to loot, won a military victory and then proceeded to humiliate the Mughal nobility before stripping them of all their wealth and vanity. Women were taken away in thousands by the invader and his men, from the ordinary householder to the palace; men were slaughtered, houses dug up for wealth, nobles tortured, and the most ignominious defeat that could be, was inflicted on the people of Delhi. Mohammedshah, sunk under decades of pleasure and vice, could do nothing more than bow his head, which, to his good fortune, still stayed on his body. The pompous nobles of the realm met a worse fate. Khan Dauran died in battle, Saadat Khan committed suicide, Kamruddin Khan was stripped and ‘exposed’ to the sun, and the Nizam’s property and harem was raided while he was forced to abandon his palanquin for a mule.

In Vasai, the victorious Chimaji Appa was a picture of restraint and moderation. The battle had been hard and the enemy valiant. The loss in men was colossal for the Marathas. The citadel of Vasai lay open to abuse and to loot. The Pindaris in the Maratha army could have rampaged through the remains of Portuguese possessions and burnt them to the ground. Yet, Chimaji and Pilaji Jadhavrao gave their enemy the privilege to be treated like ‘a warrior’. They went out with their heads held high, in uniforms, playing their band, to sail away on ships requisitioned and paid for by the victor. Their women were not just respected but protected, honoured and returned to their families. The contrast in the two victors could not have been starker or the tenets of the ‘Bharati’ war better defined.

The decimation of the two powers meant the Marathas stepped into the space of being India’s paramount power despite Shahu’s pretensions of being the Amir-ul-Umara of the Mughal Badshah. Bajirao’s letter to Chimaji clearly laid out his objectives of taking over the Mughalai – all Mughal assets in the north and the south – and for a while there was even talk of the Rana of Udaipur being placed on the throne of Delhi. This did not happen when Nadir Shah placed Mohammedshah back on the throne before his departure. Even if it had, the Rana would have been a ruler without power and beholden to the Maratha Peshwa.

The year 1739 thus marked a climactic change in the Indian political milieu; it was actually the shell of the Mughal Empire that lingered on, often miserably, for the next hundred odd years. The Portuguese restricted themselves to Goa from then on until the present Indian state evicted them in 1961.

It was time to grasp the prize and pronounce the Marathas to be the guardians of India’s destiny. However, this did not happen and destiny had something else in store over the next year or so. Even then, the Marathas had to tread the path towards supremacy in India and this was to lead to another climactic year two decades later in the fields of Panipat north of Delhi.

There was time on hand for the Marathas. Their enemies had vanished. The long campaigns were done. It was time to consolidate. That was when domestic turbulence reared its head and the rumbling began, this time, nearer home. Looking back, it was perhaps inevitable and overdue.

Stormy days lay ahead, and the finale was to be played out on the banks of the Narmada.

The month of May 1739 was indeed a happy one. Vasai, the last bastion of the Portuguese kingdom of the north Konkan had been captured. Nadir Shah had decided to return to his country.

After Nadir Shah left for his country, Bajirao wrote a letter to the Badshah and dispatched him an offering of 101 gold coins. The Badshah even replied, assuring that all the agreements which had been approved previously will be followed appropriately; the Jagir and Mansab would be granted; however, Bajirao should show that he can serve the Badshah as per the agreement (Dt 17 February 1740). However, the Nizam again began trying to avoid the implementation of those agreements. Here, Bajirao entered into treaties and agreements with all the Rajput kings in Bundelkhand, and strengthened his own control there. In this task, Govindpant Bundele helped him a lot. Bajirao had been working towards bringing the Nizam to his knees and forcing him to implement the previously entered agreements.

To be continued…

INCHBIRD-BAJIRAO MEETING

Even though the Vasai battle had finished through a treaty, many of the festering complaints remained behind. Since the fall of Vasai, the Portuguese had been trying to obtain Sashti, Bardesh, and Madgaon in Goa from the Marathas, while they accepted that Chaul and Korlai forts could not be defended and would be given to the Marathas. For this task, they began negotiations through the Mumbai Governor. The Portuguese intended to directly deal with Satara’s Chhatrapati and get their objectives fulfilled. The British volunteered to do this for the Firangis. But the Governor Stephen Law informed them, that since all the power was in Bajirao’s hands, there would be no use of negotiating with Shahu. They had already experienced the same. If the Portuguese agreed, they would negotiate with Bajirao and get the desired outcome. Upon that the Portuguese agreed for the British Governor to begin negotiations with Bajirao himself. Stephen Law, the President at Bombay, therefore, sent Captain Inchbird from Mumbai to Pune once again to meet Bajirao. But Bajirao was on a campaign towards the Godavari. Inchbird travelled hundred Kos from Pune for meeting Bajirao. On 14 January 1740, Inchbird met Bajirao at Paithan, near the river Godavari. He discussed with Bajirao, and Bajirao relayed to Captain Inchbird the following clauses. Of these, one clause is illustrative of the relations between the components of the Maratha Confederacy, in this case, the Angre family and the Peshwa.

