BACK STORY – ANWARUDDIN KHAN

At this time the Peshwa and Raghuji were struggling with each other in Bengal. Due to this, Satara forces could not arrive to help Murarrao Ghorpade. In March 1743, the Nizam took control of Arcot, and dispatched a challenge to Murarrao asking him to hand over Tiruchirappalli. His huge army laid siege to the fort. However, well-stocked with provisions that could withstand a long siege, he refused to hand over the city and the fort. The siege dragged on for six months without any impact on the fort. The Nizam realised that the fort could not be taken by force. He, therefore, began negotiations with the embattled Murarrao. The Nizam offered Murarrao two lakh rupees and the fort of Penukonda, not far from his base at the fort of Gutti, if he handed over Tiruchirappalli. With no succour on the way, Murarrao accepted the offer, evacuated the fort on 29 August 1743, and handed it over to the Nizam. The transaction was described by Ananda Ranga Pillai, “By these means Asafjah, who is an astute man, gained his object, but at the same time Murarrao gathered renown.”

This way, the Nizam removed Murarrao and took control of Tiruchirappalli on 29 August 1743. He unfurled the Badshah’s standard there. Meanwhile, the Maratha army went ahead to block him, but there was no battle. At first, the Nizam appointed a trusted aide named Khwaja Abdullah as the Regent to the boy Nawab at Arcot. However, the very next morning Khwaja Abdullah collapsed and died. The Nizam, therefore, summoned an old hand in his service named Anwaruddin Khan to take over the guardianship of the young Nawab. Anwaruddin had joined the Mughal army in the reign of Aurangzeb, and over the years had shown ample evidence of courage and loyalty to the Nizam. As a security for his good behaviour, however, Anwaruddin’s third son Mohammed Ali remained as a hostage at Hyderabad.

Anwaruddin Khan’s ability had been tested more than once in the preceding years. Babuji Naik was keen to obtain a Jagir in the Carnatic and had come with a large army towards Hyderabad, where in the Nizam’s absence, just a small army remained. Babuji sent a letter to Anwaruddin Khan asking him to pay the usual tribute and close the matter. Anwaruddin refused and preferred a war to paying any tribute and with a small army confronted Babuji Naik and defeated him at Andole, some ninety kilometres from Hyderabad.

After Bajirao’s campaign near Shrirangapatnam in 1726, Shahu had not entrusted the Peshwa with an invasion of the south. With Babuji Naik’s defeat, the Peshwa’s involvement in the Carnatic was to begin.

A Persian source, which perhaps belongs to the early days of Nanasaheb’s appointment as the Peshwa, states that Nanasaheb Peshwa began from Pune with a large army and intercepted the Nizam’s army. The records of this campaign are scant in Marathi letters, and it is only Anwaruddin’s biographer Burhan who gives some details of this campaign. The Peshwa’s army completely surrounded the Nizam and forced a siege. Seeing his demoralised army, the Nizam advised a payment of tribute. However, Anwaruddin remained silent. Noticing his silence, Shahanawaz Khan, a minister with the Nizam said to him, “The silence of the Saheb, what does it mean? Pandit Pradhan is no Babuji Naik. The one is not to be compared to the other, the other was a drop, this is the sea.”

The chronicle by Burhan that eulogises Anwaruddin then goes on to describe how he decided to stand forth boldly before the large army. Nanasaheb, dropping the plan of war, came and met the Nizam, who greeted him with “a Khilat, Itr and Paan”, and all the “formalities of conversation and conventions of friendship,” were adhered to. The later rise of Anwaruddin Khan is attributed to this stoic resistance on his part.

Returning from Tiruchirappalli, the Nizam took rest for some months at Arcot. While he was here, the British and the French sent him some gifts to keep him happy. His huge army established their terror everywhere. The disorder that had prevailed in the region, had caused the western trade to stop completely. He appointed his grandson Muzaffar Jung on the administration of the Balaghat ranges in the Carnatic by giving him Jagir at Adoni. By March 1744, the Nizam felt assured enough to leave the Carnatic and returned to Golconda.

The Carnatic would have settled down but for an assassination soon after. The Nizam’s arrangement at Arcot did not last for long. Among the old soldiery were some disgruntled Afghan mercenaries. The occasion chosen for their revolt was the wedding of one of the Nawab’s relatives. As the boy Nawab along with his many relatives arrived at the venue and took their appointed seats, the Pathans with their leader Abdul Khan made a boisterous entry and demanded an immediate payment of their arrears. Anwaruddin Khan had not yet reached the venue. Hirasat Khan, one of the nobles, tried to reason with the Pathans, but they refused to let the young Nawab leave the place.

As tempers rose, a rough soldier grabbed the young Nawab’s robe, which prompted an altercation between the Afghans and the Nawab’s party. Just then, Anwaruddin’s procession was also seen arriving. A young nephew of Hirasat Khan said to Abdul Khan, “You wretch! Is it for you to draw the Nawab’s robe and force him to sit down? Here comes the procession of the Nawab. He will have you beaten like dogs.”

The retort was sufficient for a sudden flaring of tempers. Swords and daggers were drawn. Hirasat Khan along with Abdul Khan and several others were killed. The boy Nawab was stabbed to death. Sixteen of the Pathans were killed in the ensuing melee. Anwaruddin Khan came on the scene and ordered an immediate retribution against the Pathans. He then sorrowfully reported his failure to protect the Nawab to the Nizam. The common people of the city whispered that Anwaruddin and Murtuza Ali had a role in the entire episode. Although the Nizam was highly displeased, he found no person other than Anwaruddin worthy of being appointed as the next Nawab. The Walajahi dynasty of Arcot thus began with Anwaruddin Khan.

