Raghuji Bhosale, Aavji Kavde etc. Sardars had been campaigning in Berar and Khandesh. They and Naseer Jung had been engaging in big and small skirmishes for almost a year to a-year-and-half. In the past two years, Raghuji Bhosale had established his control well over Berar and the Central Provinces and had caused the Nizam’s control there to diminish to a large extent. One of the gentlemen wrote to the Peshwa, “We resolved the matter of Devgad, Chanda, etc. principalities, Berar Mahals, Bhoom, Parinda etc. Balaghat Mahals. We served and have written this request to accept this service from our side.”
In the Nizam’s absence, Naseer Jung had found Raghuji Bhosale also taking chunks of his territory. Probably, all this plan must have been devised by Sumant himself. At this time, Anandrao Sumant, arriving from Delhi, brought along messages from the Nizam asking his son to ensure that the Marathas did not gain any advantage in his absence. As early as May 1739, when the victory at Vasai had just been won and Nadir Shah had quit Delhi, a Maratha emissary named Shamji Govind Takle wrote to Purandare, “Naseer Jung arrived at Nanded. He has renewed the Jagirs and expenses amongst all his Sardars (to Sultanji Nimbalkar and Sayyed Jamaluddin Khan and Chandrasen Jadhav). The fort at Ausa is given to Chandrasen. They have all been asked to gather an army. He is also amassing an army. The Sumant has arrived here from Hastinapur (Delhi). Naseer Jung now intends to send him to Maharaj (Shahu) to earn his goodwill and then take help from Raghuji and Fatehsingh Bhosale and then begin a war with the Shrimant. If Shrimant acts according to the agreement and implements the confiscation, it would be good, but, even if he doesn’t, it is fine. Shrimant is at Burhanpur and Aavji Kavde has arrived in Berar. Disturbances are at hand. Let us see to what level it goes. Shrimant should remain alert (12 May 1739).”
This shows, that the Nizam and Naseer Jung had again begun their erstwhile project of engineering a split between Shahu and the Peshwas. Later, Naseer Jung also levelled certain charges against this Maratha emissary and had begun torturing him.
Duff, Kincaid, and Shakawali authors mention, that since Bajirao had still not received the Jagir that had been agreed to be granted to him, he attacked Naseer Jung. The germ of this accusation seems to be in the above explanation. However, the point about the Jagir or the stations was the least important. The previous game that the Nizam had begun playing between the Chhatrapati and the Peshwa, his son too had begun the same even now. Even when there was an agreement that Anandrao Sumant should be removed from the diplomatic office, the Nizam had retained him at his court till now. Not only this, in the treaty that was negotiated after the Bhopal affair, and later during Nadir Shah’s invasion at Delhi, this Sumant was serving the Nizam and was engaging in various activities. Therefore, Bajirao felt like permanently stopping this relief valve type of arrangement, something that was helping the Nizam get relieved of the pressure that was applied by him. After the outcome of the Vasai affair, he prepared to teach this Nizam’s son a lesson. In a way, this was a repetition of the Palkhed incident. It looked like since he did not receive the grant-notifications for the Malwa province from the Nizam, which was why he attacked the Nizam’s realms.
Shahu would always be in a dilemma in such situations. Whenever four other people caused his heart to become suspicious towards Bajirao, such uncertain behaviour was common at his court. In such a situation, Bajirao had always tried to impress his terror over the Nizam, Shahu or anybody else, which is what he adopted this time as well.
In all his campaigns, Bajirao used strategies that were tailored to the situation and the opponent. His ability to discern or create opportunities and his timing an attack at the right moment had served him in good stead. His limitations were known to him and his enemies – the lack of an artillery force and an infantry that did not match up to the best of the age. In later years, he did find some mortars and a few guns to conduct siege operations, but these never became the main strike force of his army. He forced his enemies to submission with a purely mounted force. A group of two or three men carried a spare horse, and the preference was for Turkish horses due to their speed. Flight in the face of a strong enemy was not considered an act of cowardice; it was never the intention of the Maratha troops to give battle in an unfavourable situation. The timing and ground had to be right and the enemy vulnerable before the cavalry charge decimated an unprepared enemy. Siege was a proven method that brought the enemy to his knees without losing one’s men. Bajirao’s long campaigns from Palkhed onwards were geared to tire his enemy and find the right time and place to strike. Bajirao’s success lay in his ability to choose when to fight, where to fight and when not to.
To be continued…
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