  1. The Maratha control in Sashti (Goa) and Bardesh would be removed.
  2. Revdanda (i.e. Chaul) and Korlai fortresses should be handed over by the Portuguese to the Marathas.
  3. We accept Portuguese control over Daman fortress.
  4. The Portuguese should not trouble our regions in Vasai, Daman, Thane, Sashti (Thane), Belapur etc. In lieu of that, we won’t trouble Sashti (Goa) and Bardesh.
  5. The Portuguese should help us in our activities in the Fonda Mahal and Jambavali Panch-Mahal. When we establish our control in that province, they should not trouble it.
  6. If we clash with the Angres, the British and the Portuguese should help us along with their navies.
  7. In Sashti (Goa) and Bardesh, whichever followers of Maharashtra Dharma, the Portuguese should allow them. They should allow the same in Goa too.
  8. The Portuguese should not object to our ships and vessels on the seas. We will not object to their ships and vessels.

These clauses were confirmed into a treaty on 7 September 1740 by Nanasaheb. However, in that treaty, the 7th clause above regarding the Maharashtra Dharma was dropped. The 6th clause above was related to the project to subdue Tulaji Angre. The 5th clause above seem to be added with an intention to keep Kolhapur’s Sambhaji II in check against the Warana Treaty. In that the intention to expand the Maratha power in the Carnatic is also expressed. Under the above treaty of 7 September 1740, two fortresses of Revdanda (Chaul) and Korlai came under the Peshwa’s control in the month of November.

Although the treaty was approved later, it clearly demarcated areas that would be governed by the Marathas, their right of navigation and so on. The treaties of 1739 and 1740 repeatedly refer to ‘Bajirao’s Navy’, and it appears that the Peshwa and his brother had plans to form their own navy that would challenge the best in the Indian seas. The apprehensions voiced by the British in 1737 looked like coming to fruit.

Numerous big and small memorable incidents occurred at the time of the battle of Vasai. These must be read from the original documents. Since they had defeated a European power in a battle, the Maratha terror spread everywhere in the country and it gave stability to their rule. Other rulers and subjects began treating Bajirao and Chimaji with respect, and began obeying their orders. The British were terrified. Therefore, only a battle of Plassey or Gheriya (Suvarnadurg) did not prove to be the end of Maratha power. The whole Maratha leadership used to feel utmost admiration till the end because of Vasai’s victory. In the betrayal by Raghoba, the Sashti island passed to the British, but Vasai station, which had been lost earlier was acquired back. This was why, Bajirao II sat in Vasai belonging to him, and sought refuge with the British. Vyankatrao Ghorpade wrapped up the Goa treaty, while Chimaji wrapped up the affairs at Vasai, and both arrived at Satara to meet Shahu towards the end of June. At that time, Shahu felicitated both of them wholeheartedly. Similarly, the shower of accolades both of them received from big and small Sardars can only be imagined. One of the gentlemen wrote to Chimaji, “You wrote in your own handwriting about Vasai’s victory. The utmost joy I felt reading that, cannot be written about! There is no comparable virtue and prowess like yours. Such mighty achievement is extraordinary and unintelligible for common people. God and Brahmins have blessed you profusely, which is why you are able to accomplish such huge tasks.”

Another one wrote – “This year, there was abundant rain everywhere. Farmers are planting their crops. The subjects are filled with happiness. Secondly, because Tahmas-Quli Khan returned back, the moneylenders and subjects were filled with hope. You captured Vasai. These three things have turned out to be excellent. Besides the Goa campaign was also successful and some money was earned there. Events that would ordinarily not have happened have all taken place this year. Therefore, both the Swamis are Purnabrahma’s Avatars in this Kaliyuga. These achievements are not for mere mortals. Rajashree Raya’s efforts removed Tahmasp Quli Khan from Delhi and the Swami’s victory has done the job at Vasai and Goa. Only the Tapasvi could see the Swami’s real self. Others used to see Shrikrishna as a human being. Only Vidur, Akroor, and Bheeshm used to see Purnabrahma in him. The Yogi sees same in the Swamis.”

However, one must admit that they achieved this. If the Marathas had willed, it was not impossible for them to uproot the whole of Portuguese power from the western coast at this time. But one needs to remember, that the erstwhile oriental noble policy, that everybody should live amicably with each other, they should live, and let others live, was always alive in Hindu hearts.

To be continued…

THE SURRENDER

The Marathas entered the fort on 12 May 1739 and Chimaji wrote a graphic account of the battle for Vasai to Brahmendra Swami the next day. He warmly complimented the Firangis for their valour. “The Firangis fought like true soldiers. Our men fought in accordance with the tenets of the Bharati war (a battle fought based on certain moral principles such as treatment of the unarmed, towards women, and those who have surrendered). There have been many battles before this, but none can be compared to this battle. It is all due to the Swami’s blessings. Our people would not leave the towers. Finally, the fanatic Firangis lost courage and on the day of Ashtami they sought a truce and surrendered. In eight days, they agreed to leave the fort with their families. I stopped the firing.”

Chimaji’s victory was hailed by Sultanji Nimbalkar, who was once Shahu’s Sarlashkar but had gone over to the Nizam. He wrote to Chimaji congratulating him for his fine victory, “Vasai is a difficult place, you placed it under siege, took the army near the walls, blew up the walls with mines and you won the fort. Hearing this pleasing news is very satisfying. Your efforts so far have been rewarded by God.”