To be continued…

BACK-STORY – TIRUCHIRAPPALLI

Savnoor, a town sixty kilometres south of Hubli, was taken over by an Afghan Sardar in Aurangzeb’s time and his descendants had ruled over it since. Originally an officer at Bijapur, he switched allegiance to Aurangzeb when Bijapur was taken over by the Mughals. As is often the norm, there is a story that the founder, Nawab Abdul Rauf Khan, while on a hunt saw a hare chase a dog and struck by the scene decided to establish his capital there. Over the next sixty years, a succession of Nawabs tried to retain their independence. Shahu first sent Bajirao Peshwa against Savnoor in 1726, then it was ceded to Sambhaji II of Kolhapur as his area of influence in 1730. The Nizam had not given up his claims either. Savnoor had to pay Sambhaji II tribute off and on, however, a settled arrangement could not be enforced. Savnoor Nawab’s kingdom was quite expansive, and his control prevailed in the region between the rivers Krishna and Tungabhadra.

Besides Savnoor, many other big and small principalities were continuing almost independently in the Carnatic. They were Mysore, Bednoor, Chitradurga, Harpanahalli, Anagondi, and Rayadurga. Out of these, the Mysore realms were over the southern half of the Carnatic, while the rest were on the northern half of the Carnatic. In them, the Bednoor principality was quite big on the boundaries of the western Ghats. Beneath the Ghats, there was Sondhe principality, which also had some control over the Ghat regions. When the Nizam became independent, the Tanjore principality, and the Gutti principality established by the Ghorpades were two Maratha principalities in the Carnatic. Gutti’s rulers had under their control the forts of Gajendragad and Sondur. Gutti’s Murarrao Ghorpade turned out to be especially valorous. For fifty years, he established a sound influence over various rulers in the Carnatic. In summary, at the time of the Peshwa rule, three different types of rulers were powerful in the Carnatic, Muslims, Marathas and Kannadigas, and they kept engaging in internecine warfare as well.

Arcot Nawab’s kingdom was spread over the Carnatic Balaghat. The Nawab of Arcot, Sadat-ullah Khan of the Nevayat (immigrants from Arabia from the sixth century, literally meaning newcomer) dynasty ruled the territory for nearly three decades. On his death in 1732, his nephew Dost Ali Khan succeeded him, but the Nizam did not approve his accession.

When Dost Ali was managing the administration of the Carnatic, his son-in-law Hussein Dost Khan alias Chanda Saheb, a very clever and scheming gentleman rose to prominence in 1732. He improved his army, increased the revenue collections, and generated experience in state administration. He established friendly relations with the French and arranged for their assistance to be provided in emergency situations. In the same year, Chokkanatha, the Nayak ruler of Tiruchirappalli, died without an heir and Meenakshi, his queen, succeeded him. However, soon a descendant from another branch, named Bangaru Tirumala, disputed the succession and tried to take over the city. Taking this opportunity, Arcot’s Nawab Dost Ali dispatched his son-in-law Chanda Saheb along with the army to extract whatever advantage he could obtain from the dispute. Chanda Saheb played a very big treacherous game to capture Tiruchirappalli. He established relations with the queen there. Pitting the two protagonists at Tiruchirappalli against each other, Chanda Saheb won Meenakshi’s trust and obtained a large sum of money from her for safeguarding her city. Bangaru had to be content with the city of Madurai.

In the next four years, the Hindu kingdoms of Tanjore and Tiruchirappalli became the eye of the storm that ruffled the entire Carnatic. Maratha Sardars like Raghuji Bhosale etc. were fully aware of all this back-story. Thereafter, Chanda Saheb nursed the desire to destroy Hindu kingdoms of Tanjore and Madurai, and increase the prestige of his Islamic religion. The state of Tanjore had been conquered in 1676 by Vyankojiraje (or Ekojiraje) Bhosale, the stepbrother of Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj. After his death, his three sons, Shahaji II, Sarfoji, and Tukoji ruled one after the other, making it a rich and prosperous territory with its fertile well-irrigated lands. When Tukoji died in 1736, his son Shahaji III came to the throne, but was dependent on Sayyed Khan, his military commander, for support.

Sayyed Khan ousted Shahaji III from the throne and enthroned another claimant named Sidhoji. Shahaji III, therefore, began to scout for friends who would get him back to power and his quest took him to Benoit Dumas, the French Governor of Pondicherry. Dumas promised him help, in exchange for the east coast port of Karaikal. In his moment of need, Shahaji III agreed. However, Sayyed Khan once again supported him and brought him back to the throne. Shahaji III then repudiated his agreement with Dumas and refused to hand over Karaikal. Dumas who had friendly relations with Chanda Saheb, turned to him for help. Chanda Saheb then attacked Tanjore and conquered Karaikal for Dumas.

To be continued…

BEGINNING OF CARNATIC POLITICS

The origin of the word Carnatic is explained in various ways. Kannada explorers have stated it to mean the region that has been rendered fertile because of its black soil, or the region that is blessed with fragrant flowers. Whatever the origin, for the analysis of the subject at hand, one can safely assume the general meaning of Carnatic to be the region wherein Kannada language (and other southern languages) is spoken. The region begins to the south of the Krishna River and goes right up to the seas, barring the present-day state of Kerala. Hindustan’s peninsula is bounded on the eastern and western coasts by mountain ranges. The western range is called the Sahyadri or the Western Ghats while the eastern range is called Eastern Ghats. The prevalent terms for high and low-lying areas within these hills were, Balaghat and Paaeenghat respectively. Bala meant high, while Paaeen meant plains. These were prevalent Farsi words used at the time. Accordingly, the words Balaghat and Paaeenghat were used in relation to the hilly regions on the western and eastern coasts.