The British at Bombay received the news about the fall of Vasai on 7 May 1739 and described the final battle, “The President acquaints the Board that yesterday he received the melancholy news of the capitulations being signed the 5/16 instant for the surrender of the city of Vasai to Chimnaji, the Maratha General, in the term of one week – that is to say, on the 12th instant – occasioned, as the President is well-informed from different parts, by the success of the mines which the Marathas sprung on the Cortines (curtains, ramparts) and bastions to the number of twelve or thirteen. It is observable that the place is so situated and surrounded with water that only three out of the eleven bastions were subjected to be attacked, and the mines made such breaches in two of them as rendered the storming very practicable, which the Marathas attempted with the utmost fury and resolution, being repulsed several times and as often returned to the attack, and at length gained lodgements on the bastions. The Portuguese being tired and harassed with so warm an action, which first and last held two days, having several of their officers and many people killed and their ammunition nearly exhausted, and observing the place was no longer tenable against such numbers, hoisted a white flag, and sent one of their officers to treat of a surrender with Chimnaji, who allowed them the space of a week to evacuate the town on most honourable conditions.”

The saffron flag, the Zaripatka, was unfurled on the citadel of Vasai. An elaborate ceremony to propitiate the gods was held. The accounts of the day show that the ritual prayer costed nearly twenty-eight rupees. Fifteen goats were bought for rupees fifteen, flour worth seven and three quarters of a rupee and miscellaneous items like coconuts and Shendur, Abeer, and Bukka powders were bought for about five rupees.

A striking feature after the surrender, and indeed during the entire period of Maratha expansion, was their magnanimity towards a defeated enemy. Vasai was no exception. In line with the battles with the Nizam and Bangash, the surrendered Portuguese men and their families at Vasai were treated humanely. A war that took the lives of twenty-two thousand (?) Marathas did not end with a massacre of prisoners, and their families were not molested. Chimaji was a man with a generous heart, and to an enemy who fought with so much valour, he allowed seven days to leave the fort. Pilaji Jadhavrao who was present at Vasai, in his letter to Radhabai urged her to use her influence with Chimaji to release most of the prisoners, retaining only a few as hostages until the Maratha prisoners at Goa were released. Among those released were the women captured at the fort of Tarapur.

The Firangis marched out to ships with their band playing, taking with them all their belongings. Chimaji had organised a hundred ships to transport the Firangis and paid the rentals for them. Chimaji also granted full religious freedom to those who remained and three churches were preserved in the region.

The Marathas had paid a huge price in men. The Portuguese acquitted themselves well. Chimaji wrote to Shahu, “The Firangis fought with courage as expected. This is called soldiering. For one-and-a-half Prahar (quartile) the Firangis rained fire on us. Absorbing all this fire, the Maratha armies held their positions. This never happened before. It was the limit.”

To be continued…

TREASURED VICTORY

Chimaji in particular set his heart on the capture of Vasai and would not be distracted from his objective. Anguished over his own chronic ill-health, he told his men that if he dies before the conquest of Vasai, they should stuff his corpse inside the barrel of a cannon and blow it inside the fort. The Portuguese garrison had no supplies, no allies, and hardly any contact with the outside. The northern wall of the fort was stacked with the best guns they had, for that was where the attack came from. A large area in front of the walls had no vegetation, and therefore no shelter, and any Maratha soldier found in these parts was greeted with blistering fire from the fort. Chimaji found a mansion belonging to Martinho de Silveira about sixteen hundred arm-lengths (roughly equalling a yard) away from the walls of the fort. He fortified it and began using it as a base to attack the fort. Mines were laid from long distances in the face of such fire. Mines would not work efficiently because, “the ground being loose sand near the seaside where the water would not permit mine of any depth, no mine could be carried deep enough to endanger the walls.”

Portuguese gunners fired by night and day and the Marathas replied with their one hundred and thirty-four cannons and sixty mortars firing into the fort. The three-month-long attack may have rained over forty-five thousand shells into the fort.

The resilient Portuguese still would not surrender and submit, and the battle wore on with heavy casualties on the Maratha side. In April 1739, the British gave some aid to the defenders and some money. This did not alter the course of the war. General de Silveira, who had succeeded De Mello, was killed during Maratha shelling. The Marathas enthused by Chimaji’s presence through the war, at great risk to their lives, laid mines under the fort walls.

On 2 May 1739, the first mines succeeded in creating a breach. Thirteen mines were set off simultaneously early in the morning to the beating of drums. Two towers named San Sebastian and Remedios were blown up. Another breach was made in the tower named Carvalho. In their hurry to occupy the breach, the Marathas rushed in before all the mines had exploded and many were killed when these mines blew up. The Portuguese kept up a steady fire at the breach killing several hundred of the attackers. On 3 May a mine laid by Malharrao Holkar exploded and another breach was created. The Portuguese defenders rushed to defend the breach and a desperate hand-to-hand fight began. By then, eight hundred Portuguese officers and men were dead. General Silveira Menezes was killed during the shelling. With the fort’s perimeter punctured at several places, the Marathas could enter in large numbers, forcing the Portuguese to unfurl the white flag of surrender early on 4 May 1739. Vasai had fallen.