In the Carnatic region, there are four languages spoken. The region to the north where Telegu is spoken is called Telangana; region to the south, where Tamil is spoken is the Dravid country; the region to the west beneath and beyond the Ghats is known as Malabar. Besides these three regions, the central portion that remains was Carnatic, meaning Belagavi, Dharwad, Bijapur, Hyderabad, and Gulbarga (Kalburgi) districts were part of the Carnatic. In the ancient times, many Hindu kingdoms had ruled this region of the south India. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries these regions had once been under the influence of the Bahmani Sultanates and the Vijayanagar Empire. After the battle of Talikota in 1565, bits and pieces of Vijayanagar still survived in the Hindu kingdoms of Mysore, Tiruchirappalli, Tanjore, Madurai and so on. At that time, whichever officials were appointed at various places to keep armed contingents, they had been maintaining their Watans in a hereditary manner, even after their overlord rulers had been destroyed. These were termed as Palegars. Out of these Palegars some were also called as Desais. The Sultans of Bijapur and Golconda exercised control over these and allowed them to survive on the payment of an annual tribute. Even in Maharashtra, such Desais or Deshmukhs were seen. But since the time Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj’s kingdom had been established, the power of these Deshmukhs began declining within Swarajya. The Marathas often clashed with the Desais and Palegars in the Carnatic. But their complete annihilation was later brought about by Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan. Since Aurangzeb was forcefully opposed by the Marathas in Maharashtra, Muslim power never settled firmly over the Carnatic. These Palegars would keep most of the region in their control, and if any enemy attacked them, they would somehow provide him some kind of tribute etc. for the time being. They would mostly also engage in internecine disputes amongst themselves.

Shahaji and his son Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj first established the Maratha power in the Carnatic. They renovated quite a few old forts and built many new ones. Bijapur Sultan had conferred the Jagir of the Carnatic on Shahaji. It was a part of the Shire principality. Shahaji’s Jagir consisted of the five Parganas of Shire, Hoskote, Kolar, Balapur and Bengaluru.

Once Aurangzeb captured Bijapur and Golconda he appointed various civil and military officials under the office of Subedar at various places, who later grew in strength and began running their own Nawab offices in a hereditary fashion. In the eighteenth century, such five Nawabs were especially powerful in the Carnatic. They were located at Arcot, Shire, Kadpe (Cudappah), Kurnool, and Savnoor. The Mughals had always divided their possessions in the Deccan into six Subas for a long time. These were, Khandesh, Berar, Aurangabad, Bidar, Hyderabad or Golconda and Bijapur. Out of these, the last two Subas were somewhat more expansive. This was because, whatever new region the Mughals captured, they included the new possessions in either Hyderabad or Bijapur Subas, and they named those Hyderabad Carnatic, and Bijapur Carnatic respectively. When Nizam-ul-Mulk charted an independent path here in the Deccan since 1724, the authority of these six Subas of Deccan passed into his hands. He claimed to be the overlord of the Nawabs of the Carnatic, acting on behalf of the Badshah at Delhi. He refused to acknowledge the Maratha right to collect Chauth until 1728, when he was defeated by Bajirao Peshwa. The Nawabs had been paying the tribute to the Marathas since then.

To be continued…

REASON BEHIND BATTLE

Raghuji Bhosale, Aavji Kavde etc. Sardars had been campaigning in Berar and Khandesh. They and Naseer Jung had been engaging in big and small skirmishes for almost a year to a-year-and-half. In the past two years, Raghuji Bhosale had established his control well over Berar and the Central Provinces and had caused the Nizam’s control there to diminish to a large extent. One of the gentlemen wrote to the Peshwa, “We resolved the matter of Devgad, Chanda, etc. principalities, Berar Mahals, Bhoom, Parinda etc. Balaghat Mahals. We served and have written this request to accept this service from our side.”

In the Nizam’s absence, Naseer Jung had found Raghuji Bhosale also taking chunks of his territory. Probably, all this plan must have been devised by Sumant himself. At this time, Anandrao Sumant, arriving from Delhi, brought along messages from the Nizam asking his son to ensure that the Marathas did not gain any advantage in his absence. As early as May 1739, when the victory at Vasai had just been won and Nadir Shah had quit Delhi, a Maratha emissary named Shamji Govind Takle wrote to Purandare, “Naseer Jung arrived at Nanded. He has renewed the Jagirs and expenses amongst all his Sardars (to Sultanji Nimbalkar and Sayyed Jamaluddin Khan and Chandrasen Jadhav). The fort at Ausa is given to Chandrasen. They have all been asked to gather an army. He is also amassing an army. The Sumant has arrived here from Hastinapur (Delhi). Naseer Jung now intends to send him to Maharaj (Shahu) to earn his goodwill and then take help from Raghuji and Fatehsingh Bhosale and then begin a war with the Shrimant. If Shrimant acts according to the agreement and implements the confiscation, it would be good, but, even if he doesn’t, it is fine. Shrimant is at Burhanpur and Aavji Kavde has arrived in Berar. Disturbances are at hand. Let us see to what level it goes. Shrimant should remain alert (12 May 1739).”

This shows, that the Nizam and Naseer Jung had again begun their erstwhile project of engineering a split between Shahu and the Peshwas. Later, Naseer Jung also levelled certain charges against this Maratha emissary and had begun torturing him.

Duff, Kincaid, and Shakawali authors mention, that since Bajirao had still not received the Jagir that had been agreed to be granted to him, he attacked Naseer Jung. The germ of this accusation seems to be in the above explanation. However, the point about the Jagir or the stations was the least important. The previous game that the Nizam had begun playing between the Chhatrapati and the Peshwa, his son too had begun the same even now. Even when there was an agreement that Anandrao Sumant should be removed from the diplomatic office, the Nizam had retained him at his court till now. Not only this, in the treaty that was negotiated after the Bhopal affair, and later during Nadir Shah’s invasion at Delhi, this Sumant was serving the Nizam and was engaging in various activities. Therefore, Bajirao felt like permanently stopping this relief valve type of arrangement, something that was helping the Nizam get relieved of the pressure that was applied by him. After the outcome of the Vasai affair, he prepared to teach this Nizam’s son a lesson. In a way, this was a repetition of the Palkhed incident. It looked like since he did not receive the grant-notifications for the Malwa province from the Nizam, which was why he attacked the Nizam’s realms.

Shahu would always be in a dilemma in such situations. Whenever four other people caused his heart to become suspicious towards Bajirao, such uncertain behaviour was common at his court. In such a situation, Bajirao had always tried to impress his terror over the Nizam, Shahu or anybody else, which is what he adopted this time as well.