Chimaji also wrote to his favourite nephew Nanasaheb on the day Vasai was captured, giving details of the final military moves of the day, “We laid Vasai under siege and raised platforms to fire our guns. We mined the walls from the north. Ranoji Shinde placed five mines to the tower on the left. Yashwantrao Pawar and Ranoji Bhosale laid mines under the wall of the fort. On the right, Santaji Wagh under Malharrao Holkar had placed his mines. Vasai has very strong walls. It is not a place where mines would work. Yet, our men worked hard to place the mines. On 2 May, we lit the fuses to the mines. Four of Ranba’s mines blew up. His men rushed in the breach. Just then, the fifth mine blew up. Heavy stones from the wall came down on the men, who were buried.”

The victory at Vasai was an achievement that was treasured more than any Maratha battle before this. Chimaji ended his letter with a sense of achievement and wonder. “The Maratha army never had a war like this one. It was the extreme limit; it is difficult to expand on it any further. To win this fort was God’s grace and Raya’s saintly deeds.”

The Marathas entered the fort on 12 May 1739 and Chimaji wrote a graphic account of the battle for Vasai to Brahmendra Swami the next day. He warmly complimented the Firangis for their valour. “The Firangis fought like true soldiers. Our men fought in accordance with the tenets of the Bharati war (a battle fought based on certain moral principles such as treatment of the unarmed, towards women, and those who have surrendered). There have been many battles before this, but none can be compared to this battle. It is all due to the Swami’s blessings. Our people would not leave the towers. Finally, the fanatic Firangis lost courage and on the day of Ashtami they sought a truce and surrendered. In eight days, they agreed to leave the fort with their families. I stopped the firing.”

To be continued…

TO VASAI

One of the writers mentions, “Baji Bhivrao and my side was one and the same. What is destined, cannot be avoided! His son Bapu is wise, keep your affection over him. His brother Chimnaji Bhivrao too is enthusiastic, wise, strong and well-behaved. Bajirao was extremely capable. He laid down his life for the cause. Everything will be done to project his family well.”

Two days later the Peshwa wrote a memorable letter to Baji Bhivrao’s mother, telling her that “he was now her Bajirao.”

“Two days back, during the attack on Tarapur, Baji Bhivrao was shot on his face and died. God has done the inappropriate. You have suffered much grief. For me, I have lost a brother. You are older and wise, so you may adjust to your sorrow. To sum up, please consider me as your Bajirao. Keep your benevolent eye on me.”

Chimaji Appa wrote to Baji Bhivrao’s younger brother Chimnaji, “Bajirao has gone, with a good reputation. We are pained that one side of me has left us. Mother Venubai Kaki in her old age has to suffer this. his sons Bapuji and Gangoba are safe with me.”  

In Tarapur, many Firangi women were taken captive and returned to the Portuguese with the utmost respect. The Portuguese chief of the fort was killed, and an apocryphal story says his wife was captured and brought before Chimaji Appa. Reassuring her, Chimaji told her that he was her brother and gave her gifts before sending her back to her people. The lady requested Chimaji that her wish that her husband get a proper burial be granted. Once again, Chimaji allowed the Portuguese to bury their captain with all the rites associated with the funeral. These anecdotes reflect on the prevailing Maratha ethos in no small measure.

The capture of Tarapur was followed by the fall of inland fort of Asheri. Asheri was a difficult fort to capture as it was surrounded by thick forests. However, the flood of victories and overwhelming force made the task easier. Versova, on the island of Sashti was the next to fall on 9 February. Fearing its capture and use by the Marathas, the fortified port of Bandra was demolished on the advice of the British, probably because it faced the island of Bombay. The final fort to be taken back was Dharavi which had changed hands twice in the past twelve months. Its position to the south of Vasai at the mouth of the creek endangered all ships approaching the fort from the south. Manaji Angre sent some men to assist in the attack on Dharavi. On 10 March 1739, Manaji took the port of Uran, close to his base at Colaba.

This way, in the month of January 1739, locations like Mahim, Tarapur, Dahanu and Shirgaon were captured. With Mahim and Arnala already in Maratha possession, Vasai was encircled by land and sea. What remained was a final blow to Vasai, the nerve centre of Portuguese power in the north.

The chief centre of Portuguese power outside Goa was Vasai. The fort itself was considered one of the strongest of its age with walls nearly forty feet high, five feet thick and a perimeter of about three kilometres. Its projecting four-sided bastions made it difficult to take the fort by escalade or firing of the artillery shells available with the Marathas at that time. Mines were difficult to deploy due to the loose sandy soil close to the sea. While the western face of the fort looked at the sea, to its south was a wide creek and to its east there was marshy land. Opposite the creek stood the fort of Dharavi, which had recently been taken back from the Portuguese. The northern face of Vasai alone stood exposed to Maratha attacks. However, a clear open space in front of the fort made it difficult to launch an attack in the face of accurate fire from the fort’s three northern bastions.

For the Portuguese, the situation in Vasai was desperate. The entire northern kingdom, a possession of two hundred years, now appeared to be slipping from their hands. Of late, they had concentrated their forces in Vasai, abandoning outposts that could not be defended. The besieged Portuguese General pinned his hopes on help from the British, their neighbour and only other European power in the region. He, therefore, tried to interest the British, and linked the defence of Bombay with that of Vasai. His plaintive appeals for help were treated with a British instinct for self-preservation.

In April 1739, the Dutch and the British were busy engaging Sambhaji Angre outside his base in Vijaydurg, which they called Gheria, without any result. That was one reason Sambhaji could not render any help at Vasai. The British considered the Marathas and Angres as separate powers and did not consider an attack on Vijaydurg as an attack on the main Maratha power. However, any help rendered to the Portuguese would have turned the Marathas against them.

To be continued…

GOA’S BLOCKADE

Some area around Goa, too, is named Sashti. When the Peshwas attacked Vasai, to ensure that the Portuguese at Goa did not provide any help, they got Vyankatrao Ghorpade and Kolhapur’s Chhatrapati’s Sardar Dadajirao Bhave Nargundkar to capture the Sashti province around Goa. Goa did not have enough men to withstand Vyankatrao’s attack. Vyankatrao Ghorpade was in the Vasai campaign in 1737, and he was well-aware of the tactics to be employed in such campaigns. Since the regions of the Carnatic to the south of the Krishna River was under the purview of Kolhapur’s Sambhaji II, to ensure he did not create any obstacles in the campaign, his Sardar Dadaji Bhave was appointed on the campaign with Sambhaji II’s permission. These two men accomplished the responsibility with much success. On 12 January 1739, Vyankatrao got down into Goa via the Dighi mountain pass. In a short while he harassed the Portuguese. Sawantwadi’s Sawants and the Portuguese had a running dispute. Therefore, upon the Peshwa’s request, the Sawants helped Vyankatrao, due to which the Portuguese were brought down to their knees so quickly. Vyankatrao’s force consisted of seven thousand cavalry and equal amount of infantry. He was assisted by Sardars like Sayaji Gujar, Manaji Paygude etc. The Viceroy wrote to General Martinho de Silveira de Menezes, who was defending Vasai, “Here we find ourselves in a state of consternation created by crossing of the Maratha forces on 23rd instant (12 January by the old calendar) captained by Vyankatrao, into Salcette… this consternation makes it impossible for me to help the fort of Vasai and other forts of that province with men, but, on the other hand, puts me in need of utilising the troops of Vasai to defend this island of Goa.”

On 15 January, Madgaon was taken, and the fort of Fonda was won by the Raja of Sondhe, who was a Maratha ally. Very soon, he captured most of the Sashti province except for the locations of Raitoor and Marmugoa. Fonda’s fort Mardangad fell into his hands on 19 February. On 22 February, the Wadkars began wreaking havoc in Bardesh. The Bardesh district of Goa also fell. With Goa itself threatened, the war entered its last phase. Upon this, seeing that the Marathas were not threatening to capture the whole of Goa island, the governor began negotiating for peace. Vyankatrao had resolved that the Portuguese must be driven out from this country once and for all. At the same time, Bajirao got the news that Nadir Shah had captured Delhi. Due to this, he dispatched a final order to Vyankatrao, that they should end the Goa battle and immediately return. The moment the Portuguese sued for peace, Vyankatrao informed them, “We have been ordered to capture all of your kingdom. After capturing Vasai, the Peshwa is going to himself attack Goa.”

Hearing this, the Portuguese officials became extremely concerned. They also tried to entice some of the Maratha army men to act as spies. But having left no other option, on 27 April 1739, they accepted the terms of the treaty and avoided any future calamity.

The important elements of the treaty were as follows – Out of the revenue of the Sashti and Bardesh provinces, the Portuguese must pay the Marathas forty percent amount. They were to pay the Marathas seven lakh rupees fine as the expenses of the campaign. This way, Chimaji Appa had captured the northern Konkan province, and Vyankatrao had vanquished their power to the south around Goa to a large extent.

The following description is available relating to that, “The Portuguese emissaries kept visiting the camp for ten more days to keep haggling. The terms agreed were, in Sashti and Bardesh, we were granted 40 percent, while they were to keep 60 percent. Some of the outposts were handed to us, some retained by them. They were to allow people to follow Hindu religion. These Portuguese are sinful people. The achievement of their annihilation is an extraordinary accomplishment. Excellent terror has been established around Goa.”

Tubaji Anant wrote, “Vyankatrao captured eight or nine stations in the Sashti and Bardesh province. The Portuguese were taught a much-needed lesson. All of it is the greatness of the Swami’s virtue. Vyankatrao too is renowned warrior. The fame of his name has spread across Goa. Now capturing Goa should not take much time or effort.”

However, Goa was saved as the Viceroy managed to secure the good offices of Dadaji Bhave Nargundkar with a well-placed bribe, and the Portuguese fort of Raitoor which he was to attack, was saved. Dadaji was in charge of a large tract between the Tungabhadra and Malaprabha rivers in the Carnatic on behalf of Sambhaji II of Kolhapur. Through the good offices of Dadaji, envoys and rich merchants were sent to the Marathas to contract a peace. The first meeting began at the Maratha camp where the Firangi envoy was told by Dadaji that should the Portuguese choose to leave India and sail away in ships owned by them or the British, the Marathas would allow them to go unmolested. This opening gambit did not find favour and when the meeting did not appear to be reaching a conclusion, there were new proposals put up from the Maratha side that asked for tribute and full religious freedom in Goa. Vasai, Daman, and Karanje were to be handed over to the Marathas. These proposals were not accepted by the Portuguese.