In all his campaigns, Bajirao used strategies that were tailored to the situation and the opponent. His ability to discern or create opportunities and his timing an attack at the right moment had served him in good stead. His limitations were known to him and his enemies – the lack of an artillery force and an infantry that did not match up to the best of the age. In later years, he did find some mortars and a few guns to conduct siege operations, but these never became the main strike force of his army. He forced his enemies to submission with a purely mounted force. A group of two or three men carried a spare horse, and the preference was for Turkish horses due to their speed. Flight in the face of a strong enemy was not considered an act of cowardice; it was never the intention of the Maratha troops to give battle in an unfavourable situation. The timing and ground had to be right and the enemy vulnerable before the cavalry charge decimated an unprepared enemy. Siege was a proven method that brought the enemy to his knees without losing one’s men. Bajirao’s long campaigns from Palkhed onwards were geared to tire his enemy and find the right time and place to strike. Bajirao’s success lay in his ability to choose when to fight, where to fight and when not to.

To be continued…

URGENT SUMMONS

At this time, Shahu’s mind was utterly despondent. The Nizam had spread a rumour to the effect, ‘Your Konkanastha Brahmin Peshwa and Senapati Khanderao Dabhade is going to betray you.’

He ensured it reached Shahu’s ears so cleverly, that he wrote the following extraordinary letter to Ambajipant on 12 March. “You tell Bajirao four convincing points and ensure that he chases away our enemies and breaks out of this cycle of betrayal. We don’t understand what you spoke in front of the Swami, and what you are doing currently. Find out what exactly the Senapati and Pradhan are thinking and write them to us. Only then, the Swami will feel some certainty. Constant writing has reached its limit. But it doesn’t seem like there is some action taking place. Still, if you feel you should teach the enemies a lesson and want to break their treachery, the moment you see this letter, you will chase them down and destroy them.”

At Shrirangapatnam, Bajirao and Khanderao received an urgent summons from Shahu,

“A consideration has arisen here. The Pradhan (Peshwa) and the Senapati are ordered to return to the capital. This should be done without delay; it takes time to raise troops for a campaign. You are beholden to our king. Your loyalty has pleased the king. You are ordered to return with your army and to start immediately upon receiving this command.”

Ambajipant was probably returning from the Malwa campaign at this time. After this, after returning from the Carnatic campaign, Bajirao wrote an urgent letter to Ambaji saying, “Come quickly, do not betray me.”

This also shows even Bajirao had become so dismayed. This was the effect of the Nizam’s games. There were two groups acting to free Shahu from his troubles. One was trying to convince the Nizam through diplomatic efforts, while the other was trying to teach him a lesson through military prowess. The leaders of the first were the Pratinidhi and Sumant, while the leaders of the second party were Bajirao and his soldierly assistants. The second group wanted the monsoon season for getting better prepared, but the first party used this monsoon season to engage in the negotiations for a compromise.

The Nizam thought, that the Marathas kept collecting Chauth revenues in his capital Hyderabad. Instead, they should be granted some other income source, or annual cash amount to be given to them from the treasury, which should stop the Marathas entering the Hyderabad province completely, their revenue officials should have no more reason to enter his territory. For this, the Nizam promised some cash amount and some region in the Balaghat to Maharaj through the Pratinidhi, and also awarded the Pratinidhi with some individual Jagir in the Berar province. Due to this plan, Bajirao got very angry since he had lost the instrument with which he could have posed a check on the Nizam. The Nizam had kept the Chauth and Sardeshmukhi revenues in pending, claiming that they had a dispute with Sambhaji II, and he will mediate amongst the two to impart a judgment. Bajirao convinced Shahu of this shrewdness of the Nizam, and with his orders, he embarked on the campaign against him on 27 August.

This finds support in the Shakavali accounts. Dadorao Bhimsen was executing the responsibility to generate the Swarajya revenues from the Bhaganagar province. Maharaj recalled him, took the assessed revenues and compensatory Mahals under his control, agreed the terms of the treaty, and fulfilled the Pratinidhi’s wishes. But later, seeing Sambhaji II’s aggression, Maharaj confirmed the decision to fight with the Nizam. In this affair, the Nizam also polluted Shahu’s mind with the poison of the caste-driven animosity between Deshasth Brahmin Pratinidhi and Konkanasth Brahmin Peshwas. He informed Shahu through his emissary, “Our project is completely beneficial for you. These Konkanasth Brahmins have you completely under their influence. Our only intention is to free you from their control. There is nothing wrong in us removing your revenue officials, and appointing Sambhaji II’s officials in their place. We have appointed Sambhaji II for now, to work on your behalf. Once we resolve the affair of these Konkanasth Brahmins, you can appoint the officials you like.” However, this statement, made by Grant Duff etc. historians do not have confirmed evidence.

But there is no doubt that the Nizam’s conspiracy went really deep. Without letting Shahu get the slightest inkling about the deceit in his mind, he broke away many of his Sardars like the Sarlashkar etc. and convinced them to join him. To accomplish his own objectives, propped-up Sambhaji II through Chandrasen’s conspiracy. Just with this much, Shahu became enlightened about the whole conspiracy, and dumping his craze about peace, he sent orders for battle to all his Sardars.

To be continued…

FIRST THEATRE OF CONFLICT

The Marathas, and mainly the family of Santaji Ghorpade, did not accept the Badshah, mounted a huge struggle, and brought much of the Carnatic under their control. After Aurangzeb’s death, when Shahu got the position of the Chhatrapati, he recognised his brothers at Tanjore and asked Shankaraji Mahadik to operate in those areas. Santaji’s brother Bahirji Hindurao Ghorpade and Bahirji’s son Sidhoji established their own rule all over the Carnatic based on their own strength, but in the Chhatrapati’s name, and made Gutti their central base. All this is described in the published papers from the Sondhe principality. If the dissension between Shahu and Sambhaji II had not come about, this enterprise of the Ghorpades would have got the support of the whole Maratha Confederacy, and not a single Muslim power would have remained in the Carnatic.