Eventually, Vyankatrao summoned the Portuguese envoys again and it was conveyed to them that Bajirao will not return any of the areas won and will even take Goa. However, should the Firangis wish to hold Goa, they should give Bajirao the arrears of tribute of sixty years at the rate of three Khandi (a measure of weight that equals roughly two hundred and thirty-six kilograms) of gold per year. He also demanded that Goa should allow Hindu temples to be built and they should be allowed to practice their religion. Abolition of the ‘Shendi’ (a tuft of hair preserved on their heads by the Hindus) tax was another demand.

The Portuguese then obtained a letter from Shahu to Vyankatrao, asking him to make peace. However, this was not accepted by him. The negotiations dragged on. Bribes were offered. Two lakh rupees were paid as a tribute. However, Madgaon remained in Maratha hands. A treaty was finally agreed on 22 April 1739, however with Maratha allies like the Sawant of Sawantwadi and Dadaji looking after their own interests, the complete removal of the Portuguese power at Goa was not insisted upon. Further negotiations continued in Pune and Captain Inchbird met Bajirao at Paithan in January 1740 to come to an agreement on behalf of the Firangis. The treaty was eventually signed after further negotiations in December 1740.

To be continued…

DEFENCE OF THANE

The Marathas could bring thousands of men to the battlefield. The Firangis on the other hand, faced shortages on all fronts. To take a sea-facing fort purely by the use of land forces was difficult and one fraught with the risk of high casualties. In March 1738, Shankaraji Keshav complained to Chimaji, that Manaji was not honouring his permits to trading vessels. These letters show the divide between not just the Angre brothers but also divisions between the Peshwa’s Sardars and Manaji, who was an ally. The intense war between the two powers, and the higher casualties that an attacking force normally sustains, turned this fairly local war into a battle of will and attrition. Chimaji was determined to oust the Portuguese and, despite his own failing health, personally directed the campaign on the ground. The Portuguese General Cardin, despite his apparent success, got hardly any help from Goa. He therefore, resigned from his post in April 1738 and De Mello was appointed in his place.

The situation within the fort at Vasai was not favourable for the Portuguese. They had no money and Goa could not spare any men to defend Vasai. As on 18 September 1738, there were four hundred and eleven men at Dharavi and some more at Mahim and other places. Vasai had eight hundred and ninety-seven soldiers, of which five hundred and twenty-one were Portuguese. In addition, a further nine hundred were defending the fort from without and one hundred and ninety were stationed on the beach. It was only in October 1738 that Goa managed to send a further four hundred and eighty men to Vasai. As against this, the Marathas had three thousand men at Thane and Pilaji Jadhavrao was in the region with seven thousand foot and seven hundred horse.

The monsoon months did not witness much fighting. Chimaji returned to Pune by the end of May 1738 to recoup his health. The final act in this war began after October 1738.

After the monsoon months of 1738, at a time when Nadir Shah was still in Kabul, Chimaji threw all his resources into the battle in the Konkan. In Pedro De Mello, the Portuguese too had a brave captain. His ambition to retake the fort of Thane was his undoing; that eventually led to a turn in the fortunes of the Marathas. At this time, the Marathas had worked to make the Thane fort strong in all respects and ready for battle.

On 24 November 1738, De Mello sailed from Vasai with about one thousand freshly arrived troops from Portugal. Sailing south past Bombay, they turned into the creek towards Thane. The water at Thane was shallow. De Mello’s artillery could not be brought close to the fort as the water did not permit his larger ships to approach the Thane fort. He, therefore, had to use them from a distance and they would not serve any purpose. De Mello, therefore, decided to get closer to the fort with some of his men. Khandoji Mankar was commanding the Thane fort and he replied to the Portuguese fire with some of his own. As De Mello edged closer to Thane, he was hit by a Maratha shell and he died on the spot. The defeated Portuguese withdrew to Vasai. The British watched the Portuguese defeat, which they had foretold; the force was inadequate, they had said, and the Marathas had an overwhelming superiority in numbers. The Portuguese lost all courage because of their Commander’s death. Their attack, mounted after much preparations, turned back towards Vasai.

The time around 1738 was favourable for the Peshwas on all sides. They had no other external affair which would have created a dilemma for them troubling their minds. Due to this, they got the opportunity to concentrate their whole power on the Vasai campaign. Men and material were poured into the Konkan from November onwards. Troops and guns were sent to Konkan by the Peshwa from his base in Pune. A rumour spread that Nadir Shah would come to Deccan. For that, Bajirao left towards Khandesh, and in the month of December 1738, Chimaji Appa again got down into Konkan. All principal Maratha chiefs like Shinde, Holkar, Baji Bhivrao Rethrekar, Tukoji and Jiwaji Pawar, Pilaji Jadhavrao etc. fought the battle and were present in the Firangan at this time. Many guns were brought from various foundries in Kalyan, Junnar, and Pune. Bajirao sent eight thousand horse and ten thousand foot-soldiers to serve under Shankaraji Fadke in November 1738. Both the parties engaged in passionate clashes at all the major junction points. Everybody was convinced, that this was the final battle. In all, in the battles at Dharavi, Mahim, Tarapur and Vasai, the Marathas displayed immense capability and bravery. Portuguese supplies to Vasai were coming from Goa to the south and Daman in the north. Ranoji Shinde, therefore, attacked Daman, while Vyankatrao Ghorpade attacked Goa itself to ensure that the Portuguese at Goa were kept in check, after the monsoon of 1738.

To be continued…

SECOND ROUND

Shankaraji described the battle of Mahim in a letter to Chimaji on 26 December 1737, “Seventeen Firangi ships with one-and-a-half-thousand men came, some went to Mahim. We sent three hundred men to Mahim. On 23 December, the Firangis emerged from Mahim and attacked us. Three batteries, one manned by Dada (Mahadaji), one by Karnaji Shinde, and a third manned by Khandoba were at the centre of the fight. About two-and-a-half to three thousand men attacked the battery manned by Dada. Ramchandrapant charged with his cavalry and pushed them back but was shot in his arm. As the cavalry withdrew, the Firangis attacked the battery. There were some Arabs from Surat who changed sides and began killing our own people. In the melee, Dada… fell. A hundred to one-hundred-and-fifty men were also killed. We then went to Shirgaon. Although Dada is killed, I will do my utmost and not be found lacking in my duty. If they follow us, we will fight them…”

De Mello followed up his success and chased the Marathas out of both Mahim and Shirgaon up to the hill fort of Asheri, then besieged by the Marathas. The demoralised Marathas abandoned the siege at Asheri without a fight and a triumphant De Mello returned to Vasai towards the end of January 1738. Cardin, the General in charge of Vasai, followed up with an attack on the island fort of Dharavi. Portuguese ships pretended to head up the creek towards Thane and doubled back to attack Dharavi on 17 February 1738. They also landed men from the rear and managed to stop the reinforcements coming from Thane. Cardin claimed he had won the fort with barely two hundred soldiers, while four hundred Maratha horse and a thousand foot had to watch the loss from a distance. The losses at Mahim, Asheri, and Dharavi pushed the Marathas onto the backfoot.

Even as they launched a counterattack to recover lost forts, the Portuguese were looking for intermediaries who could bring an amicable end to the war. The arrival of the Nizam in Malwa was the first hope that the Marathas would withdraw from the Konkan. In December 1737, the Viceroy at Goa proposed sending a message to Sawai Jaisingh, who had asked for Portuguese experts for building his astronomical observatories, to broker a peace with Bajirao. However, the disturbed conditions prevented the dispatch of the padre. The Viceroy then sent a gift to Jaisingh through Surat, with a letter. However, nothing came of it.

The Marathas quickly quit their posts at Mandavi, Manor, Kelve, Shirgaon stations and retreated towards Vasai. The Marathas were as if afraid of the Portuguese fire. People began deserting the force daily, and everybody began feeling that their hard work for the whole of past year would go waste. But at this time, finishing off the campaign against the Nizam, Chimaji Appa himself got down into Konkan. On completion of the battle of Bhopal, Chimaji left Khandesh and ordered the replenishment of various items in Konkan. After visiting the Ganesh temple at Ranjangaon on 18 January 1738, he reached the Konkan by the end of that month and began directing the operations. His arrival completely changed the scenario. People got a fresh impetus. The Marathas, with huge courage, began building new fortifications at various places. The Marathas had recruited Arabs and Canarese men in their armies. However, these were found wanting in loyalty as well as performance in battle. They were, therefore, replaced by residents of Konkan and tested Maratha veterans now free from their engagement in Malwa. Instead of a frontal attack, the Marathas once again began to attack the Portuguese territories that sent supplies to Vasai.

De Mello had taken the fort of Dharavi in February 1738. A Maratha attempt to re-take the fort of Dharavi in March 1738 failed. Chimaji wrote to Nanasaheb, “The anguish due to Dharavi is so intense, only God knows how much! But what is to be done? For now, I don’t see a way.”

Cardin on the other hand wrote, “The Marathas have lost twelve thousand men so far. But due to their superior numbers, nobody holds it to account.”

The Marathas could bring thousands of men to the battlefield. The Firangis on the other hand, faced shortages on all fronts. To take a sea-facing fort purely by the use of land forces was difficult and one fraught with the risk of high casualties. In March 1738, Shankaraji Keshav complained to Chimaji, that Manaji was not honouring his permits to trading vessels. These letters show the divide between not just the Angre brothers but also divisions between the Peshwa’s Sardars and Manaji, who was an ally. The intense war between the two powers, and the higher casualties that an attacking force normally sustains, turned this fairly local war into a battle of will and attrition. Chimaji was determined to oust the Portuguese and, despite his own failing health, personally directed the campaign on the ground. The Portuguese General Cardin, despite his apparent success, got hardly any help from Goa. He therefore, resigned from his post in April 1738 and De Mello was appointed in his place.

To be continued…

BATTLE OF MAHIM

In the first year of war, the Portuguese lost most of the island of Sashti, and a few places around Vasai. However, Vasai, the nerve centre of Portuguese power in the Firangan remained in their hands. For the present, Chimaji had to leave this campaign to return to Pune. Another trial of strength with an old adversary loomed large.