But many of the clever Muslim Subedars like Zulfiqar Khan, Daud Khan Panni, and Mubarij Khan etc. arose, who were capable enough to suppress the Ghorpades. Bahadurshah attacked Kaambaksh in year 1708. At that time, he recalled Daud Khan Panni from the Carnatic to Maharashtra for his help. Daud Khan while leaving entrusted the administration of Carnatic to his intelligent official Saadatullah Khan. Saadatullah was a brave, alert, and honest gentleman. He kept the Ghorpades and other rulers under his control and firmed up the Muslim rule in the Carnatic. He selected a convenient place Arcot right in the middle of Balaghat and Painghat and made it his permanent place of stay. This became famous as the capital of the Carnatic Nawabs later in history. Saadatullah died in 1732, and after this the power of the Nawabs declined.

Under Saadatullah’s lordship, many secondary Nawabs were managing the affairs at many places like Cudappah, Kurnool, Shire, Savnoor etc. They became hereditary in their own regions. These Nawabs were present in the battle of Sakharkherda to help Mubarij Khan. The Marathas later came into contact with many such Nawabs. The imperial grant notifications of 1719, gave the Marathas the Chauth rights over Mughal dominions. Bajirao accepted the responsibility of implementing these rights. This original objective of establishing the Hindupadpaadshahi which was born in Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj’s mind, was taken up by Shahu as inheritance. Shahu’s simple desire was that the Nizam and Bajirao should act in unison and take care of the benefit of both parties.

Having met Bajirao three times and seen his intense nature, the Nizam realised that the truce with Shahu would not last. Bajirao was seen as ambitious, not amenable to any control by his king and desirous of founding an Empire. His demands were growing in conjunction with his military abilities. While the Nizam desired to have the Maratha army with him and was prepared to pay for its expenses, he did not want the Nawabs and Rajas of the south to pay any tribute to the Marathas. Here, he found Bajirao blocking his path and aspiring to extend Shahu’s kingdom to the south.

Shahu’s court had seen the first confrontation between Bajirao and Shripatrao Pratinidhi over the ‘north or south’ debate. Shahu had largely separated the two areas of influence thereafter, sending the Pratinidhi with Fatehsingh Bhosale to the campaigns in the Carnatic, and Bajirao to the north. Many Maratha chiefs, once unified under a strong king in Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj’s time, now offered their services where they found better prospects. Outside powers such as the Nizam were always looking for opportunities to drive a wedge in the Confederacy. Many restless Maratha chiefs such as Udaji Chavhan, Chandrasen Jadhav, Raorambha and the sons of Santaji Ghorpade had already joined either Chhatrapati Sambhaji II of Kolhapur or the Nizam. The lack of a strong central authority to ensure cohesive action was driving this. However, with the monarchy itself divided between Satara and Kolhapur, this was a big ask.

In 1725 a seven-point treaty was signed between Shahu and Sambhaji II pledging to support each other in their fight with the Mughals. However, the arrival of the Nizam changed political equations in the Deccan. There was a short period of amity between Bajirao and the Nizam; their interests, however, soon drew them apart. The first theatre of conflict was the south, in the Carnatic.

To be continued…

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CARNATIC

After settling down the affairs at Aurangabad for fifteen days to a month further, Nizam started to go to Hyderabad. He reached there in the month of January 1725. At this time, Golconda was especially important. This strong fort had the most important treasury and equipment. Nizam bribed the officials there profusely and took all of that in his control. From this time, Hyderabad became the Nizam’s capital. One clever foreigner Anwaruddin Khan was a special favourite of the Nizam serving at Delhi. He came to the Deccan at this time for serving the Nizam. Nizam appointed him on the security of Hyderabad. He later rose to fame as the Nawab of Carnatic. One of the effects of the Nizam’s permanence was that, due to constant changes in the officials managing the Deccan affairs, a scene of constant quarrels, rebellions, battles etc. had prevailed all over, which changed hereafter. All the six provinces of Deccan came under the control of one person. Due to which, the administration got a unified discipline. The Marathas too had to decide their future policy considering the Nizam’s ownership. Due to which the Carnatic affairs acquired a special significance. To ensure the Nizam did not get any help from the north, Bajirao was forced to consolidate his foundations in Malwa.

A memorable document of Chimaji Appa is available, which describes the special significance that the Carnatic affairs acquired as mentioned above. This document reached Bajirao eight days after the battle of Sakharkherda. The document suggests Bajirao the points to discuss with the Nizam in their meeting. The list contains many clauses and highlights an important suggestion in relation to the Carnatic campaign. Chimaji suggests that the Nizam should ask Shahu to dispatch Bajirao to accompany himself on the Carnatic campaign with his forces. If at all, the Nizam himself did not go to the Carnatic, and sent Aiwaj Khan; then too, Bajirao should accompany him; and when either of them visited the Carnatic to establish their control, Bajirao accompanying them should try and implement the Maratha Chauth and Sardeshmukhi rights as well. This way, the troubles that arose around Pune would not arise in that province. This seems to be the meaning of the suggestion. Shahu had a decided policy that Bajirao should work in the north, while Fatehsingh Bhosale, the Pratinidhi etc. should work in the south. But if the Nizam himself asked for Bajirao, Shahu would not be able to refuse it. This was the overall plan. This was an effort to ensure the future arrangement that arose from this would be that the Peshwa’s control should prevail all over the kingdom equally and his area of responsibility should not be shared with anybody. According to this same policy, Bajirao went on his Carnatic campaigns in two years, 1725 and 1726, after this. Also, Nizam and Bajirao began operating in a single area hereafter, which was a memorable transformation in history.

It is important for the readers to understand the prevailing internal political situation in the Carnatic at this time. Dodda Krishnaraja Wodeyar was ruling at Shrirangapatnam and his reign lasted from 1714 up to 1731. These Wodeyar kings were erstwhile officials over Mysore province under the Bijapur Sultanate, who had become independent lately. Dodda Krishnaraja’s power was not that extensive. The Carnatic was primarily divided into two portions, Balaghat and Painghat. Bala meant higher, while Pain meant lower or plain. These words have been used in the erstwhile description at many places in Hindustan. The northern and western portions of the erstwhile Mysore princely state were high and mountainous. It was called Balaghat or Table Land. The eastern and southern sloping coastal region in the Madras province was called Painghat. These names were the prevalent nouns applied to north-west-central and south-eastern regions in common local language respectively. All this region belonged to the erstwhile Vijayanagar Empire. Later, some of its portions were captured by the Bijapur and Golconda Sultanates. Further, some of the other portions were regained by Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj and his brother Ekojiraje. When Aurangzeb captured the kingdoms at Bijapur and Golconda, the Badshah’s power was established on these southern regions.

The Marathas, and mainly the family of Santaji Ghorpade, did not accept the Badshah, mounted a huge struggle, and brought much of the Carnatic under their control. After Aurangzeb’s death, when Shahu got the position of the Chhatrapati, he recognised his brothers at Tanjore and asked Shankaraji Mahadik to operate in those areas. Santaji’s brother Bahirji Hindurao Ghorpade and Bahirji’s son Sidhoji established their own rule all over the Carnatic based on their own strength, but in the Chhatrapati’s name, and made Gutti their central base. All this is described in the published papers from the Sondhe principality. If the dissension between Shahu and Sambhaji II had not come about, this enterprise of the Ghorpades would have got the support of the whole Maratha Confederacy, and not a single Muslim power would have remained in the Carnatic.

To be continued…

BAJIRAO’S BACKGROUND

Balaji Vishwanath died suddenly. It doesn’t seem like he was especially ill. Therefore, there were no plans made for the succession by anybody. His death propelled his elder son Bajirao to his place as the Peshwa. Bajirao Ballal as he was called, was born on 18 August 1700 and Chimaji was about six or seven years younger. At the time of his father’s death, he was 19 years of age. Bajirao was born when his father must have been nearing forty years of age, and becoming a parent for the first time at that age was unusual at the time. Besides Bajirao and Chimaji Appa, there were two sisters, Anubai and Bhiubai. The order of Balaji’s four children, Bajirao, Bhiubai, Chimaji and Anubai seems to be with a difference of two-and-a-half to three years between each pair.

When Bajirao, a youth of 19, was appointed by Shahu as the Peshwa in succession to his father, it was not really a case of hereditary succession to offices, which had by then become a fixed practice in the Maratha kingdom. The Chhatrapati does not seem to have spent much time in making his choice. Young Bajirao had given evidence of his precocious ability in his father’s campaigns, and Shahu was a good judge of character, who followed the wise rule of choosing the ablest instruments and allowing them full initiative without himself interfering with their acts. Accompanying his father since childhood, Bajirao was very well versed in the actual situation and political moves. In these first twenty years of the eighteenth century, many of the transformations in Maharashtra’s politics took place with lightning speed. Bajirao had grown up in that kind of situation. After Aurangzeb’s death, the massive turn that Balaji gave to Maharashtra’s politics, just infused itself into Bajirao’s life. Bajirao had completely understood the tactical moves in the affairs of Dhanaji and Chandrasen Jadhav, Kanhoji Angre, Damaji Thorat, Nizam and the Sayyed brothers living with his father and observing his each and every move.

The Duke of Wellington used to say of the world-conqueror Napoleon, “The presence of that man in the battlefield was equivalent to the addition of 50,000 men to his army.”

Similarly, Shahu used to say, “If I were offered the choice between one lakh of troops on the one hand and Bajirao alone on the other, I would prefer Bajirao.”

Bajirao’s entire career justified this choice. The jealous opposition of his rivals in the ministry put a brake on his activity, and the constant intrigues against him by the Satara courtiers, forced him to keep an eye on that court and a trusty agent (usually his brother) there even during his farthest campaigns. But by 1728 his victory was complete and his position had become unassailable, and the shrewd Asafjah Nizam-ul-Mulk was the first to recognise this historic fact, to promptly abandon his policy of double-dealing and to form a secret but cordial entente with Bajirao as the best means of securing the west and south flanks of the Hyderabad State. Henceforth, the Nizam’s ambition sought an outlet in the south and the east (i.e., Karnataka’s Balaghat upland and Painghat plains), while the Peshwa roamed unchallenged over the west and the north.

If Bajirao had not been checked and hindered during 1720-27 and if he had lived for ten years after 1740, would the history of India have taken a different shape from what we see? Why did his work fail? Not so much for the short life as for the limitation of his genius. His work was that of a conqueror not that of a consolidator. He was a matchless cavalry leader, but no statesman, no far-sighted political reformer. The very idea of remodelling the political institutions of the Marathas and setting up schools for training the new type of captains and civil servants required by the altered condition of the Maratha Empire, and the sudden impact of European tactics and arms upon the old conservative Indian world, never entered Bajirao’s head, nor into that of his more happily situated son and successor. Hence, if a longer life had been granted to Bajirao, the foreign subjugation of all India would have been delayed but not prevented. Europe has proved that even east of Suez, “Knowledge is Power”. This is the lesson of Maratha history, in spite of all the splendid opportunities which the Maratha race came to find and the exceptionally capable men that it produced.

To be continued…

DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITIES

Sardeshmukhi was the private Watan-right of the Bhosale family. So, ten percent of the collected revenues were wholly given to the master of the throne. It was decided, that nobody would have a claim upon that part of the revenue. The Maratha kingdom’s revenue was the Swarajya revenue plus the Chauth revenue collections from the Mughal Subas. Out of this total revenue, one-fourth was to be given to the king for ‘Rajbabti’ (imperial expenses). The remaining three-fourths, i.e. seventy-five percent were to be kept separate by the name ‘Mokasa’ for other expenses. Two parts from this Mokasa named, ‘Sahotra’ and ‘Nadgowda’, were kept aside for the king to be dispensed to anybody as per his wishes. Sahotra was six percent of the overall revenue, while Nadgowda was three percent of the same. Of these two finalised items, Shahu granted the ‘Sahotra’ portion of the revenue to the Sachiv official. It was decided that the Sachiv should himself ensure collection of this portion of the revenue from the regions. Shahu would grant the ‘Nadgowda’ item to anybody whom he felt like at different times. Removing nine percent parts of these two items and the initial 25 items pertaining to Rajbabti, amounting together to 34 percent of the total revenue, 66 percent of the total revenue was the remaining Mokasa that was left behind. It was decided, that this portion was to be distributed amongst different Sardars as Jagirs.