Withdrawal of a section of Maratha troops and Chimaji Appa’s departure in July 1737 from the Konkan for the campaign against the Nizam weakened their position in the Firangan. After that, for around one-and-a-half years, Appa could not pay much attention to the Konkan task. There is no doubt, that if the Nizam invasion had not reared up its head in the north, Vasai would have been captured at the beginning of 1738. But Bajirao had to run towards Bhopal along with his trusted lieutenants to face the Nizam. Due to this, the Konkan task had to be postponed.

Sensing an opportunity to recoup, in September 1737, the Portuguese began pouring men and material into the territory from Goa, Daman, and Europe. The reinforcements reached India, and in the next two months, one-and-a-half thousand men, of which five hundred were Portuguese, reached Vasai by sea. They also brought provisions, food, and gunpowder with them. They began their advance against the Marathas.

Antaji Raghunath, Anjurkar etc. many of the local people had kept themselves engaged in some or the other tasks. Since a dispute arose between brothers Sambhaji and Manaji Angre that too worked in hurting the Vasai campaign. In December 1737, Krishnaji Naik wrote to his kinsman, “Sambhaji Angre’s fleet is at sea. It took away some trading vessels of the Siddi and the Portuguese. Firangi vessels coming here would have been challenged if Sambhaji Angre was on friendly terms.”

Still, the siege positions were being maintained, and skirmishes too kept happening once in a while. The Marathas could not succeed at Vasai unless its blockade was complete and supply routes were closed, so they diverted their attack to Daman. Shankaraji Phadke’s brother Mahadaji went north and attacked Mahim. Mahadaji decided to force the issue at Mahim and the Peshwa sent Ramchandra Hari Patwardhan to help him. Another force went towards Shirgaon.

While the Marathas began their attack to win Vasai, the Portuguese planned to recover their losses. The withdrawal of the Marathas was an opportunity for them to do so. The loss of Thane was the beginning of the loss of Sashti, and for the Portuguese recovering the fort at Thane was of paramount importance.

Shankarajipant’s brother Mahadajipant was sitting in a siege at Mahim. Vasai’s intrepid General Pedro de Mello Maestro de Campo, tried extremely hard once to snatch away the Thane fort from Maratha hands. However, seeing the threat to Mahim, they sent three relief parties by sea in December, the last of which were led by General himself. This Portuguese detachment attacked the Marathas on 23 December and broke the siege. This gentleman was courageous, adventurous, and highly experienced, and it was difficult for the Marathas to face his attack and survive. The Maratha batteries were destroyed and Mahadaji Fadke’s ambitious attack failed. Trapped in a forward position with no shelter, he was killed in the attack along with many of his chief Sardars.

Vasudev Joshi and Raghunath Hari wrote the report of this incident to Chimaji as follows, “Ramchandra Hari and Mahadaji Keshav had besieged Mahim. The British, Portuguese and Siddis banded together. In two to three days, they transported a hundred ships full of soldiers into the fortress from the southern side of Kelve. Therefore, Ramchandrapant took around seven to eight hundred men and on 10th attacked the Kelve side. He killed twenty-five to thirty enemy soldiers. They also lost one Raut, one or two horses were wounded. After that, the enemy took the opportunity yesterday, and a force of one-and-a-half to two thousand men attacked the siege positions. They attacked all three siege posts at once. They opened up a barrage of gunfire from the ramparts too. The siege positions and our tents caught fire. Men could not find time to step out of the tents and pick up their weapons. So, Ramchandrapant, Amar Singh etc. ten to fifteen Rauts got up on their horses and killed ten to fifteen enemy soldiers. Ramchandrapant himself killed two of them, and forced the enemy to turn around. At that time, Ramchandrapant was hit in his right hand by a bullet. His sword fell from his hand on to his knee. With this, he turned around and the enemy captured the siege positions. Our men lost the patience and they retreated. Mahadaji Keshav, Dhondopant, Waghoji Khanvilkar, Rajabarao Burudkar, Chitto Shivdeo, Janardan Hari, Ganesh Hari, etc. men were within the siege who could not run away. They fought there and laid down their lives. Around two hundred men died, and up to a hundred were wounded. People have lost heart, and the enemy has gained. Even after this, we tried to allay everyone’s fears, again besieged the fort, and have remained in front of the fort with an intention to teach the enemies a lesson. Do write quickly to all our colleagues like Shankaraji Keshav at Arnala and Bahadurpur, Khandoji Mankar at Dharavi, Dattaji Moreshwar at Asheri, Narayan Joshi at Belapur, Bakhaji Tapkir at Kalyan-Bhiwandi, to ensure they take extra care. Our men have been terrorised at various places. Unless the Swami himself provides them encouragement, they would not feel energised and we won’t be able to take the enemies to their logical destiny. So, the Swami must put a thousand of his tasks aside, realising the necessity here, must send some Rauts for help here, and should encourage people at all stations here. Swami must come to the Nasik province, he should render the region desolate in the Daman province, and he should catch up with the enemy at some place, which will increase our prestige immensely.” Before Vasudev Joshi’s above letter reached, the Portuguese had attacked the siege positions and broken the siege.

To be continued…