Different regions were distributed amongst various Maratha Sardars for such revenue collection campaigns. The king’s chief military contingent used to be under the Peshwa’s and Commander-in-Chief’s control. They had Shahu’s standing orders, to secure the regions by quickly campaigning to wherever needed. Besides, the Peshwa was to roam around in some regions around Khandesh and Balaghat, while the Commander-in-Chief was to collect revenue from the Baglan and Gujarat provinces. Senasahebsuba Kanhoji Bhosale was to live between the Berar-Painghat region and the region to the east of Gondwana, and Sarlashkar was to keep himself engaged in the region on the banks of the Godavari, and around Aurangabad. Fatehsingh Bhosale was to remain around the Carnatic, while the Pratinidhi was to manage the region between the Neera and Warana rivers, and towards Hyderabad and Bidar. Chitnis and Angre were to work in Konkan, and Pantsachiv would manage his own previous Jagir in addition to collection of ‘Sahotra’ from elsewhere. This was the general distribution of responsibilities that Shahu put in place amongst his chief Sardars. At this time itself, there was a strict instruction to everybody, that nobody should act in someone else’s province. The main objective of these campaigns was collection of the Chauth revenues from all the provinces. Of course, it had been decided that every Sardar would present the accounts of their own campaigns in front of the government. Even though, the revenues of the individual Jagirs had to be generated by everyone individually, since most of the Sardars were given the responsibilities pertaining to Rajbabti, Nadgowda, Sahotra etc. in each other’s provinces, their practices did not become disjoint. They had to maintain their own forces for their activities. They would engage in campaigns, would collect the taxes and bring them back, only then they would be able to sustain the expenses of their household and forces. This meant, they sometimes had to spend first, and then the income would arrive later. The remaining 66 percent income which had been awarded to the Jagirdars, would not get deposited in the government treasury, but would have to be collected by the Sardars, and they had to take care of their own expenses from it. However, they had to send the Sardeshmukhi income to the king. Shahu appointed Nayab or Ajahat Sardeshmukhs (representative working on his behalf) at various places to collect that income. But, one single fixed arrangement for the revenue collection did not take shape for permanence. Persons and situations went on changing, based on which, various Peshwas and stewards decided different arrangements as per the situation of the time, and ensured sustainability. Since confirmed information, that such-and-such change was implemented for such-and-such reason, is not available today; due to which, we can only get a high-level summary information about the arrangement. For example, there were agreements in place with many of the Sardars that one fixed amount would be deposited on their behalf in the government treasury.

To be continued…

TREATY FOR MAHARASHTRA

The British emissaries further drew up thirty clauses for Mumbai, and in them they tried to resolve all the older disputes. Those clauses were as follows:

“Sambhajiraje Chhatrapati. Coronation Era year 10 (up until 15 May 1684). Mumbai’s governor (Captain Richard Kejwin) sent Captain Henry Garry, Thomas Wilkins as emissary and Ram Shenvi as interpreter. Accordingly, considering their request, the following clauses have been accepted for Mumbai. They are –

  1. Whatever trouble has been caused due to Sambhajiraje’s people to the British, or whatever disputes Sambhajiraje has with them, they are hereby advised to forget it, not to bring it into any further discussions, and not to hold any grudges for the same. Sambhajiraje will also do the same. After this treaty is agreed, if any untoward incident takes place, they should ignore it, and maintain friendly conversations with each other. This point has been agreed.
  2. British and their trading partners should be provided access to Sambhajiraje’s kingdom and his harbours. Whatever goods they want to import and export, should be done paying the fixed customs duties. The customs officials should not trouble them otherwise. Similar facility would be extended to Sambhajiraje’s traders and subjects in the British harbours. Clause accepted.
  3. If there is any theft of the British goods or those of their trading partners in Sambhajiraje’s kingdom, then upon presenting the thieves in front of Maratha Subedar or Havildar, due justice would be imparted, and due compensation will be provided from the thieves. Similar arrangement will be followed by the British with regards to Sambhajiraje’s subjects.
  4. If any of the British vessels, ships or boats have embarked on trading journeys, and must take refuge at any of Sambhajiraje’s harbours due to inclement weather conditions, they should be granted permission to leave upon attainment of favourable weather conditions without any trouble or without paying the customs duties. But if any vessel, has been marooned on land on account of any cyclone etc. and has been captured by Sambhajiraje’s Subedars, they should provide as much help as possible, and collect whatever customs chargeable on the goods being imported from it. Sambhajiraje will follow the custom implemented at the time of his father, and the facilities granted to other Christian traders will be extended in his harbours as well. Clause accepted.
  5. Whatever treaty between Sambhajiraje and the British has been agreed here, if someone raises a point of contention, it should be resolved amicably through mutual discussion. There should not be any hurdle raised for this treaty. Accepted by both.
  6. Sambhajiraje is constantly engaged in war with the Mughals. In that, if Sambhajiraje’s people, while carrying on plunder in the Mughal realms, loot British factories too, and carry away their goods, all such goods should be returned by Subedars or Havildars. Similarly, if at any time, if the people serving in Sambhajiraje’s factories, or the Arhtiyas (agents) are captured, they should be released without trouble.
  7. Sambhajiraje has many vessels on high seas like the Mughals. If Sambhajiraje’s people capture any of the Mughal vessels, and if it is carrying any British goods, marked appropriately, and these markings are proven to be theirs, then those goods should be returned. If the vessels, boats etc. captured by the British, contain goods belonging to Sambhajiraje’s subjects, they should return such goods back to their owners. Accepted by both.
  8. Whichever goods the British import, they would pay two-and-a-half percent customs duty; there would not be any duties charged on exports, and there would not be any further trouble.
  9. As per British request, the customs duty that erstwhile Adilshahi Sultanate imposed on their goods that are transported from Rajapur to Balaghat, should continue. But the customs duty prevalent currently will be charged.
  10. The British and their trading partners should be free to buy any goods they want in Sambhajiraje’s kingdom or harbours, from his residents or traders at a judicious price. Subedar or other officials should charge the standard customs duty. There should be no other blockade through any past grudges or any other reasons.
  11. Hostilities prevail among the Portuguese, the Dutch and the British. Sambhajiraje will not help the British or any others in their struggle with each other. The treaty agreed between Sambhajiraje and the British should be followed by both without exceptions.
  12. If any trader or resident of Sambhajiraje’s kingdom owes some goods or trading articles to the British or their trading partners, and they are not being delivered; such people upon presenting in front of the Maratha Subedar or official, upon confirmation that they indeed owe the goods to the British, without looking at their social position or office, they would be forced to deliver the debt. The British should also follow this clause with regards to Sambhajiraje’s subjects.
  13. If a British person or their official commits a crime and seeks refuge in Sambhajiraje’s realms, upon the British judicial officials demanding their custody with his officials, his officials would ensure that they are captured and hand them over to the British judicial authorities. Similar clause should be followed by the British with regards to Sambhajiraje’s criminals.
  14. If any of Sambhajiraje’s subjects forcefully enters the British factory, and engages in fighting, the punishment for their crime will be the responsibility of his Subedars. If a British person is found to be guilty, the Subedar will have the right to put him in chains and inform Mumbai. They will be punished or released based on the response received from Mumbai.
  15. Since there is a paucity of firewood on the Mumbai Island, the British should have permission to buy it from Sambhajiraje’s realms and transport it without customs duty. Whatever was prevalent before will continue. The customs duty was charged before. It will be similarly continued.
  16. The British had a factory at Rajapur. At that time, they had sold some goods to the local traders there. The British owe these traders the payment. The Subedar and Havildar associated should help investigate the matter, and facilitate judicious payment is done.
  17. British are free to open factories at Nagothane and Pen; but they will have to pay customs duty on all the goods imported-exported via this route, similar to the way they paid at Rajapur. They won’t be subject to any other nuisance.
  18. The British will not be allowed to buy any person in Sambhajiraje’s kingdom to make them a slave or to convert them to Christianity.
  19. There were some goods bought from the British at Khudawandpur and other locations. In lieu of that, Sambhajiraje’s father Shivajiraje had agreed to pay ten thousand imperial hons. The expenses to build the Rajapur factory so far, any other expenses that will be incurred further on it, whatever has been paid so far, needs to be summed up, and deducted from the total. That much amount will be paid by Sambhajiraje to the British in the form of coconut and betel-nuts.
  20. The British are free to open their factories wherever they please. They should be granted around 60 covid (an old unit of measurement equalling 18 inches) long and 15 covid broad land for building their factory. The factory will be two-and-a-half covid high and the walls will be half a covid thick, not more than that. If they want any further space, they should build one more warehouse of the same dimensions. If that is also found insufficient, then they should build shops like those built in markets. However, the permission to build such factories will be granted only to those British persons who have been given an authority by Captain Richard Kejwin. It should not be granted to anyone else.
  21. Whichever traders, dyers, weavers come bearing goods for trading with the British, and holding British goods, should not be troubled by Maratha Havildars or Subedars. Instead, they should be provided as much help as possible.
  22. The British must bring gold and silver only for minting coins, not to be used elsewhere. The usual interest that is chargeable for such gold and silver must be paid.
  23. While conveying the goods, to take care of them, the British are allowed to hire labourers or other people in their employ. Such people should only be as many as are sufficient to take care of the trading goods, and then the Subedars or other officials would not block their access; but if they are more than what is necessary, they would not be given permission.
  24. As per the British request, whichever Maratha Subedars in Sambhajiraje’s kingdom needs any goods, would be supplied to them; but except for the king’s own, or senior officials’ request, any other such transactions should be left to the British discretion regarding the supply. If the senior ministers have provided a letter, then the British must provide the goods; but without that, it will be left to British discretion whether to supply such goods or not.
  25. As per British request, Subedars should not send their emissaries to Mumbai. Sambhajiraje confirms that nobody will send any emissaries except him. If it is a larger and important question, Sambhajiraje will send the emissary himself; but at other times for common things, Subedars will send letters with a messenger, and demand replies.
  26. As per the British request, if the other Christian traders are provided any other facilities apart from the ones mentioned above, then they should also be granted such facilities. All such facilities will be given to the British as well.
  27. As confirmed by the British, they have antagonised the Siddis. In such a situation, if they need Sambhajiraje’s help, he will provide it.
  28. As requested by the British, the customs duty should be charged only at a place where they buy goods. Thereafter, while transporting them, there should be no further blockade. But whatever has been traditionally charged from Sambhajiraje’s father’s times, will continue. That has been the prevalent practice.
  29. As per British request, they should not be charged a head-tax for their servants. If such a practice exists for other Christians, then the British will also be given such benefit.
  30. As requested by the British, their messengers should be provided complete access to and from. They should be allowed to pass their letters without any blockade. Whichever letters bear the authentic British seal and are being carried by such messengers, only those, after checking the seals, will not be held up. Marathas will not raise any disputes with respect to the above clauses agreed and follow them.”

As per the above treaty, following Sambhajiraje’s desire, the British no longer provided any shelter or provisions to the Siddis. Naturally, the trouble mounted by the Siddis in the Maratha realms quieted down until Sambhajiraje’s death.

Ramchandrapant Amatya writes, “The regions in the Jagir of Shyamal (dark-skinned) were all captured completely except for the Janjira fort. By applying pressure on them from the Tambras’ (copper-skinned, Mughals) side a big reverse was avoided.”

To be continued…